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Preface
Change comes with opportunities but also risks for the people or organizations
affected. Due to this complexity, many people seek to influence the direction of
change they are subject to. However, since their future is influenced by various
factors and is hence inherently uncertain, it is often not clear which options are
most promising. In this dissertation, I study change in three different settings,
namely in a market environment, at the workplace and within communities.
Making use of the economist’s toolbox, theoretical models and experiments en-
able the identification of cause and effect of actions while change takes place.
In Chapter 1, I study formerly large and successful firms whose failure can
be linked to the emergence of a new market. This new market uses the same
technology as the old market. It is therefore puzzling why firms who were proven
industry leaders failed in markets that require the same technological skills.
Chapter 2 analyzes the impact of disadvantageous and preferential treatment
in the workplace. To this end, we conduct a sequence of experiments in which
participants are paid to solve tasks. In these experiments, we compare the effects
of (dis)advantageous treatment in terms of wage and workload on performance
and use facial expression analysis software to link people’s facial expressions with
future performance. Finally, Chapter 3 studies to what extent people condition
the extend to which they show solidarity on other people’s level of risk taking.
New Markets and the Failure of Old Firms
The paper “New Markets and the Failure of Old Firms” takes the literature on
industry evolution(see e.g. Gort & Klepper, 1982; Jovanovic, 1982; Jovanovic &
MacDonald, 1994; Klepper, 1996, 2002) as point of departure. This literature
can successfully explain many stylized facts of markets’ evolution. However,
these models are not readily reconcilable with the observation that industry
leaders that entered their industries early on and were very innovative suddenly
go extinct when new markets emerge that use the same technology. To solve this
puzzle, I extend one class of models of industry evolution by explicitly allowing
xi
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for the arrival of a second market. I show that the failure of successful and
innovative firms from the old market is based on two potential explanations: 1)
The goods sold in the old and new market could be such close substitutes that
firms from the old market opt not to enter the new market of fear for canni-
balizing their original product, 2) The firms are characterized by organizational
diseconomies of scope, i.e. a cost disadvantage of being active in both markets.
To gain a better understanding of the importance of the two effects, I con-
duct three case studies of former industry leaders that failed upon the arrival
of new markets in which they had a technological advantage. Those are Digital
Equipment Corporation, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer and Kodak. All three firms dif-
fer substantially but all three firms struggled due to organizational diseconomies
of scope and not due to substitution effects. Although I discuss several poten-
tial reasons for organizational diseconomies of scope, I also identify the need for
further research in this regard. The following project was inspired by the lack
of understanding of organizational diseconomies of scope in change processes.
Emotions and Effort
“Emotions and Effort”, a joint project with Steffen Huck, asks a question that
has received attention from economists and psychologists alike (see e.g. Akerlof
& Yellen, 1990; Spector, 1978): How do work conditions affect workers’ behav-
ior? In a controlled laboratory setting, we conduct a sequence of experiments in
which we investigate how social comparison impacts workers’ productivity in the
context of reallocating wages or workload. Social comparison is especially inter-
esting in our setting, as all experiments are characterized by the fact that high
skilled participants face a disadvantageous treatment whereas worse performing
participants receive preferential treatment. By studying both changes in wage
and changes in workload, we are able to determine whether one is preferable to
the other in terms of efficiency.
In addition, we employ facial expression analysis software. This way we are
able to link the facial expression of emotion triggered by the announcement of
change to future productivity. In doing so, we study one important aspect of
change: How could negative responses to change be foreseen? What is more, a
questionnaire at the end of the experiment provides us with additional informa-
tion on participants’ dealing with emotion.
The participants in our experiments react with reduced effort to being in-
formed that worse performing participants are exempt from an increase in work-
load at constant wage. At the same time, they do not react negatively in terms
of emotion. In contrast, low skill participants that are informed of their prefer-
ential treatment show more anger in response to this information. In addition,
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this increased anger is associated with increased productivity. These results,
however, are not robust with regard to variations in the treatment, i.e. no
treatment effect in terms of productivity can be found if less skilled partici-
pants receive easier tasks or the unequal treatment is based on a difference in
wages. This is despite the fact that questionnaire measures of anger as well as
comments in open questions at the end of the experiment and anecdotal evi-
dence from the laboratory indicate that disadvantaged high skill participants
got angry in response to the treatment.
Solidarity, Responsibility and In-Group Bias
In “Solidarity, Responsibility and In-Group Bias”, Friedel Bolle and I investigate
two conflicting motives in showing solidarity. On the one hand, it has been
shown that people are held responsible for their actions (see e.g. Cappelen,
Sørensen, & Tungodden, 2010). On the other hand, people often engage in
in-group/out-group discrimination (see e.g. Tajfel, 1970).
We conduct an experiment to study the relative importance of these two
factors in showing solidarity. Participants chose between two lotteries A and B.
Lottery A has a lower probability of paying nothing than lottery B. However,
lottery B pays a larger prize in case of a win. Before subjects chose a lottery
they know that a phase of voluntary redistribution in groups of three follows
the lottery choice. Due to this redistribution, the winners of a lottery can show
solidarity towards the losers. Crucially, winners of a prize can make transfers
conditional on the lottery choice of the losers. While holding people responsible
for their lottery choice suggests that losers who chose lottery B and therefore
did not avoid risk receive less solidarity, in-group favoritism predicts that the
same participants are only discriminated against by winners of the less risky
lottery A.
Indeed, in our experiment we find in-group bias. People who win a prize
in the less risky lottery show less solidarity towards losers who chose the more
risky lottery. This result is in line with both holding people responsible for their
actions and in-group bias. However, winners of lottery B show more solidarity
towards loser who also chose lottery B than towards loser who chose the less
risky lottery A.
Further, we extend the fairness theory of Cappelen, Konow, Sørensen, and
Tungodden (2013) and show that differences in the acceptance of risk are as-
sociated with different views on fairness. While many participants from both
groups can be thought of as being supportive to their own kind, a quarter of par-
ticipants who avoided risk conform with behavior that aims at equalizing payoff
unconditionally. In contrast, the share of more risk accepting participants that
xiv Preface
aim at equalizing payoff for all is zero.
Chapter 1
New Markets and the
Failure of Old Firms∗
1.1 Introduction
Market conditions are not constant but subject to change. In particular, newly
arising markets that emerge due to new inventions are subject to change. Over
time, more firms enter the market, production increases and prices fall (see e.g.
Gort and Klepper (1982)). This evolution of markets has been modeled and
empirically analyzed by Jovanovic (1982); Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994);
Agarwal and Gort (1996) and Klepper (2002) amongst others (for an overview
see Malerba, 2007).
One additional aspect of some markets’ development is a decrease of the
number of active firms after an initial increase; a pattern called shake out.
Based on the above mentioned existing models, different firm characteristics
can be identified, which make it less likely for firms to be part of the shake
out. Among these are entering a market early on and being highly innovative
(Klepper, 2002; Jovanovic & MacDonald, 1994) or efficient (Jovanovic, 1982).
However, while the literature on the evolution of markets can successfully
explain the stylized facts of many markets’ developments there are prominent
counter examples of firms that have been technologically superior industry lead-
ers for decades but failed nevertheless. These failures can be linked to the arrival
of new markets but they occurred despite the fact that these emerging markets
used the same technology as the old market. What is more, according to the
predictions of the above cited models large and innovative firms should actually
∗Over the course of the research for this paper, I received important feedback from many
people. In particular, I would like to thank Roland Strausz, Steffen Huck, Volker Nocke, Jana
Friedrichsen, Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch and Pio Baake for their comments.
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have an advantage in these emerging markets.
In this paper, I attempt to resolve the puzzle of failing old and formerly large
and successful firms. I show that their failure can be understood in light of an
extended model of industry evolution. I complement the theoretical analysis
with three case studies of failed former industry leaders.
In particular, I extend the Klepper (2002) model by explicitly including the
emergence of a second market. Based on the extended framework two potential
causes for failure connected to the emergence of a second market can be iden-
tified: a cannibalization effect and organizational diseconomies scope. The first
is based on strategic considerations according to which a firm might have lower
incentives to supply a good that is a substitute to another of its products while
this effect is absent in firms that are active in only one of the markets. The
second potential cause lies in organizational diseconomies of scope that make
it more expensive to grow in one market if the firm is also active in another
market. While the first effect seems to be well understood by economists, the
second might be less familiar. To gain a better understanding of the potential
role and relative strength of these two effects, the case studies describe the rise
and fall of Kodak, Digital Equipment Corporation and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer.
All firms share the characteristic that they entered their original market early
on and were successful innovators which made them large and highly profitable
firms for decades. However, they also share a rapid downturn of their business
and finally failure. These failures are connected to the arrival of new markets
such as digital photography, the IBM compatible PC and TV. Yet, all three
firms had a technological advantage in these markets. Kodak for example in-
vented digital photography. Based on the above models of industry evolution,
it is a puzzle why these firms failed upon the arrival of markets where they had
a technological advantage over new firms. Interestingly, the three cases point at
organizational diseconomies of scope as a prime reason for their failure. These
seem to outweigh the technological superiority of the experienced firms.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, I introduce the model of
industry evolution and the emergence of a second markets. Section 1.3 includes
the case studies on the rise and fall of Digital Equipment Corp., Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer and Kodak, Section 1.4 discusses other theories of industry evolution
and potential causes for organizational diseconomies of scope and Section 1.5
concludes.
1.2 Model
In this section, a model of a market’s evolution will be presented. Based on the
model, predictions concerning the development of market price and the number
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of firms active in the market can be derived. In particular, it will be shown
that old firms with highly effective R&D are least likely to leave the market.
In a second step, the emergence of a second, related market is analyzed and
it is shown how those firms’ advantage in the first market can translate into a
disadvantage in the new market.
1.2.1 A market’s evolution
The market to be analyzed is born in t = 1 and inhabited by firms and consumers
who take actions in discrete time. Each period consists of four stages. In stage
1, K potential entrants are presented the opportunity to enter the market. In
stage 2, incumbent firms decide whether to exit the market or stay active and
potential entrants decide on whether to enter or not. Next, firms chose their
level of R&D investment and in stage 4 firms set quantities (see Figure 1.1).
All firms are assumed to supply a homogeneous product to consumers that
are characterized by inverse demand function P (Qt) that is decreasing and con-
cave in the aggregate quantity produced by all firms, Qt. R&D is modeled as
process innovation in the sense that it is cost reducing. In particular, a firm’s
production cost consists of a common cost component ct that is reduced by
αig(rit), the fruit of cost reducing R&D. Here, g(rit) is the production function
of R&D, which is increasing and concave in the investment in R&D, rit, and
generates costs of rit. g(rit) is augmented by factor αi which captures different
levels in skill of conducting R&D, i.e. αi > αj > 0 for a firm i of type θi = H,
the highly innovative type, and a firm j of less innovative type θj = L. Among
the K potential entrants, a share s > 0.5 is of the less innovative type. Follow-
ing Klepper (2002), innovation is assumed to be imitated at no cost with a one
period lag. Therefore, the common cost component ct is given by
ct = ct−1 −max
i
{αig(rit−1)}
with c1 > 0 and such that both types of firms can profitably enter in t = 1
2. In
addition, firms face a cost m(∆Qit;Qit−1) that depends on the time difference
in output ∆Qit = Qit − Qit−1 and reflects costs of adaptation and scarcity
of resources when a firm expands. m(·) is increasing and convex in ∆Qit for
∆Qit > 0 and zero otherwise. Also, m(·) as well as ∂m(·)/∂Qit is decreasing
in Qit−1. Based on the above, firms chose quantity Qit, investment in R&D rit
and their entry/exit decision so as to maximize current period profit Πit given
by
Πit = [P (Qt)− ct + αig(rit)]Qit − rit −m(∆Qit;Qit−1) (1.1)
2The market dies at T with T such that
∑T
t=1 αig(rit) = c1 for a high type firm i that
entered the market in t = 1.












Figure 1.1: Structure of the game in period t.
In the last stage of each period, when incumbents and potential entrants set
quantities, their profit maximizing level, Qit, solves the first order condition of
Equation 1.1 with respect to Qit, given by
P (Qt) + P
′(Qt)Qit − ct + αig(rit) = m′(∆Qit;Qit−1)
if this quantity is positive. Otherwise the quantity is set at zero. As the profit
function of every firm i is strictly concave in Qit a Nash equilibrium of this
Cournot game exists and is unique. Taking the derivative of Equation 1.1 with
respect to rit gives the first order condition
αig
′(rit)Qit = 1
which is solved by the incumbents’ and potential entrants’ optimal rit for Qit >
03. Otherwise, rit = 0.
Lastly, incumbents for which Πit > 0 stay in the market and exit otherwise
and potential entrants for which Πit > 0 enter and all others abstain.
Based on the first order conditions of profit maximization it can be seen that
each firm’s quantity Qit is increasing in its effectiveness of R&D, αi, increasing
in the margin of price over the common cost component ct and increasing in
Qit−1. In addition, the investment in cost reducing R&D is increasing in α as
well as in the quantity to which it applies, Qit.
In this setup, two factors contribute to firm heterogeneity. First, high type
firms have larger price-cost margins and therefore bring larger quantities to the
market than low type firms. Second, due to the cost of growth, the time of
entry matters. In particular, later entrants have a disadvantage over earlier
entrants of the same type they cannot make up for because they will bring
smaller quantities to the market which also translates into lower investment
in R&D and therefore lower margins. This is despite the fact that R&D can
costlessly be imitated with a one period lag.
R&D spillovers contribute to an industry-wide cost reduction in each period.
As a consequence, the market exhibits an increasing aggregate quantity over
3Here, investment in R&D is conducted with the aim of cost reduction only and not for
strategic purposes. In this sense, it is rather a Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) world than one
of Brander and Spencer (1983).
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time and a falling market price. It is important to note, though, that this
development occurs although some firms might reduce their quantities from one
period to the next. A pattern that occurs if the market price drops sufficiently
so as to make it prohibitively expensive for a firm to incur a cost of quantity
growth.
Lemma 1. Aggregate quantity Qt is strictly increasing in t and the price P (Qt)
is strictly decreasing over time.
Proof. Suppose firm i reduces its quantity supplied in period t such that it offsets
the quantity increase by all other firms, i.e. Qit = Qit−1. As a consequence, it
will choose Qit such that
P (Qt) + P
′(Qt)Qit > ct − αig(rit) +m′(∆Qit;Qit−1).
A contradiction. This is due to the fact that in comparison with period t − 1
where
P (Qt−1) + P
′(Qt−1)Qit−1 = ct−1 − αig(rit−1) +m′(∆Qit−1;Qit−2)





and Qit < Qit−1, m
′(∆Qit;Qit−1) ≤ m′(∆Qit−1;Qit−2) and, crucially, ct −
αig(rit) < ct−1 − αig(rit−1) as ct < ct−1 and αig(rit) < αig(rit−1).
As inverse demand is strictly decreasing and time constant and aggregate
quantity strictly increasing over time, the price P (Qt) is strictly decreasing over
time.
Over time, the downward trend in prices can lead to a situation in which
it becomes unprofitable for additional firms to enter the market. In particular,
entry is not profitable for entrant i if for Qit > 0
P (Qt) + P
′(Qt)Qit − ct + αig(rit) < m′(∆Qit; 0)
This is to say that a pair Qit, rit larger than zero is too expensive to achieve.
As high type firms have a larger effectiveness of cost reducing R&D it follows
that high type firms will not stop entering the market before low type firms do.
Similarly, a firm that has been active in the market exits if the market
price P (Qt) falls below the common cost component ct and it is prohibitively
expensive for that firm to generate a large enough cost reduction through R&D
so as to arrive at positive price-cost margins. This is exactly the condition
under which the market will experience a reduction in the number of firms: a
shakeout.
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Proposition 1. A shakeout occurs if and only if for some firm i in period t
P (Qt)− ct < m′(∆Qit;Qit−1)− αig(rit)− P ′(Qt)Qit (1.2)
for all Qit > 0
Proof. Note that the exit of one firm is equivalent to a reduction in the total
number of firms in the market. To see this consider the two cases 1) a low type
firm exits and 2) a high type firm exits the market. For 1), if a low type firm
leaves the market it cannot be that other low type firms still enter the market
as Qit is increasing in Qit−1. In contrast, entry by high type firms could still
occur. Nevertheless, as all firms of the same type that entered in the same
period are identical and therefore also leave the market in the same period and
the number of potential entrants is constant over time and the share of low type
firms among potential entrants is larger than 1/2, the exit of a cohort of low
type firms will, in numbers, outweigh any potential entry by high type firms.
For 2), in case high type firms exit, there cannot be entry anymore. Therefore,
exit by high type firms directly translates into a reduction of the total number
of firms in the market.
if: The above condition states that for firm i in period t marginal revenue
is smaller than marginal cost of production for all Qit > 0. i’s best response
to the output of all other firms, Q−it is therefore to set Qit = 0 and exit the
market.
only if: Firm i will only leave the market in period t if Πit ≤ 0. As there are
no fixed costs involved and Πit is concave, this is equivalent to the first order
condition with regard to Qit being negative for all Qit > 0, i.e.
P (Qt) + P
′(Qt)Qit − ct + αig(rit)−m′(∆Qit;Qit−1) < 0
It follows that a necessary condition for a shakeout is given by the market
price in period t falling below the average cost of production of the most efficient
firm in period t − 1. As there is exit only if P (Qt) − ct < 0 and ct = ct−1 −
maxi{αig(rit−1)} it follows that P (Qt) < ct−1 −maxi{αig(rit−1)} is necessary
for exit.
Corollary 1. A shakeout occurs only if the market price in period t falls below
the average cost of production of the most efficient firm in period t− 1, i.e.
P (Qt) < ct−1 −maxi{αig(rit−1)}
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In addition, the RHS of Equation 1.2 is decreasing in the age of the firm as
m′(∆Qit;Qit−1) is decreasing in Qit−1. Similarly, the RHS is decreasing in αi.
Therefore, the condition in Equation 1.2 will be satisfied for younger and less
innovative firms before the same is true for older more innovative firms.
Corollary 2. If old and highly innovative firms exit the market, they do so not
before younger and less innovative firms left the market.
As a consequence, a high skill in innovation and a head start through early
entry bring benefits to a firm that later entrants or less skillful innovators cannot
achieve. In particular, high type firms that entered in t = 1 will not be driven
out of the market. However, what has been an advantage in one market, might
become a disadvantage if a new market arrives. The next section analyzes such
a case.
1.2.2 Emergence of a related market
In the previous section, I describe how a market can change with regard to its
size and composition. Besides the change within markets, often industries are
subject to change due to new inventions which create new markets as well.
I assume that a new market occurs at an exogenously given point in time.
Firms active in this new market produce a good called b in contrast to the good
produced in the original market, called a. Products a and b have some proximity
in the sense that consumers perceive goods a and b as (imperfect) substitutes,









t < 0. Just as in the single
market, inverse demand is concave in quantity. Further, for k, l ∈ {a, b} and
k 6= l I assume that ∂2P l(Qlt, Qkt )/∂Qlit∂Qkit ≤ 0, i.e. the slope of the inverse
demand of one good is not increasing in the quantity supplied of the other good.
To consider the case where firms from the original market have a technolog-
ical advantage in the new market, I assume that firms’ R&D expenditure for
product a can be of use as well for product b. In fact, I will make the extreme
assumption that R&D is a pure public input in the sense that for a firm pro-
ducing goods a and b an investment of rit invested in R&D produces a cost
reduction of αig(rit) in both markets.
In addition, a firm that produces goods a and b incurs a cost of grow-
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Figure 1.2: Structure of the game in period t for the case of two markets.











m+) with m− < 0 < m+
4. Note that in Klepper (2002) it is implicitly assumed
that the marginal cost of growth is independent of the quantity produced of the
other good for firms that have been active in another market before entry.
The structure of the game to be played is very similar to the one where
there is just one market and is depicted in Figure 1.2. A finite number Ka
of potential entrants and a finite number Kb of potential entrants is presented
the opportunity to enter markets a and b whereas every incumbent in market
a is a potential entrant in market b and both, high and low type entrants, can
profitably enter the new market. After having made their entry or exit decision,
firms set their level of R&D investment and set their quantity or quantities.
Apart from the second market and the resulting (dis)economies of scope, the
firms’ maximization problem is the same as before. A firm i’s profit function
depending on whether it is active only in market a, only in market b or active












t)− cat + αig(rit)]Qait + [P b(Qbt , Qat )− cbt + αig(rit)]Qbit
− rit −m(∆Qait,∆Qbit;Qait−1, Qbit−1)
Lemma 2. The Cournot game has an equilibrium which is unique.
Proof. I will show that marginal profits are decreasing in all actions. It follows
from Rosen (1965), as will be shown, that this result is sufficient for the existence









































































































This ensures that profits are strictly concave in quantities.
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and uniqueness of equilibrium in the Cournot stage game. Let k, l ∈ {a, b} and
k 6= l. First and second order derivatives of the profit functions with respect to
quantities are given by
∂Πkit
∂Qkit





















Qkit − ckt + αig(rit) +










































































































For the results of Rosen (1965) to apply, the profit functions need to be
concave. For firms that are active in one market only and therefore only take
one action, this is equivalent to negative second order derivatives. As can be
seen from Equation 1.4 this holds true as inverse demand is decreasing and
concave and the costs of quantity adjustment is increasing and convex. For all
firms that produce both products, the Hessian has to be negative definite. The











and its elements are given by Equations 1.5 and 1.6. Given that inverse demand
for good k is decreasing and concave in the quantity supplied of good k, that
inverse demand for good k is decreasing in the quantity supplied of good l as
these are substitutes and the second derivative with regard to good l being











it ∈ (m−,m+), H is negative definite.
Therefore, the Cournot stage game is a concave game and Theorem 1 in Rosen
(1965) applies, i.e. an equilibrium point exists.
To show uniqueness of the equilibrium, it suffices to show that a weighted
nonnegative sum of all players’ payoff functions is diagonally strictly concave.
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A sufficient condition for this to hold is that the matrix [G(Qt, r) + G
′(Qt, r)]
be negative definite for some weights r > 0. G(Qt, r) is the Jacobian of the
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where firms are ordered here from 1 to Nt such that those firms active in only
one market come first and the firms active in both markets in the end. As can
be seen from 1.7, G(Qt, r) is negative definite if marginal profits are decreasing



















































































As these are all negative, G(Qt, r) is negative definite, which is sufficient for the
equilibrium to be unique (see Theorem 2 in Rosen (1965).

























































































for all firms i that are active in market k and all firms j that are active in both
markets, if these quantities are positive. Otherwise, i’s equilibrium quantity is
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zero.
The optimal investment in R&D is determined taking into account the opti-
mal quantity set in the successive stage and by the first order conditions of the










jt) = 1 (1.12)
We are left with stage 1 of the game, the decision on whether to be active in a
market and if so, in which one(s). An incumbent firm or a potential entrant will
not be active at all if he cannot make positive profits in either market in isolation
or in both markets in parallel, i.e. Πa(rait, Q
a





















firm is solely active in market b if it makes positive profits in market b and these
are larger than the profit from being only active in market a or being active
in both markets. Lastly, a firm is active in both markets if it derives positive
profits from its activity and if these are larger than if it were active in one of
the markets in isolation.
Before analyzing how the presence of the second market affects firms from
the first market, note that all firms that are active in market a in period t− 1
could profitably be active in market b as well if they were solely active in market
b.
Lemma 3. Upon arrival of market b, Πbit > 0 for all firms i that are active in
market a in t− 1.
Proof. As market b can profitably be entered by high and low type firms by
assumption, Πbjt > 0 for all firms j that did not enter market a. Further, as
investment in R&D is a perfect public input and innovations can be imitated
one period after they arrived by firms in that market, a firm i that is active in
market a has strictly larger margins and therefore strictly larger profits than a
new entrant.
Even though a firm can be profitable in market b in isolation, it might fail
to profitably enter market b in addition to market a.
Lemma 4. An incumbent from market a can be unable to profitably enter mar-
ket b in addition due to a cannibalization effect or organizational diseconomies
of scope.




it < 0, i.e. the price of
one good is decreasing in the quantity of the other good. It can be seen from
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Equations 1.9 and 1.10 that this reduces the optimal quantity of each good
for a firm that is active in both markets. Suppose there are no organizational













it−1). Then the benefit of being active in both markets stems from






it) whereas a unit invested in R&D by a firm which is solely
active in one market reduces its costs by αig
′(rkit)Q
k
it. However, if this positive
effect is outweighed by the cannibalization effect, the firm will prefer to be active
in one market only.
Now suppose that the cannibalization effect and the joint R&D effect just
cancel in a situation where there are no organizational (dis)economies of scope.
As a result, the firm in question would be indifferent between being active











it > 0, is sufficient to make it unprof-
itable to enter the second market. This is due to the fact that both, optimal
quantities as well as optimal R&D investments are reduced.
Therefore, even though a firm could make profits in both markets in isolation,
enjoys a technological advantage in market b due to its experience in market
a and through the nature of R&D as a pure public input, it might still fail to
profitably produce goods a and b simultaneously. This can end up being a threat
for the very survival of the firm for two reasons. First, if it enters market b with
a lower quantity than the high type entrants that are only active in market b, it
is potentially subject to a future shakeout. Second, if the incumbent does not
enter market b he could be forced to exit market a when market b grows large
and ultimately replaces market a.
Proposition 2. Although an incumbent firm survives a shakeout in the orig-
inal market and has a technological advantage in the new market, it can fail
irrespective of whether the firm enters market b or not.
Proof. Lemma 4 shows that an incumbent from market a might not be able to
profitably enter market b in addition. Suppose that the aggregate quantity in





t < 0 because goods a
and b are substitutes, this creates a downward pressure on the price in market
a. It follows from the optimality condition for the firm’s quantity Equation 1.8
that this has a negative effect on the quantity supplied by the firms active in
market a. As the price for good a is strictly decreasing in Qbt , there exists a Q̄
b
t
for which P a(Qat , Q
b
t) = 0 and all firms exit market a, including the high type
firms that entered market a in t = 1 and would therefore be certain to survive
a shakeout.
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Now suppose a high type firm that entered market a in t = 1 profitably enters
market b upon occurrence but does so only with a small quantity Qbit = ε due
to the cannibalization effect or organizational diseconomies of scope. That way
it finds itself in a similarly disadvantageous position as low type firms or firms
that enter later on and suffer from their lower quantities and therefore lower
investment in R&D and consequently lower margins. This is because either its
quantities for both goods are increasing but then the cannibalization effect or
the organizational diseconomies of scope that made it optimal to enter market
b only with a small quantity are still at work and will make growth in market b
more costly than it would be were the firm active in market b in isolation. Or the
firm is reducing the quantity supplied for one of its goods. While this reduces the
cannibalization effect and the organizational diseconomies of scope, it reduces
the optimal investment in R&D as well as it is increasing in the quantity supplied
(see Equation 1.12). Either way, this firm will have lower margins in market b
than a high type entrant that entered market b upon occurrence and is therefore
more likely to exit market b when prices in market b decline.
While the cannibalization effect can often be exogenous to the firms active
in market a because the basic innovation comes form outside the industry, the
organizational diseconomies of scope might be within the control of the firm.
It is therefore of interest to better understand the empirical relevance of these
two factors. While a full-fledged empirical analysis is beyond the scope of this
paper, it might be useful to at least gain a better understanding of what could
drive organizational diseconomies of scope and learn more about their relevance
for the failure of firms. To this end, the next section studies three cases of firms
that have been immensely successful for decades. Nevertheless, within a couple
of years they lost their dominance and ultimately failed altogether. All three
cases are characterized by the arrival of substitute products in combination
with a technological advantage the incumbents had in supplying these products
themselves. These cases therefore fit the framework used in the above model.
1.3 Case studies
1.3.1 Digital Equipment Corporation
Why did an organization that was wildly successful for thirty-five
years, filled with intelligent, articulate, powerful engineers and man-
agers, fail ...? (Schein, DeLisi, Kampas, & Sonduck, 2004)
Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) was a computer company founded in
1957. In 1987 it became the second largest computer manufacturer in the world.
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DEC had reached $14 billion in sales, $1.3 billion in revenues and 120,000 em-
ployees by 1988 (Rifkin, 1993). DEC was known for innovations in many fields
within the computer industry as well as for its leadership and culture. In 1986
its founder, Ken Olsen, was named “Entrepreneur of the Century” by Fortune
Magazine, in 1988 Business Week called DEC the eighth most successful cor-
poration in the US and Roberts (1991) called them “the most successful MIT
spin-off company” (Schein et al., 2004). Not long after, though, the economic
decline began and DEC reported a loss of $2.8 billion for its fiscal year 1992
(Rifkin, 1993). Only six years later, after laying-off thousands of employees and
selling various business units, what remained of DEC was bought by Compaq. It
took less than ten years for DEC to disappear after having introduced milestone
innovations such as interactive computing, graphical user interfaces, operating
systems technology, microprocessor design and networking to the computer in-
dustry within the preceding 35 years (Schein et al., 2004).
In 1957, Ken Olsen and Harlan Anderson founded DEC in an old mill in
Maynard, Massachusetts. Already in their first year in business they made
profits. At that stage DEC produced logic modules used for memory testing
by the Bell Labs and Cal Tech. Two years later they developed their first
computer, the refrigerator-sized Programmable Data Processor (PDP-1). After
being in business for five years, DEC’s profit grew to $807,000. A year later, in
1963, DEC introduced the first minicomputer, the PDP-5. In 1964, the PDP-
6 was the first 36-bit computer and the PDP-8, sold from 1965, was the first
mass-produced minicomputer. In 1967, sales hit $38 million, almost six times as
much as in 1962. DEC also grew geographically by opening facilities in Canada,
Europe, Australia and Japan. Five years later, in 1972, sales reached $188
million. This growth was sustained through the 80’s until the collapse in the
early 90’s.
The foundation of DEC’s tremendous success was the combination of “hir-
ing the best and brightest from MIT and Lincoln Labs” (Schein et al., 2004,
p. 136) and making good use of them in an industry that was just developing
and in which there were no off-the-shelve solutions. Both factors shaped DEC
as a company and were defining features for its culture that remained strong
and largely unchanged until the very end. The need for inventions placed engi-
neers at the center of the organization from the very beginning. The company’s
culture, strongly related to Ken Olsen’s personal values, was combined with
selective hiring and aimed at enabling engineers to provide the best solutions
possible for any problem they encounter. Schein et al. (2004) describes this
culture as consisting of five core genes and an additional five assumptions that
are based on the first set but more market related. The first group consists
of the belief that DEC can and will revolutionize computing and that the ulti-
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mate source of revolutionary ideas is the individual. However, it is recognized
that the development of ideas has to be subject to intensive debate which will
eventually lead to full utilization of the ideas potential. Schein et al. (2004)
summarizes these two factors as “rugged individualism” and “truth trough con-
flict”. Further, Ken Olsen strongly believed in personal responsibility, i.e. those
who come up with ideas or suggestions are the ones responsible for bringing the
idea to fruition. The last of the five core traits of DEC’s culture was the sense
of being a family from which no one can be rejected. Failure, therefore, was
seen as a mismatch between a task and the employee rather than a failure of
a DEC family member. Together, these core values created what appeared to
DEC’s employees as a very strong and unique culture which they remembered
as having been enormously empowering even years after DEC’s failure.
Based on these core values, DEC derived additional assumptions that did
guide the conduct of the company and its employees. Based on the assumption
that DEC can and will revolutionize computing and that it will ultimately find
the truth through its internal processes, it was assumed that a good product
will sell itself and that the judgment, of whether the product is good, can be
made by its engineer. This was termed “engineering arrogance” by Schein et
al. (2004). Although this might seem like a bad trait, the belief in and aiming
for the ultimate truth in solving a problem also created a moral commitment to
DEC’s customers: DEC saw itself committed to identifying and truly solving its
customers problems. On its way to finding the solution, the company heavily
relied on “the market as arbiter”, i.e. priorities in the developments of products
were not assigned early on by management but left to the internal and external
market to set. The last two fundamental characteristics, although seemingly
contradictory, were defining for the way management worked at DEC. It was
assumed that individuals can and will successfully work together and coordinate
their activities in the interest of the company. At the same time, though, DEC’s
founder and CEO until 1992, Ken Olsen, kept a special position within DEC in
which he retained power no one else had in DEC.
DEC’s culture of empowerment, shaped by excellent engineers, is seen as
the source to its milestone innovations such as PDP and VAX. However, it also
is the key for understanding its failure. The combination of economic success,
vastly talented engineers , empowerment in the sense that good ideas, good
product design had to be pursued and prioritizing was delegated to the market,
caused troubles as the computer industry matured and markets for standardized
products, in particular the IBM PC, arose.
Although it is often said that Digital failed to enter the market for PCs, this
perspective is not quite correct. In fact, they introduced three different PCs to
the market at the same time: Rainbow, DECmate and Professional 350. Each
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running a different operating system. What they failed in was to introduce
an IBM compatible PC, the then standard in the industry. DEC’s sales of
other products did not manage to keep the company afloat as the PC revolution
unfold. Especially Digital’s original market of minicomputers started to become
obsolete in the early 90’s when microprocessors became more powerful5.
In providing own products to the starting PC market, Digital acted accord-
ing to the values that made it a large and successful company. They developed
the products in-house, with the skilled engineers that will find the right so-
lution eventually and did leave prioritizing between Rainbow, DECmate and
Professional 350 to the market. However, the market opted for the IBM PC
that arrived on the market two years before DEC’s PCs because IBM made use
of OEM suppliers for several parts of its system which sped up development
and production considerably. Finally, Digital could have entered the market for
IBM compatible PCs just like DELL and HP did, however, this fundamentally
conflicted with DEC’s “engineering arrogance”. As Ken Olsen put it: “we do
not copy!”
1.3.2 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
For audiences at home and abroad, MGM was Hollywood at its most
Hollywood in the best sense of the word, proved by the fact that
MGM grosses were reliably leagues ahead of its competitors’ and
had been since the company was formed in 1924. (Eyman, 2008, p.
3)
20 years after Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM) was founded, its studios cov-
ered 167 acres (about 67 ha), employeed 6000 people, owned 40 cameras, 60
sound machines and had 33 actors as official stars as well as 72 featured play-
ers and 26 directors under contract (Eyman, 2008). In the fiscal year 1944-45
MGM’s profit was $22.4 million. In contrast, Paramount made $14.5 million,
Fox made $10.9 million and Universal had profits of $3.4 million. “Within the
industry, when Paramount or RKO made a particularly good picture, it would
be said “it was of MGM quality”; at a sneak preview, when the MGM logo of
a roaring lion appeared, there would be a spontaneous burst of applause from
the audience” (Eyman, 2008, p. 3).
MGM’s fall began in the 40’s. In 1949, they still had a 22% market share,
the same as in 1939. Until 1956, MGM’s market share dropped to 17% and 1957
saw a $7.8 million loss from motion pictures. A little more than ten years later,
at a net loss of $35.366 million, MGM was bought by investor Kirk Kerkorian
and most of MGM’s assets were sold.
5A development for which DEC provided key solutions with its Alpha-series.
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Although MGM was formed of Metro Pictures, Goldwyn Company and
Mayer Productions, Louis B. Mayer was the driving force of what would become
MGM. And MGM became “different”. While other studios, such as Paramount,
went into assembly line production of B movies to fill the theaters of their own-
ers, MGM went after the growing middle class to entertain them with classy
films. For Mayer, movies had to be an escape from reality, a dreamworld, beau-
tiful and luxurious. And he was willing to spent the money necessary to achieve
this goal. In this spirit he telegraphed to a director “Spare nothing, neither
expense, time, nor effort. Results only are what I am after.” (Eyman, 2008,
p. 111). Similarly, Mayer had parts of “The Big Parade” reshot after the film
was finished increasing the cost from $250,000 to $382,000. “The Big Parade”
became one of the biggest successes of the silent film era and grossed $6 million,
a third of the industry’s earnings in 1925. With the additional success-stories
of “Ben Hur” and “The Merry Widow” MGM made a profit of $4.7 million in
its first year. It came as close as $1 million to Paramount that had taken 10
years to build up such a production.
MGM had developed a system that was able to produce A movies almost as
on assembly lines. Actor Ricardo Montalban described it as: “MGM functioned
like General Motors. It was run with such efficiency that it was a marvel. It
was done by teamwork; they could project the product, and the product was
not any individual movie, it was the actor. They created a persona that they
thought the public would like; they tailor-made the publicity to create a persona
through-out the world. It was amazing.” (Eyman, 2008, p. 4). In this quote
Montalban describes what is a lasting part of MGM’s legacy: the perfection of
creating stars. Mayer had a sense for faces that people liked and he did what
was necessary do bring them under contract for MGM. When Mayer saw Greta
Garbo for the first time in Berlin, his daughter Irene remembered him to be
“hell-bent”. “He said it had nothing to do with beauty, “It’s what she conveys
and the expression emanating from her eyes”. He wanted to meet her that day,
and a meeting was arranged...”. Thereafter, Greta Garbo came under contract
at MGM and a Hollywood-legend.
Mayer and his head of production, Thalberg, built MGM around their stars.
They would “establish an MGM star with a spectacular picture – John Gilbert
in “The Big Parade”, Ramon Navarro in “Ben-Hur” – then put him in three
or four medium-budget vehicles for every high-budget picture.” (Eyman, 2008,
p 118). Similarly to their roster of stars, MGM had numerous producers and
directors under contract, binding the biggest talents of the industry to MGM.
Mayer himself described his plans as follows: “I’m going to build up the biggest
collection of talent so that this studio can’t fail. ... If you come across any
actor, director or writer who looks promising, let me know and I’ll sign’em up.”
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(Eyman, 2008, p. 154).
Apart from its stars and talent, MGM stood out through the aesthetics its
pictures showed. During the silent film era, MGM pictures were “often knock
out combinations of lush art direction and spectacular camera work bespeaking a
radiant self-confidence...[and]... romantic photography” (Eyman, 2008, p. 120).
And even for the pictures that weren’t one of the big spectacles, “MGM offered
a little something extra”.
The combination of these aesthetics, Mayer’s sense for stars and talent and
his drive to bring these factors together to build a viable business reflected the
values he stood for. As Mayer’s biographer puts it: “The movies weren’t just
a business for Mayer, they were vehicles for the projection of his own fantasies
of social mobility and sexual attractiveness. He took the fantasies seriously, he
took the audience seriously, and the took the movies seriously.” (Eyman, 2008,
p. 149).
However, as defining as these aesthetics were for MGM’s leading position
in Hollywood, they were also a major cause for its fall. When the audience’s
tastes began to shift away from MGM’s beauty and luxury, the studio failed to
follow suit. It was seen as just wrong. In 1945, when watching a close-up scene
of Audrey Trotter in “Lady in the Lake”, Mayer would ask the director: “Why
does her hair look awful?”. After it was explained that she just got up in the
middle of the night, Mayer replied: “I don’t care if she’s coming out of the toilet,
her hair can’t look like that.” (Eyman, 2008, p. 380). In the same vein, Mayer
disliked King Vidor’s “The Crowd” because of one scene were a toilet was shown
in a bathroom. He acknowledged that “We all have our natural functions, but
we don’t put them on the screen.” (Eyman, 2008, p. 403). The drifting apart
of opinions on what a movie could or could not show was clearly realized. It
didn’t change the policy of MGM, though, but left them frantic. After Mayer
had seen Billy Wilder’s “Sunset Boulevard” in 1949, he said: “I don’t know
what it is, the picture business. Everyone wants to see this,” accompanied by a
clutch at his crotch. “Men with dirty faces, women with messed-up hair. Who
wants to look at garbage? We always forget what we’re doing! We’re making
moving pictures! They have to be beautiful! Every frame has to be beautiful!”
(Eyman, 2008, p. 432).
Besides the change in tastes that MGM did not follow, there was a new
medium on the rise: television. And with the growth of television, cinema fell.
Between 1946 and 1948, movie attendance fell from 80 million per week to 67
million while ownership of TV-sets grew from 136,000 in 1947 to 700,000 in 1948
and reached 10 million in 1951. During that time, 6,500 movie theaters closed
within a three-year period. Instead of using its position in moving pictures to
shape TV, MGM did nothing. As screenwriter Millard Kaufman remembers:
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“The studio had a preoccupation with its primary place in the picture business,
so it was the last studio in the world to accept TV and turn out TV product.
The whole company thought TV was nothing but midgets in a fishbowl, and
they were wrong. There was a time when everybody wanted to be with MGM,
but with television nobody wanted to be with MGM. So everybody got away
hell ahead of them, and then they got frantic.” (Eyman, 2008, p. 463).
With its failure to acknowledge and follow the changing taste of its audience
and the rise of television, MGM, the then industries greatest, lost market share,
profits and its position as defining studio in Hollywood. Although it did survive
that way till it was bought by Kirk Kerkorian in 1969, the studio that was MGM
in the 20’s, 30’s and 40’s was gone. Finally, in 2010 MGM went bankrupt and
filed for Chapter 11.
1.3.3 Kodak
We were ahead of the curve in digital even though we were pretty
much a film and chemical company. We did a lot of research in
digital because we knew at some point in time the world would
change. We invented the digital camera. So, being the first ones
there we continuously worked in the labs so to make sure when that
change was made we were prepared for it. (Paul Porter, Kodak’s
Director of Design and Usability in Lucas Jr & Goh, 2009)
George Eastman began to manufacture dry plates in 1880 and invented roll
film in 1885 which was used in the first Kodak camera introduced in 1888. In
the following decades, Kodak produced a range of folding and pocket cameras
that simplified the process of photography and opened it to the masses. In
1934, Kodak had introduced the first Retina camera. These were produced
in Stuttgart, Germany, and, as Kodak’s traditional top-line 35mm camera for
advanced amateurs, were highly sought after (Snyder, 2013). In 1935 Kodak
introduced Kodachrome, the first subtractive color film. It was produced for
74 years until 2009 and became very much appreciated by professionals and
amateur photographers. Magnum photographer Steve McCurry described it as
“You just look at it and think, this is better than life” (Dobbin, 2008). A quote
that is illustrated by the fact that McCurry’s legendary National Geographics
cover photo the Afghan girl was shot on Kodachrome. Kodak’s high quality
products enabled it to capture most of the US market for photography with a
90% market share for film and 80% for cameras in 1976 and supported a growth
in earnings from $1 billion in 1962 to $10 billion in 1981 (Lucas Jr & Goh, 2009).
Kodak Eastman was not only a dominant company in photography, though. For
decades, it was among the most successful US firms; it was added to the Dow
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Jones Industrial Average in 1930 and joined the S&P500 and the Fortune 500
upon their creation in 1957 and 1955. In addition, it was rated among the
world’s five most valuable brands until the 1990’s (Economist, 2012).
During the 1990’s and 2000’s photography became digital and with it came
Kodak’s decline and death. Even though an engineer at Kodak invented the first
digital imaging sensor in 1976 and Kodak was the first to produce a megapixel
sensor, good enough to produce prints, Kodak filed for Chapter 11 in 2012 only
little more than a decade after its profits peaked at $2.5 billion in 1999.
As Paul Porter is quoted in the beginning of this section, Kodak was a
film and chemicals company. For most of its life, Kodak was known for both
its innovations to make photography easier for the masses as well as provide
high quality. Synonymous with the former fact is the well known Kodak slogan
“You press the button, we do the rest.”, which accompanied the company from
the very beginning. Synonymous for the latter are endorsement as the one by
Steve McCurry and other professional photographers who built their career on
the quality of Kodak’s products and services. However, if Kodak would have
solely been a chemicals and film company, its demise might seem less puzzling.
But that was not the case. In contrast, it was Kodak who pioneered digital
photography but failed to generate profits from these innovations apart from
royalties and licensing fees that would make up big parts of Kodaks earning in
its final years. It might seem the more surprising that Kodak failed the transition
to digital when realizing that at least from the early 90’s that transition had
become a clear focus of top management. To facilitate this change, George
Fisher, a former CEO of Motorola became CEO at Kodak in 1993. And it
wasn’t for a lack of trying that they finally did not succeed. In fact, Kodak
introduced more than 50 products related to digital photography, among them
not only digital cameras but also photo cds and software to share ones photos
with others online. Further, at one time Kodak had 23 scanner projects running
in parallel (Lucas Jr & Goh, 2009).
Therefore, the failure to make the transition to digital imaging does not seem
to be due to a lack of skill or technology nor was it that digital photography
was not on the CEO’s agenda6. It was more that Kodak’s culture was one of
being a chemicals and film company and going digital confronted both many
employees and lower level managers with a future that conflicted with what they
new of the technical side of photography as well as the way of doing business7.
Lucas Jr and Goh (2009) cite George Fisher in an interview looking back at
his time as CEO saying: “I think that the fear drove paralysis that manifested
6Although it can be said that the growth of digital photography was underestimated.
7Kodak’s business during the film era was very much one of the “razor-blade” type, i.e.
they sold cameras but made their money with film, paper and services.
1.3. Case studies 21
itself as time went on, to rigidity with respect to changing our strategy and
I didn’t see that at the start...we really had to work very aggressively to get
middle management first of all understanding what we were trying to do and
believe that this was a story of opportunity, that we were in the picture business,
that digital was just a technology just like film was, and that picture business
opportunity was gigantic, and there was a future for them...Their arguments
would be all over the map...Kodak can’t succeed in this market. We’ve tried
some consumer products before and failed miserably. There is no money in
this business; it’s all low margin...There is a new set of competitors...we don’t
know anything about them. I also believe firmly...(that) digital imaging was
everything in the future. Therefore we were either going to be in the picture
space...or we weren’t. If we were going to be in it, we’d have to make an all out
assault on digital imaging which meant a step function change.”
In that way, Kodak started the industry of digital photography by making
the essential inventions. However, its organization was built around film-based
photography that was very successful for more than 100 years but the benefits
were largely reaped by its competitors, especially Japanese electronics compa-
nies such as Sony, Canon or Nikon. The combination of the declining market
for film and Kodak’s failure to make profits with its digital business lead to the
fall that culminated in Kodak’s filing for Chapter 11 in 2012, 132 years after
George Eastman started his business.
1.3.4 Comparison
The cases of DEC, MGM and Kodak differ widely. MGM started to fall even
before DEC was founded. So, failure of firms does not seem to be limited to
the technological revolution that DEC and Kodak faced in the 90’s and 2000’s.
Kodak, in turn, was already a behemoth when MGM and DEC peaked and
ultimately died after 132 years apparently ruling out a naturally limited lifetime
of firms of just a few decades. Then, MGM differs from DEC and Kodak in that
is was not a manufacturing firm in high tech industries. This seems to suggest
that maybe no company, however successful at some point in time, is guaranteed
to survive. Also, the way these three firms failed differ. While it is often assumed
that large and old firms are too slow to adapt to new technology, this is not
necessarily the case. Kodak invented the very technology that ultimately caused
its failure and DEC entered the PC market that would push its minicomputer
business to extinction. MGM, though, can be thought of being too hesitant to
enter the television industry.
However, all three cases feature parallels as well. First of all, DEC, MGM
and Kodak had been immensely successful in their market not only in the sense
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that they had been technologically superior to their competitors but also were
highly profitable. Change as well was an inherent part of these firms’ develop-
ment. DEC introduced interactive computing and graphical user interfaces to
the industry. MGM went from silent black & white pictures to sound and color
and musicals. Kodak joined the market for 35mm cameras and different kinds
of film such as the K-14 Kodachrome.
1.4 Discussion
In the following, I want to discuss three aspects of the preceding analysis. First,
Klepper (2002) represents one class of models that aims at analyzing the evo-
lution of industries. Therefore, I will discuss whether a similar extension as
suggested above could incorporate the pattern of failing previously successful
firms in other models of industry evolution. Second, the above model identified
a cannibalization effect as well as organizational diseconomies of scope as po-
tential factors for firm failure. Based on the three case studies, I will discuss the
role these two factors played in the failure of DEC, MGM and Kodak. Third,
the model is silent about the cause for organizational diseconomies of scope.
I therefore want to discuss the observations from the case studies in light of
existing theories and identify open questions for future research.
Closest to the model of Klepper (2002) is probably the learning by doing
model of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988). In their paper, a firm’s cost in a later
period is decreasing in the output produced in an earlier period. Based on
learning-by-doing and firm heterogeneity, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988) show
how an initial cost advantage for a firm can accumulate over time and con-
tribute to increased market concentration. This result is qualitatively similar
to the one derived from the model in Section 1.2.1. Accordingly, it would also
appear as a puzzle how one of the Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988) type firms with
initial cost advantage become disadvantaged in a market that uses the same
technology. In terms of the above case studies, with learning-by-doing type
firms, it is not obvious why MGM did not use their production technology from
the movies (where they had acquired an advantageous position) to produce ma-
terial for TV. Similarly, DEC as the leading manufacturer of minicomputers
could have used their know-how and leading position in the industry to supply
IBM compatible PCs under their own name. However, they chose not to. And
even though digital imaging requires a different technology from the traditional
film-based photography, Kodak can be thought of as having been in an early
and advantageous position in that market. Kodak was not only the firm invent-
ing and producing the first digital camera and the first megapixel camera for a
price below $1000, it held essential patents in digital imaging (which towards
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the end of its life would become its most important source of income). There-
fore, also a Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988) type model would require an extension
that incorporates organizational diseconomies of scope to explain the observed
pattern.
In Jovanovic (1982) an industry is modeled in which firms can have high or
low costs but are only imperfectly informed about their type. Over time, when
these firms receive signals about their type, expected future profits are adjusted
and firms that receive sufficiently unfavorable signals leave the market. Similar
to the cases before, it is not apparent why firms that learned that they are of the
low cost type would either not enter the new market which requires the same
technology or fail to be profitable in this market.
Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) study the evolution of an industry where
the market starts to exist with a basic invention that will be refined by some
firms which are then high technology firms (as compared to those firms that use
only the basic invention and are called low technology firms). Taking the model
at face value, the invention of the TV and the IBM PC could be seen as basic
inventions for which MGM and DEC happened not to develop the refinement.
However, this would raise the question whether it is a reasonable assumption
to assume that those refinements are delivered randomly when those firms used
an essentially identical technology for decades.
It therefore appears to me that the immense success of firms in one market
and the rapid failure of those firms in a market where they have a technological
advantage is not easily explained by other models of industry evolution either.
In that way, the above analysis is not necessarily particular to Klepper (2002)
type models.
To arrive at a better understanding of the relative importance of the canni-
balization effect and organizational diseconomies of scope, consider the starting
quote for the Kodak case study. Apparently, Kodak was eager to enter the new
market. So, strategic considerations of protecting their original business by be-
ing absent from digital imaging did not seem to drive decisions at Kodak. This
logic is supported by George Fisher’s view that digital imaging will be the future
and that Kodak would need to embrace it if it wants to continue being a player
in imaging. Further, it seems that cannibalization was not the driving force of
DEC’s decision not to enter the market for IBM compatible PCs. While the
cannibalization effect could have, in principle, been based on the competition
an IBM compatible PC would have created towards both, their minicomputers
and their own PCs, I am convinced of neither. Apparently, DEC did not worry
to a great extend about PCs cannibalizing their minicomputers otherwise they
would not have introduced three different models themselves. In addition, as
all three PCs they offered were based on different systems, the existence of a
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close substitute in the own product range did not seem to impede the willing-
ness to bring a new product to the market. This strategy is consistent with the
observation in Schein et al. (2004) that prioritization was delegated to market
processes. In the case of MGM, the case study suggests that its CEO perceived
TV as inferior to cinema and therefore did not produce for TV. The cannibal-
ization effect, however, requires that the products in question are close enough
substitutes. While they might have been in reality, at MGM they “thought TV
was nothing but midgets in a fishbowl” (Eyman, 2008, p. 463). In that way,
MGM’s decision not to enter TV is not consistent with a cannibalization effect.
The case studies reveal that the three firms dealt quite differently with the
emerging new markets. While Kodak created the new market, tried to shape it
from the very beginning and its top management aimed at making Kodak the
dominant player in digital imaging, DEC and MGM can be seen as having been
far more hesitant to embrace the new developments. However, also the cases of
MGM and DEC differ considerably. While it seems that neither DEC’s founder
and CEO, Ken Olsen, nor DEC’s engineers were willing to adopt the standard
of the IBM PC, Mayer’s hesitance to follow the new tastes of movie-goers and
TV was met by many talents leaving MGM as they realized that ignoring this
change did not promise a bright future. It might therefore not be surprising
that there is no unified theory that can explain the observed organizational
diseconomies of scope. Nevertheless, I belief that certain models can shed light
on factors contributing to organizational diseconomies of scope.
Cyert and Kumar (1996) show how agency costs can increase the cost of
technology adoption even if the technology itself is present in the firm. This
is based on the argument that individuals who have the necessary knowledge
have an incentive to cash-in on that information asymmetry. As a consequence,
“these adaptation costs are shown to imply that such firms have higher effective
learning or information search costs than smaller firms that may be potential
entrants” (Cyert and Kumar (1996)). Another way in which agency costs can
increase the costs of organizational change is presented by Schaefer (1998). In
his model, he analyzes a situation in which agents that expect change can divide
their effort between productive actions and influence activity aimed at affecting
the direction of change for personal benefit. Analyzing a setting of bounded
rationality, Hirshleifer and Welch (2002) present a model of memory loss in
which past actions are better remembered than past information. In their model,
new projects arrive which can either be good or bad and the firm has the option
to either adopt or rejected those projects. The authors show that compared to
a situation without memory loss, a stable environment leads to a situation in
which a firm continues to follow old policies.
In contrast to the previous models, where situations were analyzed in which
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an additional activity or change in general leads to higher costs, Carrillo and
Gromb (1999) show how inertia can be a profitable and a deliberate choice of
a firm. In their model, agents can invest in culture specific capital and the
principal can decide to adopt a new culture. However, the principal might find
it optimal to commit to cultural inertia so as to protect the culture specific
capital of his agents and therefore provide incentives to invest in the first place.
In a growing industry such as computers in the 80s and 90s, an organiza-
tion like DEC that aims at resolving conflict through discussion and not based
on power, there is wide scope for costly influence activity as in the model of
Schaefer (1998). Also, in an organization such as Kodak, where resources had
to be shifted from the traditional film based business to digital imaging it is
conceivable that different business units used their knowledge to extract rents
such as suggested by Cyert and Kumar (1996). However, while the above mod-
els on agency problems can explain why it might be more costly for a firm to
join a new market in case it is already active in another market, these cannot
explain why such firms fail. All models crucially depend on the assumption that
there are rents that can be extracted by agents due to asymmetric information.
Therefore, a firm should not fail due to rent extraction by its agents if they
attach reasonable weights on future income from these organizations. In addi-
tion, while an organization in Carrillo and Gromb (1999) might end up with
an unprofitable culture after a change in the environment occurred, it is not
apparent why there would be opposing movements within an organization as
observed in Kodak where top management pushed the shift to digital for years
whereas lower levels of the hierarchy seemed to resist the change.
Further, the case studies suggest that some individuals within the organi-
zation were just not willing to change just as if the business model was part
of their preferences. The focus of Mr Mayer on beautiful and luxurious movies
and the dedication of Ken Olsen and DEC’s engineers to providing in-house
solutions for their customers are examples. It appears to me as an interesting
line of future research to investigate what drives these individuals’ reluctance to
change in the presence of large monetary losses that are associated with sticking
to the old business model.
1.5 Conclusion
In the above I aimed at resolving the puzzle that evolution of industry mod-
els make good predictions as to which firms are likely to succeed in a market
but fail to explain why these firms fail nevertheless upon the emergence of addi-
tional markets that use the same technology. I identify two effects that can cause
failure for formerly large and successful firms in markets where they have a tech-
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nological advantage: a cannibalization effect and organizational diseconomies of
scope.
By conducting case studies of former industry leaders Kodak, DEC and
MGM I show that organizational diseconomies of scope were the prime reason
for failure by making it prohibitively costly even for a technologically superior




This paper addresses the question of how employees’ effort provision reacts
to a change in the work environment. When markets are subjects to change
through entry and exit, innovation or the arrival of new markets, a change in
firms strategy is called for. Often, these strategy changes require a change in the
employees’ work environment as colleagues might get laid off, new ones get hired,
and resources are reallocated. It could be expected that, as a consequence, some
people gain while others lose. However, some policies seem to be more accepted
than others. It is, for example, very unpopular to cut employees’ wages. In
contrast, working longer hours for the same wage seems to be more acceptable.
Under such circumstances, a firm that is trying to increase efficiency might
rather increase working hours and keep wages constant than reduce wages at
constant hours.
The relationship between wages and effort has already received scrutiny from
economists. In particular, Akerlof and Yellen (1990) formulated the fair wage-
effort hypothesis and studied its consequences. The fair wage-effort hypothesis
is based on empirical results from psychologists (see e.g. Lawler & O’gara, 1967;
Valenzi & Andrews, 1971; Pritchard, Dunnette, & Gorgenson, 1972) that report
reduced effort or even left jobs as a result of wage decreases and states that a
unit of effective effort exerted by employees will equal the ratio of perceived
remuneration to the perceived value of that unit of effective effort.
The fair wage-effort hypothesis received additional support from laboratory
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Steffen Huck. We thank David Schindler and
Leonard Doyle for their help in using their software mucap, Nina Bonge, Nyongwon Min, Renke
Schmacker, Sharwin Rezagholi and Friederike Heiny for excellent asistance in conducting the
experiments. Johannes Leutgeb’s comments as well as his willingness to share his emotions
both through facial expression and verbally has helped this research.
27
28 Chapter 2. Emotions and Effort
experiments. Gächter and Thöni (2010) show that subjects in a three person
gift-exchange game respond negatively to disadvantageous wage discrimination.
Nosenzo (2013) and Greiner, Ockenfels, and Werner (2011) support the view
that social comparison is a key factor in driving a negative response, while a
wage cut in itself might not be sufficient2. Nevertheless, Falk, Fehr, and Zehnder
(2006) show that the introduction of a minimum wage is sufficient to increase
the reservation wage of participants in an experiment without social compari-
son. Therefore, there is evidence from laboratory experiments supporting the
hypothesis that unfair treatment of workers results in withdrawal of effort. How-
ever, it is less clear what exactly is perceived as unfair; it might even be equal
pay (see Abeler, Altmann, Kube, & Wibral, 2010)3. Further, the evidence on
the effect of preferential treatment of workers is less clear.
In field experiments, workers react in different ways to unfair treatment.
While Cohn, Fehr, Herrmann, and Schneider (2014) show how wage cuts and
social comparison for disadvantaged workers reduce effort, Hennig-Schmidt,
Sadrieh, and Rockenbach (2010) demonstrate invariance of work effort to pos-
itive and negative wage comparison. In between those two findings, Lee and
Rupp (2007) report some negative effect of wage cuts that are short-lived and
Kube, Maréchal, and Puppe (2013) report negative effects of wage cuts on pro-
ductivity but no effect of wage increases4.
Outside the field of economics, several studies were concerned with fairness
and counterproductive work behavior (see e.g. Spector, 1978), employee theft
(see e.g. Greenberg, 1990, 2002) and legal claims of former employees (see e.g.
Goldman, 2003). However, at the same time, employees can exhibit organiza-
tional citizenship, i.e. behavior that is to the advantage of a firm or organization
in general (see e.g. Spector & Fox, 2002, 2010).
Therefore, employees can exhibit desirable as well as undesirable behavior
depending on how they feel treated. Based on that, it will be in every organi-
zation’s interest to correctly foresee the effect a policy change will bring about.
However, organizations often will, ex ante, not have the knowledge necessary to
make adequate predictions as this requires knowing what employees deem fair,
whom they compare themselves to and how they judge their current situation.
2Not all information seems to be detrimental to the disadvantaged workers, though, as
Azmat and Iriberri (2016) show in studying the effect of relative performance feedback in
a real effort experiment with piece rate payment. Here, the performance feedback increases
performance for all workers potentially because differences in payoff are based on subjects
actions and not due to differences in the wage.
3Abeler et al. (2010) study a gift exchange game where two agents chose effort and a
principle choses wages. The authors observe lower effort in the treatment where the principal
is restricted to pay both agents the same wage. In contrast, effort levels are high when the
principle can pay the agents different wages.
4Cohn, Fehr, and Goette (2014) show that the lack of an effect of wage increases can be
explained by the fact that only those employees increase their effort who felt underpaid before.
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Because of that, possessing an indicator as to how employees will react would
prove useful.
We propose one such indicator, namely the facial expression of emotions,
and study its role in the context of changing work environments. The facial
expression of emotion is particularly suited as an indicator as they occur uni-
versally in emotionally arousing situations, are linked with subjective experi-
ence, are judged universally and discretely and have important social functions
(Matsumoto, Keltner, Shiota, OSullivan, & Frank, 2008). We conduct real ef-
fort experiments that are characterized by the disadvantageous treatment of
some individuals while others receive a preferential treatment. To address the
question of how to promote efficiency, we compare both changes in wages and
changes in work load. At the same time, we employ facial expression analysis
using the software Facereader to track subjects’ emotions during the experiment
and conduct the questionnaire STAXI-2 (Rohrmann, Hodapp, Schnell, Tibubos,
& Schwenkmezger, 2013) to receive additional information on how subjects deal
with emotions5.
In the remainder of the paper, Section 2.2 provides an introduction to the
concept of emotions and Section 2.3 describes the experiment. In Section 2.4.1
I report descriptive results of effort and the facial expression of emotion before
turning regression analysis in Section 2.4.2. I discuss the results in Section 2.5
and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Emotions
The study of expression is difficult, owing to the movements being
often extremely slight, and of a fleeting nature. (Darwin (1872), p.
13)
Conducting experiments enables researchers to identify causal effects and, by
having done so, gain insight of cause and effect of human action and interaction.
Outside the laboratory, however, conducting experiments might not always be
possible. Still, people have an interest in foreseeing the effect a change, for
example in the work environment, will have on individuals. This way, policies
could be adapted if need be. The question remains, though, how one could
reliably tell that this need arises.
While an easy way of approaching this problem would be to just ask the peo-
ple affected, this comes with potential problems. One being that people might
not be willing to reveal their true interest and opinion for fear of retaliation.
5Some previous literature has already described the mediating role of emotion in behavior
in the work context (see e.g. Fox & Spector, 1999; Fox, Spector, & Miles, 2001).
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Another reason might be that useful feedback would require the individuals
affected to anticipate how they will, in the future, react to the policy change.
Besides verbal expression, people express themselves in non-verbal ways, in
part by means of facial expression. To be useful to researchers, there should be
some generality of human facial expression and a theory of what these are. Both
components apply to emotions, which makes it an interesting concept to study
within economic experiments. Indeed, the empirical regularities associated with
emotion have been termed “laws of emotion” (see Frijda, 1988).
Before we go on, it will be useful to define emotion. While everyone has an
intuitive understanding of what emotion is or means, there has hardly been a
consensus in the sciences as to what emotions are. Scherer (2005) for exam-
ple defines emotion as “an episode of interrelated, synchronized changes in the
states of all or most of the five organismic subsystems in response to the eval-
uation of an external or internal stimulus event as relevant to major concerns
of the organism”. Therefore, the experience of emotion has a start, which is a
trigger that can be either external or internal, and has an end. In between, sev-
eral components of the nervous system are employed to respond to the trigger
through physiological changes. In addition, for emotions to be triggered it is
necessary that the stimulus is perceived as important to the individual.
Based on the above definition, the facial expression of emotion is just one
component of an emotion but it is an element of emotion that is particularly
suit to be studied within economic experiments. One reason being that it is
easily accessible through video footage of participants without interfering with
the actual experiment in the same way fMRI scans would. In addition, facial
expression analysis is much more economical, permitting larger sample sizes or
a larger number of tests. At the same time, the analysis of facial expression
might not suffer more from willful moderation by experimental subjects than
fMRI scans. Therefore, the above cited “laws of emotion” can be expected to
apply to the facial expression of emotions in the laboratory as well.
The idea of facial expression of discrete emotion being universal to all hu-
mans goes back at least to Darwin (1872) but has received renewed attention
among psychologist following the work of Ekman (1970) and Izard (1971). As
Darwin before, Ekman (1970)’s results were based on empirical work, where
people were shown pictures of facial expressions and interpreted these with a
high level of consistency. In his study, Ekman (1970) was able to show that
not only within one culture but also across cultures this interpretation of facial
expressions was highly consistent6. In subsequent research, at least 27 studies
have replicated these early results on the universal recognition of the facial ex-
6To arrive at this conclusion, he worked with people from the Southeast Highlands of New
Guinea, which, at the time of his research, had not been exposed to western culture.
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pression of emotion (see e.g. Matsumoto, 2001; Matsumoto et al., 2008). The
basis for the universal recognition can be found in the universal expression of
emotion. On the lowest level, this requires that faces have the same anatomy
so as to being able to employ facial muscles for the expression of emotion which
is indeed the case (Gray, 1966). Already Darwin (1872) showed that differ-
ent emotions show distinct patterns of movement of facial elements. Sadness
according to his studies is expressed by depressed corners of the mouth and
raised inner corners of the eyebrows whereas surprise is described as consisting
of raised eyebrows, open mouth, open eyes and protruding lips (Matsumoto et
al., 2008). Based on those common movements as part of the facial expression
of emotion, Ekman and Friesen (1978) developed the Facial Action Coding Sys-
tem (FACS) which categorizes one or more muscles into Action Units (AUs).
Therefore, the facial expression of emotions can be summarized by their AUs. A
comparison of Darwin (1872)’s description of the expression of emotion reveals
a close correspondence to the classification based on the FACS (Matsumoto et
al., 2008). In addition to the universal expression and recognition of emotion,
previous research has also shown that the facial expression of emotions corre-
lates with subjective experience of emotions (see Matsumoto et al. (2008) for a
summary).
Despite its prominence in psychology research and every day life, emotion
research is still in its infancy in the field of economics. Nevertheless, there has
been some theoretical as well as empirical work. In particular, Elster (1996)
discusses in how far the concept of emotion fits into the rationality approach
of economics and Elster (1998) shows how emotions affect behavior. In addi-
tion, Loewenstein (2000) and Rick and Loewenstein (2008) study how emotions
could be incorporated into the economists’ utility framework. In economic ex-
periments, researchers studied the effect of emotions on behavior by inducing
certain emotions. In that line of research, Andrade and Ariely (2009) have
found that in ultimatum games, happy responders are less likely to reject unfair
offers than those subjects that were induced as being angry. In addition, Lerner,
Small, and Loewenstein (2004) induce disgust and sadness and show how this
treatment result in subtle differences in subjects’ endowment effect. In a dif-
ferent line of research, emotions were not induced through videos or pictures
but resulted more directly from the experimental design. Here, Nguyen and
Noussair (2014) report a relationship between risk aversion and emotion with
a more positive emotional state correlating with more risk taking. Habetinova
and Noussair (2015) study charitable giving and emotions and find that the
decision to donate is independent of prior emotional state but valence decreases
after a donation7. What is more, van Leeuwen et al. (2016) provide evidence
7The decrease in valence is measured by the software Facereader. In self-reports, subjects
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Figure 2.1: Structure of the Experiment
Part 1
30 min Real Effort Task
Information Part 2
30 min Real Effort Task
for the reliability and information content of facial expressions by showing that
participants in an experiment can predict rejections in ultimatum game based
on picture of responders at rates better than chance.
2.3 Experiment
The experiments were conducted in July and August 2015 as well as in Jan-
uary and February 2016 in the experimental laboratory of Technical Univer-
sity Berlin (TU Berlin), Germany. All subjects were recruited using ORSEE
(Greiner, 2015) and the experiment was computerized using the software z-tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). We ran a total of 32 sessions with 699 subjects overall.
Each experiment lasted about 1.5h and subjects received a show up fee of 5
EUR. On average, subjects earned between 13 EUR and 18 EUR in total, de-
pending on the treatment.
2.3.1 Experimental Procedure
Upon arrival at the laboratory, all participants sign a consent form (see Ap-
pendix 2.D) before entering the room where the experiment takes place. Just
before entering the room, each subject draws his or her desk number and gets
seated. Afterwards, written instructions for the experiment are handed out (see
Appendix 2.D) and questions by the participants are answered. The experiment
starts when there are no more questions. Following the experiment, subjects
fill out a questionnaire and, afterwards, go to an adjacent room to receive their
payment from an assistant.
All subjects complete two parts of a real effort task that take 30 minutes
each. These two phases are separated by information the subjects receive (see
Figure 2.1 for the general structure of the experiment). In this intermediate
part, all subjects are told how many tasks they solved correctly, whether their
performance is in the top or bottom half of their session’s performance distri-
bution and how part 2 of their real effort task would look like (see Figure 2.2).
Crucially, participants that are subject to the treatment also were told how
part 2 of the real effort task for the other half of the performance distribution
state that they felt better after donating.
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Figure 2.2: Structure of the Information Section
No. Correct Tasks






Task in Part 2 for
other Part of Distribution
would look like, whereas participants in the control group did not receive this
information8.
After the experiment concludes, subjects answer a questionnaire that con-
sists of a computerized version of the German State-Trait Anger Expression
Inventory-2 (STAXI-2)9 (Rohrmann et al., 2013) as well as questions to assess
subject characteristics.
During the whole experiment, participants are filmed by cameras that are
positioned below their computer screen. They are informed of this already before
signing up for the experiment, are reminded and sign a consent form before
entering the lab. This procedure has been confirmed by the data protection
officer of TU Berlin. The use of filming subjects during the experiment will be
explained in the later subsection on the measurement of emotion.
2.3.2 The Task
The real effort task consists of typing strings that are shown on the subjects’
computer screen10. Participants see their input in a textbox below the displayed
string and can change their input until the moment when the ok-button is clicked
and their string is submitted. In general, there are two different variants of the
task: An easy version and a hard version11.
In the easy version, all strings consist of 60 characters and have to be typed
from the beginning of a string to its end. An example of such a string is given
by
8All subjects saw the exact same number of screens but where participants in the treatment
received information about the nature of other people’s task, those in the control were asked
to confirm that they are ready for part 2.
9We thank Hogrefe AG for the permission to use a computerized version of the STAXI-2.
10It was not possible to copy and paste the strings.
11Huck, Szech, and Wenner (2015) used the same task as our easy task in their experiment
before.
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Figure 2.3: Computer Screen for Hard Task
NXgCX7JHxYZj2cfBSd8JtkYp3LPcyDX8y8NNQhrzJfg22S2ACjC85EQ43B7L
The harder task is given by typing 120 character strings in reverse, i.e. from
right to left12. An example of such a string is
Fm22cDQKgpgzv5Ez2SBSbAzuPcRbyDVkvqpJPjWbqHeCUFN2nu5D83RLSs
SH8hPMcbeGdyWbrqQ5E6a8xKcqtW6HtdAcFu9QEru7THV3umrg5S6QKrwmf9fY
All strings were shown in the same font size, centered on the screen and in
one line (see Figure 2.3).
2.3.3 The Treatments
In total, we ran four different treatments. The general structure described
in Figure 2.1 remains the same over all of those treatment variations and so
does the main theme of the treatment: In part 2, the high performers are
disadvantaged compared to the low performers but it is only the treated subjects
that are made aware of this fact.
The baseline treatment, called “Start Easy”, has all subjects starting out
with the easy task. However, in part 2 of the real effort task, high types had to
switch to the hard task. In the version called “Start Hard”, all subjects begin
with the hard task and only low types switch to the easy task in part 2. In both
variants, the piece rate is held constant at 0.50 EUR for each correctly typed
12One subject used the strategy to type from left to right and use the keyboard to make the
cursor jump left after each input. However, this did not seem to be a particular advantage.
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string. In contrast, in the remaining two treatment variations, the difference
between parts 1 and 2 is born out in the piece rate, while the task stays constant.
In the variant “Start Easy Wage” all subjects start out with the easy task and
a high piece rate of 0.50 EUR. In part 2, low types are again subject to the high
piece rate and keep on working on the easy task while high types also solve the
easy task but are paid a lower piece rate of 0.10 EUR13. Finally, “Start Hard
Wage” has the hard task for all subjects in part 1 and 2 with a piece rate of
0.50 EUR for all subjects in part 1 and a switch to a higher piece rate of 3 EUR
for low types in part 214. All four variants of the experiment are summarized
in Table 2.1.
In conducting different treatments that either vary the task or the piece
rate, the experiment enables us to draw inference with regard to the question
of whether individuals react differently to information about shocks to cost or
revenue of effort for a comparison group.
Table 2.1: Variants of the Experiment
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Task Part 1 Easy Hard Easy Hard
Change for High Type Low Type High Type Low Type
Change to Hard Task Easy Task Low Wage High Wage
2.3.4 Measuring Emotion
According to the definition in Section 2.2, an emotion consists of several compo-
nents (and their synchronized changes) only one of those being facial expressions.
However, the facial expression of emotions is a component of an emotion episode
that is particularly suited to be studied in economic experiments. In contrast to
other measures of emotion such as functional magnetic resonance imaging fMRI
or facial electromyography (EMG), the facial expression can be videotaped and
therefore be collected with a minimal interference of the experimenter with the
participants. In addition, analyzing facial expressions has advantages over self-
reports of emotion. Free form self-reports require that subjects find words suited
to express their emotion in which lies the danger of heterogeneity in the ability
to describe ones emotion verbally. In contrast, questionnaires designed to elicit
13The ratio of high and low piece rate corresponds to the ratio of average correct strings
typed by high type participants in the easy and hard task.
14Again, the change in piece rate corresponds to the change in correctly typed strings
between the easy and hard task.
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emotions are often limited to the study of certain emotion (see e.g. the State-
Trait Anger Expression Inventory Spielberger (1999)). Further, depending on
the design of the experiment, self-reports can have the disadvantage that they
are either answered at the end of the experiment at which time the emotional
episode that has been triggered already ended or that the elicitation is con-
ducted in timely proximity to the stimulus in which case the elicitation could
interfere with the emotional episode itself.
In relying on video footage of facial expressions during the experiment, our
experimental design permits us to directly measure the impact of information
about a peer group’s work environment on the expression of emotion. We an-
alyze the video footage using the software Facereader Version 6. In addition,
we employ the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory 2 (STAXI-2) a question-
naire developed by psychologist Spielberger (1999) in the German adaptation
by Rohrmann et al. (2013) at the end of the experiment to gain complementary
information on subjects’ dealing with emotion.
Facereader
Facereader is an automated facial coding (AFC) software that takes pictures and
videos of people’s faces as input and detects facial expressions. It does so in a
three step procedure. First, a face is detected in the input material upon which,
second, a 3D active appearance model (AAM) (see Cootes, Taylor, et al. (2004))
is constructed (Lewinski, den Uyl, & Butler, 2014). This AAM makes it possi-
ble to construct a model of the face even if the perspective is not fully frontal
or lighting creates challenges through shadows on the face. Thirdly, a neural
network that has been trained to detect emotion is employed to calculate prob-
abilities and intensities of emotion (see Lewinski et al., 2014; Van Kuilenburg,
Wiering, & Den Uyl, 2005). These emotion consist of Ekman (1984)’s six basic
emotions, namely happy, sad, angry, surprised, scared, disgusted and neutral.
In their study, Lewinski et al. (2014) show that Facereader15 had an accuracy
88% in detecting target emotions from the Warsaw Set of Emotional Facial Ex-
pression Pictures (Olszanowski, Pochwatko, Kukliński, Ścibor-Rylski, & Ohme,
2008) and the Amsterdam Dynamic Facial Expression Set (Van Der Schalk,
Hawk, Fischer, & Doosje, 2011) whereas humans achieved an accuracy of 85%.
Notably, this high accuracy had been achieved on datasets that were not the
one the software was trained on16.
By attaching cameras to the subjects’ computer screens, we were able to
record participants’ faces throughout the whole experiment. Using the software
15In the same version that was used in our experiment.
16Facereader was trained on the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (Lundqvist, Flykt, &
Öhman, 1998)
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mucap (Doyle & Schindler, 2015) we later on (offline) matched the z-tree stage
of the experiment with the recorded video of these stages. For the videos’ inter-
pretation, we used Facereader’s general model without calibration and analyzed
all recorded material at every frame of the 24fps videos.
Although the software can deal with images that contain different perspec-
tives and lighting situations17 we took care to set up the laboratory so as to
reduce heterogeneity in the video as far as possible. In doing so, chairs’ backs
were locked into an upright position and the height of the seat was set to the
same level for all chairs. Computer screens were moved to the back of the desk
and cameras were placed below them. The light settings of the cameras were
adjusted, if necessary, to the time of the day. Similarly, shades were used to
create light as homogeneous as possible at the desks close to the laboratory’s
windows.
In our analysis, we make use of the six basic emotions mentioned above, as
well as a neutral state and measures of arousal and valence. Except for valence,
all values for the emotions range between 0 and 1 with higher values indicating
a more intensely expressed emotion. Further, different emotions can be present
at the same time (all measure do not necessarily add up to one). The measure
valence is constructed by the software as the difference between the strongest
negative emotion and happy, the only positive emotion.
STAXI-2
The STAXI-2 is a questionnaire aimed at measuring different aspects of the ex-
perience, expression and control of anger. In its German adaptation, it consists
of 51 items. In our study, we make use of the five major scales “State Anger”,
“Trait Anger”, “Anger Expression-Out”, “Anger Expression-In” and “Anger
Control”. State anger is a measure of the intensity of anger in a subject and
its impulse to express anger18. Among the items for the state anger scale are
the statements “Ich bin aufgebracht.” (I am upset.) and “Ich könnte jemanden
treten.” (I could kick someone.) for which subjects had to chose between no
agreement and high agreement on a 4-point scale. Further, trait anger mea-
sures the frequency with which anger is felt19 and consists of items such as “Ich
habe ein hitziges Temperament.” (I am hot-tempered) or “Ich bin wütend, wenn
ich etwas gut mache und schlecht beurteilt werde.” (I am angry when I do a
good job but am judged negatively). Anger expression-out is a measure for the
17This is, of course, only true to some extend. In particular, the interpretation of the facial
model can change and cause different results depending on the perspective. A face is, e.g.,
interpreted as showing more anger when the camera is located in a higher position. It therefore
matters for the results whether the camera is positioned on top or below the computer screen.
18The measure state anger takes values between 15 and 60.
19The measure trait anger takes values between 10 and 40.
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frequency with which anger is expressed verbally or physically, whereas anger
expression-in measures the frequency with which anger is felt but not expressed.
These two scales consist of items such as “Ich verliere die Beherrschung.” (I lose
control.) and “Ich fresse die Dinge in mich hinein.” (I bottle up feelings.)20.
Lastly, anger control measure the frequency with which anger is controlled and
is based on statements such as “Ich bemühe mich, meine Wut zu lindern.” (I
try to ease my anger.)21.
Although the disadvantages of eliciting emotion through self-reports at the
end of the experiment have been discussed above, the STAXI-2 questionnaire
can still provide useful information. In particular, as only one of the measures
is concerned with the emotional state at the time. All other measures that will
be included in the analysis are concerned with with the question of how the
subjects typically deal with anger.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
In the following, descriptive results for the real effort tasks as well as for the
different measures of emotion will be presented.
Start Easy
The average number of correctly typed strings in part 1 of the experiment,
featuring the easy task, was 17. While those subjects classified as high types on
average produced about 21 correct strings, those classified as low types typed an
average of 13 strings correctly22. Comparing the productivity of all subjects in
the treatment sessions with those in control sessions, no statistically significant
difference can be found. However, the median number of correctly typed strings
by treated high types exceed that of high types participants in the control by 2.
In part 2, as is expected from the harder task, the number of correctly typed
strings of high types is, on average, lower than that of the low type subjects, who
still were working on the easy task (see Panel (b) of Figure 2.4). The average
number of correctly typed strings for all low types is about 14 and 5 for the
high types. No significant differences can be found when comparing the number
of correctly typed strings between treated and untreated subjects within the
groups of high and low types. The median number of correctly typed strings is
20Both anger expression scales range between 8 and 32 in values.
21Anger control takes values between 10 and 40.
22The difference is significant on the 1% level in a Wilcoxon rank sum test.
2.4. Results 39
Figure 2.4: Boxplots of Correctly Typed Strings (Start Easy)
(a) Correct Strings (Part 1) (b) Correct Strings (Part 2)
(c) Difference of Correctly Typed Strings
lower by 1 for the high types and larger by 2 for the low types in the treatment
sessions as compared to the corresponding subjects in the control sessions.
As a consequence, the median productivity change is the same for low types
in control and treatment sessions (median productivity increased by 1). How-
ever, at the median productivity for high types in treatment sessions dropped
by 17 whereas it dropped by 14.5 for high types in the control sessions (see
Panel (c) of Figure 2.4). The productivity change differs statistically significant
with p-value 0.02 in a two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test.
These results suggest that there is a negative treatment effect for high type
subjects in terms of productivity but no treatment effect for low types.
To describe the emotions participants went through during the experiment,
we focus on two moments in time for the Facereader data and complement these
with data from the STAXI-2 questionnaire which was answered at the end of
the experiment. The baseline is given by the emotions shown when subjects
face the screen where they are informed on how they will continue to work in
part 2 of the real effort task (“Info Own”) (see Figure 2.2 for the structure of
the information section of the experiment). Until that point, high types in the
treatment and high types in the control are in the exact same situation and
the same is true for low types. These emotions are then compared to those
shown while subjects face the next screen (“Info Others”). Crucially, on that
screen, subjects in the treatment receive information on how the other part
of the performance distribution will continue to work while participants in the
control do not receive this information.
The emotions recorded by Facereader are plotted in Figure 2.5. Each verti-
cal axis represents the intensity of each emotion and the horizontal axis repre-
sents time, with positive values indicating the time spent looking on the “Info
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Others” screen and negative values for the time during “Info Own” screen23.
Each (opaque) dot represents one observation and is assigned to one of the four
groups: Treated High Type (red), Treated Low Type (Purple), Control High
Type (Green) and Control Low Type (Orange). Added to the plots are fitted
polynomials of degree 3.
23As subjects themselves chose when to click the ok button and leave a screen, the range of










Figure 2.5: Emotions During “Info Own” and “Info Others” (Start Easy)
(a) Valence (b) Angry (c) Happy
(d) Arousal (e) Sad (f) Surprised
(g) Neutral (h) Scared (i) Disgusted
Notes. Negative values on horizontal axis correspond to time during “Info Own” screen whereas positive values correspond to time during “Info
Others” screen. Vertical axis captures intensity of Emotion. Each (opaque) circle is one observation. Lines are fitted polynomials of dregree 3. Solid
Red : Treated Top, Dashed Purple: Treated Low, Solid Green: Control Top, Dashed Yellow: Control Low; N=95301
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Panel (a) of Figure 2.5 shows valence, a measure that is constructed as the
difference between the strongest negative emotion and happy (the only positive
emotion) at every point in time. Comparing high type participants in treatment
and control it can be seen that participants in the treatment show significantly
lover values of valence (1% level, Wilcoxon rank sum test), both during the
“Info Own” screen and the “Info Others” screen and measured as mean and
median of the respective group. This can be interpreted as treated high types
displaying a more negative mood as compared to their counterpart in the control.
From one screen to the next, valence increases for both groups but less strongly
for treated high types. For the low types, those in the control start out at
a significantly lower level of valence than low type subjects in the treatment
(1% level, Wilcoxon rank sum test) but this relation reversed for the “Info
Others” screen (1% level, Wilcoxon rank sum test), as the participants from the
treatment showed lover values of valence while it increased for subjects in the
control. Again, this is born out in mean as well as median levels for valence.
Therefore, the mood of participants takes a negative course when receiving
information about a comparison group irrespective of whether this information
reveals an advantage or a disadvantage.
One potential reaction high type participants in the treatment could show as
a response to the information that they are disadvantaged compare to the low
types is anger. As the fitted lines in panel (b) of Figure 2.5 suggests, high types
in treatment start out at lower levels of anger but then exceed the anger levels
or their control peers when receiving information of their disadvantagedness
(1%level, Wilcoxon rank sum test). This pattern is also supported by mean and
median anger levels for the two groups. In addition, also the anger levels of low
type subjects in the treatment increase more strongly than those in the control
group. However, their measured anger remains below that of low types in the
control.
Perhaps surprisingly, median happiness increased for all groups except for
treated low types. Nevertheless, treated high types show lower levels of happy
than untreated high types during both screens (1%, Wilcoxon rank sum test
for both comparisons). Treated low types’ median happiness in “Info Own” is
above median happiness of control low types (1% level, Wilcoxon rank sum test)
but significantly lower than happy of untreated low types during “Info Others”
(1% level, Wilcoxon rank sum test).
To complement the data received from participants’ facial expressions, they
filled out the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory2 (Rohrmann et al., 2013)
after the experiment ended. Figure 2.6 shows boxplots of the measures derived
from the questionnaire. The results show that for high as well as low types
there is no difference between those in treatment and control with regard to
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Figure 2.6: STAXI-2 Measures (Start Easy)
(a) State Anger (b) Trait Anger
(c) Anger Expression (Out) (d) Anger Expression (In)
(e) Anger Control
the anger felt while completing the questionnaire (see Panel (a) of Figure 2.6).
This is despite the fact that both high and low types in the treatment exhibit
a greater tendency to express anger than subjects in their respective control
group (see Panel (c))24. At the same time, treated low types report more anger
control than untreated low types (significant at 10% level). This seemingly
contradictory result can occur when subjects try to counter their expression of
anger through anger control. In addition, treated high types exhibit a larger
tendency to get angry than their peers in the control group, a difference that is
significant on the 10% level.
In summary, the descriptive statistics suggest that high types’ reaction to
the information of them being disadvantaged consists of a more negative mood
in general and more intensely expressed anger as a direct response to the treat-
ment. Also, high type subjects decreased their productivity as response to the
treatment. On the other hand, low type subjects did not alter their produc-
tivity in response to their knowledge of being advantaged. This is the case
although they as well show more negative emotion in response to the treatment
as compared to the control group.
24For both high and low types the difference between treated and untreated subjects is
significant on the 5% level in a Wilcoxon rank sum test.
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Figure 2.7: Correctly Typed Strings (Start Hard)
(a) Correct Strings (Part 1) (b) Correct Strings (Part 2)
(c) Difference of Correctly Typed Strings
Start Hard
In contrast to the “Start Easy” variant of the experiment, in “Start Hard”, all
subjects start out typing long strings backwards whereas only the low types
switch to typing the shorter strings forward in the second part of the real effort
task.
In part 1, treated high types were able to correctly type 5 strings at the
median whereas high type individuals in the control do 6. During part 2, median
production stayed the same for high types in the treatment while it dropped
to the same number of 5 for the control. Comparing averages, both groups
feature a similar drop in productivity given by 0.359 and 0.365 for treatment
and control respectively. Low type subjects in treatment and control exhibit
the same median and mean number of correct strings for part 1 of the task (2
and 2.462). After switching to the easier task in part 2, productivity increases
to a median 14 correct strings for treated low types and 13 for low types in the
control but this is no statistically significant difference. Therefore, it seems as
if the treatment effect found in the “Start Easy” variant in the experiment did
not survive the change in treatment.
Comparing subjects’ facial expressions during the “Info Own” and “Info Oth-
ers” screens reveals that at first, median valence of treated high types is higher
than that of high types in the control which is reversed during the “Info Others”
screen, i.e. high type subjects’ mood is negatively affected by the treatment.
During both screens, there is no statistically different valence between treated
and untreated high types, though. For low types, valence is larger for treated
than for untreated subjects during both screens and statistically significantly so
(1% level in Wilcox rank sum test). However, valence decreases from one screen
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to the next and, in the median, does so more strongly for treated low types.
Therefore, while the treatment effect concerning productivity did not carry over
from “Start Easy” to “Start Hard”, the treatment still has a negative effect on
the emotional measure valence for both low and high types.
As was the case in the “Start Easy” variant, the measure for angry is larger
for treated high types than for untreated high types during both screens which
is statistically significant on the 1% level (Wilcox rank sum test). In addition,
the difference in angry between the two screens is larger for treated high types,
i.e. compared to high types in the control, they get more angry during the “Info
Others” screen. For the low types, the levels of angry are significantly lower for
treated subjects than for the untreated during “Info Own” and “Info Others”.
However, while there is no significant difference in angry for untreated between
“Info Own” and “Info Others”, for the treated, angry is larger during “Info
Others”.
Median happiness is lower for treated high types than for high types in
the control (1% level, Wilcoxon rank sum test for both screens) and while it
does increase in both groups, it does so less for the treated. On average, though,
happiness of treated high types surpasses that of high types in the control during
“Info Others” as can be seen in Panel (c) of Figure 2.8. For low types, treated
subjects have higher levels of happy during both screens (significant at 1% level
in Wilcoxon rank sum test) and while the level of happy decreases for subjects



























Figure 2.8: Emotions During “Info Own” and “Info Others” (Start Hard)
(a) Valence (b) Angry (c) Happy
(d) Arousal (e) Sad (f) Surprised
(g) Neutral (h) Scared (i) Disgusted
Notes. Negative values on horizontal axis correspond to time during “Info Own” screen whereas positive values correspond to time during “Info
Others” screen. Vertical axis captures intensity of Emotion. Each (opaque) circle is one observation. Lines are fitted polynomials of dregree 3. Solid
Red : Treated Top, Dashed Purple: Treated Low, Solid Green: Control Top, Dashed Yellow: Control Low; N=81053
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In Figure 2.9, different measures of anger and attitudes towards ones anger
are plotted based on subjects’ responses to the STAXI-2 questionnaire. The
current level of anger, state anger, was highest for treated high types with a
median of 18 and mean of 22. At the same time, high types in the control
exhibit median state anger of 17 and a mean of 19. There is a difference in this
measure between the two groups that is statistically significant on the 10% level
(Wilcoxon rank sum test). For low types, there is no statistically significant
difference in state anger which amounts to a median of 16 for treated and 17
for untreated low types.
No statistically significant difference can be found with regard to trait anger
which had median levels of 20 for all groups except untreated low types, which
had a median trait anger of 21. Similarly, while there are small differences in
median levels of anger expression and anger control between the groups, none
of these is statistically significant.
Based on the above, subjects appear to react negatively to the treatment in
terms of emotions expressed. However, in contrast to the “Start Easy” variant
of the experiment, this reaction does not coincide with a change in productivity.
Figure 2.9: STAXI-2 Measures (Start Hard)
(a) State Anger (b) Trait Anger
(c) Anger Expression (Out) (d) Anger Expression (In)
(e) Anger Control
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Figure 2.10: Correctly Typed Strings (Start Easy Wage)
(a) Correct Strings (Part 1) (b) Correct Strings (Part 2)
(c) Difference of Correctly Typed Strings
Start Easy Wage
Under the “Start Easy Wage” regime, all subjects in both parts of the real effort
task type the short strings from beginning to end. However, while all subjects
receive 0.50 EUR for each correct strings in part 1, in part 2 high types only
receive 0.10 EUR while low types still earn 0.50 EUR for a correctly solved task.
In part 1, high types produced a median 20 (mean 22) correct strings both
in the treatment and the control. In part 2, treated high types correctly typed a
median 17 strings correctly while high types participants in the control correctly
produced a median 21 strings. However, due to some outliers the mean number
of correct strings in part 2 is 20 for treatment as well as control. The differences
in productivity in part 2 are not statistically significant in a Wilcox rank sum
test. Treated as well as untreated low types increased their median number of
correctly typed strings from 13 to 14. Based on these numbers, the negative
treatment effect on high types receives weak support: While a negative effect is
born out in the median number of correctly typed strings, there is no statistically
significant difference in the productivity change between treated and untreated
high types.
Turning to the facial expressions subjects exhibited during the “Info Own”
and “Info Others” screen, it can be seen that treated high types had lower levels
of valence during the “Info Own” screen and higher values of valence during the
“Info Others” screen, both comparisons being statistically significant on the 1%
level in a Wilcoxon rank sum test. The comparison of valence in treated and
untreated low types is statistically significant at the 1% level (Wilcoxon rank
sum test) as well with treated low types showing lower levels of valence during
both information phases.
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Concerning the measures of angry, untreated high types have higher levels
of anger in “Info Own” than their treated comparison group, a difference that
is statistically significant at the 1 % level (Wilcoxon rank sum test). During
the “Info Others” screen, median levels of angry are again lower for treated
high types, but comparing angry levels for treated and untreated high types
in a Wilcoxon rank sum test gives a p-value of 0.1038. In addition, while the
absolute decrease in median angry levels is larger for treated high types, their
relative decrease in angry levels is smaller. In low types, treated subjects have
higher levels of angry than their control peers which is statistically significant
at the 1% level (Wilcoxon rank sum test) during both screens.
Both groups of high types show more happy in “Info Others” than in “Info
Own” and statistically significantly so (1% level, Wilcoxon rank sum test) but
treated high types are significantly more happy in “Info Own” but significantly
less happy in “Info Others” than untreated high types (1% level, Wilcoxon rank
sum test). With the low types, treated subjects exhibit lower levels of happy
during both screens but while happy for untreated low types stays constant over




























Figure 2.11: Emotions During “Info Own” and “Info Others” (Start Easy Wage)
(a) Valence (b) Angry (c) Happy
(d) Arousal (e) Sad (f) Surprised
(g) Neutral (h) Scared (i) Disgusted
Notes. Negative values on horizontal axis correspond to time during “Info Own” screen whereas positive values correspond to time during “Info
Others” screen. Vertical axis captures intensity of Emotion. Each (opaque) circle is one observation. Lines are fitted polynomials of dregree 3. Solid
Red : Treated Top, Dashed Purple: Treated Low, Solid Green: Control Top, Dashed Yellow: Control Low. N=65328
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Figure 2.12: STAXI-2 Measures (Start Easy Wage)
(a) State Anger (b) Trait Anger
(c) Anger Expression (Out) (d) Anger Expression (In)
(e) Anger Control
Based on the questionnaire measure of anger and anger attitudes, it shows
that treated high types are more angry at the end of the experiment than their
untreated peers (p-value = 0.056, one-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test) and that
the opposite it true for low types (p-value = 0.036, one-sided Wilcoxon rank sum
test). This is despite the fact that there is no statistically significant difference
in trait anger between the comparison groups. Similarly, there are statistically
significant differences in the anger expression measures or anger control.
To sum up, based on the above descriptive statistics, there appears to be
weak support for a negative treatment effect in terms of productivity in high type
subjects. However, the different measures of emotion are somewhat inconclusive
so far. While the Facereader data tends to suggest that that high types did not
get more angry, their self-assessment at the end of the experiment tells a different
story.
Start Hard Wage
As in the “Start Easy Wage” variant, subjects in “Start Hard Wage” worked in
the same type of task in both parts but this time it is the hard task. Also, low
types’ piece rate increased to 3 EUR while it stayed constant at 0.50 EUR for
high types.
High types’ median number of correct strings was 5 in the control as well as
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Figure 2.13: Correctly Typed Strings (Start Hard Wage)
(a) Correct Strings (Part 1) (b) Correct Strings (Part 2)
(c) Difference of Correctly Typed Strings
in the treatment in part 1 and part 2 of the real effort task. In the group of low
types, both treated and untreated subjects started out with a median 2 correct
strings in part 1. In part 2, treated low types increased that number to 5 while
the median number of correctly typed strings for low types in the control was 3.
This difference in correctly typed strings for low types in part 2 is statistically
significant on the 5% level in a Wilcoxon rank sum test.
High types’ valence is lower for treated than untreated subjects during “Info
Own” (1% level, Wilcoxon rank sum test). While looking at the “Info Others”
screen, however, valence increases for treated high types (1% level, Wilcoxon
rank sum test) but does not do so for untreated high types. The two groups
continue to differ in their valence (1% level, Wilcoxon rank sum test) with
treated subjects having lower values of valence. Low types start out with levels
of valence that do not differ statistically between treated and untreated subjects.
Following the “Info Own” screen, treated low types exhibit lower levels of valence
while valence for untreated low types increases (1%level, Wilcoxon rank sum
test).
Angry was lower during “Info Others” than during “Info Own” for both
treated and untreated high types. But it was larger for treated high types
during both screens (1% level). In low type subjects, angry levels increased
over time (1% level, Wilcoxon rank sum test). But while treated low types were
more angry than untreated low types during “Info Own” (1% level, Wilcoxon
rank sum test) the same comparison is statistically significant only on the 10%
level (one-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test) during the “Info Others” screen.
Happiness levels of treated high types are below those of untreated high
types during both screens (1% level, Wilcoxon rank sum test). However, while
there is a strongly statistically significant increase in happy for treated high
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types (1% level, Wilcoxon rank sum test), the increase in untreated high types
has a p-value of 0.03 in a one-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test. Treated low types
get less happy from one screen to the next, whereas untreated low types get
more happy (1% level, Wilcoxon rank sum test) and treated low types exhibit



























Figure 2.14: Emotions During “Info Own” and “Info Others” (Start Hard Wage)
(a) Valence (b) Angry (c) Happy
(d) Arousal (e) Sad (f) Surprised
(g) Neutral (h) Scared (i) Disgusted
Notes. Negative values on horizontal axis correspond to time during “Info Own” screen whereas positive values correspond to time during “Info
Others” screen. Vertical axis captures intensity of Emotion. Each (opaque) circle is one observation. Lines are fitted polynomials of degree 3. Solid
Red : Treated Top, Dashed Purple: Treated Low, Solid Green: Control Top, Dashed Yellow: Control Low. N=91680
2.4. Results 55
Figure 2.15: STAXI-2 Measures (Start Hard Wage)
(a) State Anger (b) Trait Anger
(c) Anger Expression (Out) (d) Anger Expression (In)
(e) Anger Control
Based on the STAXI-2 measure of state anger, treated high types show larger
anger levels than their untreated peers (p-value = 0.068, one-sided Wilcoxon
rank sum test) with median levels of state anger of 19.5 for treated and 18 for
untreated high types (mean: 25 vs 21). In addition, untreated low types have
higher levels of state anger than treated low types (1%, one-sided Wilcoxon rank
sum test) with median state anger of 19 for untreated low types compared 17 for
treated low types (mean: 23 vs 18). Except for the measure anger expression in,
there is no statistical difference between the comparison groups in trait anger,
anger expression or anger control. In anger expression in, low types in the
control exhibit significantly larger levels of anger expression in than treated low
types (1% level, Wilcoxon rank sum test).
While a treatment effect with regard to the productivity of high types seems
to be lacking, the descriptive statistics suggest there is a positive effect on low
type individuals. At the same time, they appear to respond negatively to the
treatment in terms of emotion although it should be noted that based on the
STAXI-2 measure, they report less anger at the end of the experiment than
untreated low types.
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Comparison
Across treatments, the descriptive statistics show some support for a negative
reaction in terms of productivity by high type subjects to the information that
they are disadvantaged. This is based on the findings from the “Start Easy” and
“Start Easy Wage” variants. For low type subjects, an increase in productivity
due to the treatment has been found in the “Start Hard Wage” variant of the
experiment.
In terms of emotion, a negative effect of the treatment on high types’ valence
is found in the “Start Easy” and “Start Hard” variant. At the same time, a
positive effect on anger is present. In contrast, a positive treatment effect for
high types in terms of valence has been found in the “Start Easy Wage” variant.
Low type subjects as well showed a decrease in valence due to the treatment
in “Start Easy” and “Start Hard”. In addition, low type subjects exhibit a
decrease in happy in the “Start Easy” and “Start Easy Wage” and “Start Hard
Wage” variant. Besides, treated high types show higher levels in state anger
than the comparison group in “Start Hard”, “Start Easy Wage” and “Start
Hard Wage”. In contrast, treated low types show lower state anger than their
comparison group in “Start Easy Wage” and “Start Hard Wage”.
2.4.2 Regressions
In this section, we extend the results presented in the previous section and ana-
lyzes the treatment effects in terms of productivity changes, emotional response
to the treatment and the correlation of emotion and future performance.
Productivity Response to Treatment
The baseline model for estimating the difference-in-difference treatment effect is
given by Equation 2.1 below. The number of correctly typed strings is regressed
on a series of indicators that associate the observations with the four groups
(Treated High Types, Control High Type, Treated Low Type, Control Low
Type) and the two parts of the real effort task.
correctiP = β0 + β1H + β2T + β3P
+ β4H ∗ T + β5H ∗ P + β6T ∗ P + β7H ∗ T ∗ P + εiP (2.1)
with H,T, P being dummy variables. In particular, H = 1 if i is a high type sub-
ject, T = 1 if the subjects is part of the treatment and P = 1 if the observation
comes from part 2 of the real effort task.
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Based on the above, the estimator for the difference-in-difference results of
low types is given by β6 and by β6 + β7 for high types. To see this, note that
the difference-in-difference estimator for low type subjects is constructed as
E[correctiP |H = 0, T = 1, P = 1]− E[correctiP |H = 0, T = 1, P = 0]
− (E[correctiP |H = 0, T = 0, P = 1]− E[correctiP |H = 0, T = 0, P = 0])
and as such is given by
β0 + β2 + β3 + β6 − β0 − β2 − (β0 + β3 − β0) = β6
Similarly, for high type subjects, the difference-in-difference estimator is defined
as
E[correctiP |H = 1, T = 1, P = 1]− E[correctiP |H = 1, T = 1, P = 0]
− (E[correctiP |H = 1, T = 0, P = 1]− E[correctiP |H = 1, T = 0, P = 0])
which equals
β0 + β1 + β2 + β3 + β4 + β5 + β6 + β7 − β0 − β1 − β2 − β4
− (β0 + β1 + β3 + β5 − β0 − β1) = β6 + β7
Equation 2.1 will be estimated as a random effects model25, i.e. we assume
that the error term εiP = uiP +ci where uiP is an idiosyncratic error term and ci
is an unobserved time-constant random variable with E[εiP |xi, ci] = 0 for both
parts of the real effort task and E[ci|xi] = E[ci] such that ci is independent
of regressors xi in both parts of the experiment. Further remarks about the
assumed error structure are in order. To illustrate these, Table 2.2 reports
regression results based on Equation 2.1 with added controls. Column 1 presents
standard errors based on the basic random effects assumption that idiosyncratic
error terms uiP have a constant and unconditional variance across time and that
there is no correlation between ui in part 1 and 2. Column 2 reports cluster
robust standard errors with standard errors clustered on the individual level,
whereas column 3 reports the results with robust standard errors clustered on
the session level. While robust standard errors allow for heteroscedasticity in the
error terms, clustering allows for correlation within the group of oberservations
the cluster is defined on. While there might be reasons to believe that there is
correlation within sessions, it poses the problem that there were only 8 sessions
per variant of the experiment which is too few for a reasonable estimation of
25A Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Muliplier Test rejects the use of Pooled OLS.
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the standard errors.
Table 2.2: Random Effects Panel Regression (Start Easy)
#correct
No Cluster Individual Cluster Session Cluster
Treated 0.467 0.467 0.467
(0.696) (0.585) (0.384)
High Type 6.927∗∗∗ 6.927∗∗∗ 6.927∗∗∗
(0.724) (0.855) (0.562)
Part 2 0.622 0.622 0.622
(0.554) (0.522) (0.511)
Treated*High Type 0.471 0.471 0.471
(0.981) (1.075) (0.710)
Treated*Part 2 -0.081 -0.081 -0.081
(0.771) (0.706) (0.668)
High Type*Part 2 -16.100∗∗∗ -16.100∗∗∗ -16.100∗∗∗
(0.779) (0.838) (0.456)
Treated*High Type*Part 2 -1.295 -1.295 -1.295∗
(1.088) (1.090) (0.688)
Time 1st correct -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Female 0.369 0.369 0.369
(0.452) (0.409) (0.501)
Semester 0.048 0.048 0.048
(0.059) (0.051) (0.065)
No Math -0.465 -0.465 -0.465
(0.542) (0.457) (0.509)
(Intercept) 14.107∗∗∗ 14.107∗∗∗ 14.107∗∗∗
(0.719) (0.680) (0.809)
# observations 374 374 374
# clusters 0 187 8
R2 0.834 0.834 0.834
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1, Random effects regression based on
Equation 2.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
As shown above, the difference-in-difference estimate for low types is given
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Table 2.3: Difference-in-Difference Productivity Effect (Start Easy)
No Cluster Individual Cluster Session Cluster
Low Types -0.081 -0.081 -0.081
(0.771) (0.706) (0.668)
High Types -1.376∗ -1.376∗ -1.376
(0.767) (0.830) (0.921)
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Estimates from Table 2.2. Based on random
effect regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 2.4: Difference-in-Difference Productivity Effect
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Low Types -0.081 0.068 -0.400 0.435
(0.705) (1.180) (0.713) (0.392)
High Types -1.376∗ 0.066 0.116 -0.308
(0.830) (0.479) (1.057) (0.379)
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Estimates from Table 2.A.1 in Appendix
2.A. Based on random effect regression. Robust standard errors clustered on individual
level in parentheses.
by the coefficient of the Treated*Part 2 interaction. Table 2.2 shows that ir-
respective of the modeling choice, the coefficient of Treated*Part 2 is not sig-
nificantly different from 0, i.e. there is no treatment effect for low types with
regard to productivity. For high type subjects, the difference-in-difference esti-
mate is given by the sum of the Treated*Part 2 and Treated*High Type*Part
2 interactions. For clarity, both effects are reproduced in Table 2.3. The effect
of knowing about being at a disadvantage is estimated as 1.376 fewer correct
strings at an average 5 correctly typed strings in part 2. This estimate is sig-
nificantly different from 0 on the 10% level for the specifications without robust
standard errors and robust standard errors clustered on the individual level.
Table 2.4 reports the difference-in-difference estimates for all 4 variants of
the experiment based on model 2.1 with added controls. The full regression
table is given in Table 2.A.1 in Appendix 2.A. Based on the small number of
sessions for each variant of the experiment the standard errors are robust and
clustered on the individual level. It can be seen that in neither of the 4 variants,
low type participants exhibit a treatment effect. What is more, it is indeed solely
the treatment effect for high type subjects in the “Start Easy” variant of the
experiment that shows a significant result.
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Emotional Response to Treatment
Following the approach used for the descriptive statistics, inference will be based
on the facial expressions recorded during the “Info Own” and “Info Others”
screens. In particular, random effects models will be estimated where each of
the six basic emotions as well as measures for valence, arousal and the neutral
state are regressed on dummies for high type subjects (H) and being treated
(T ) as well as an indicator (S) for whether participants are looking at the “Info
Own” or “Info Others” screen. In addition, interactions of all dummies H, T
and S are added.
Similar to the previous section, the following model is estimated with robust
standard errors clustered on the individual level
emotionit = β0 + β1H + β2T + β3S
+ β4H ∗ T + β5H ∗ S + β6T ∗ S + β7H ∗ T ∗ S + εit (2.2)
Besides, controls are added to the regression model. These consist of subject
characteristics such as gender, number of semesters at university, whether their
studies included classes on mathematics and measures from the STAXI-2 ques-
tionnaire except for state anger and the mean value of the emotion in question
during task 1, the time until the first correct string was typed and time itself.
Table 2.5 reports results for the “Start Easy” variant of the experiment.
As in the previous section, difference-in-difference estimates of the treatment
effects are given by the coefficients of the corresponding interactions. These are
Treated*Info Others for low type subjects and the sum Treated*InfoOthers +
Treated*Hightype*Info Others for high type subjects. For brevity, both group’s
treatment effects are reported in column 1 of Table 2.6.
For low type subjects, statistically significant treatment effects can be found
for valence angry, the neutral state, and arousal whereas high type subjects
exhibit a treatment effect with regard to the neutral state, surprised and arousal.
Therefore, a change in facial expression can be found for both types of subjects
with regard to the neutral state and arousal. However, while high type subjects
get more neutral as well as aroused, the opposite is true for low type subjects.
What is more, the coefficient for Mean Emotion in Task 1 is positive for all
measures of emotion and highly significant for 7 of the 9 measures which speaks











Table 2.5: Emotion Response (Start Easy)
Valence Angry Neutral Happy Sad Surprised Scared Disgusted Arousal
Treated 0.049 -0.020 0.035 -0.003 -0.051 -0.027 0.028 -0.024* 0.003
(0.050) (0.026) (0.032) (0.015) (0.038) (0.064) (0.028) (0.013) (0.017)
High Type 0.059 -0.008 -0.007 0.018 -0.018 0.023 0.007 -0.027* 0.039*
(0.049) (0.028) (0.032) (0.019) (0.044) (0.067) (0.023) (0.015) (0.023)
Info Others -0.041 -0.001 0.009 -0.014 0.029 -0.046 -0.002 -0.009 0.026*
(0.037) (0.025) (0.019) (0.012) (0.025) (0.036) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014)
Treated*High Type -0.212*** 0.038 -0.112*** -0.029 0.165*** 0.036 -0.023 0.040** -0.024
(0.069) (0.038) (0.043) (0.021) (0.058) (0.083) (0.038) (0.018) (0.026)
Treated*Info Others -0.078* 0.062** -0.063*** 0.006 0.046 0.057 -0.006 0.009 -0.019
(0.047) (0.029) (0.022) (0.015) (0.031) (0.047) (0.025) (0.014) (0.017)
High Type*Info Others 0.020 -0.005 -0.054* 0.008 -0.029 0.136** 0.022 -0.000 -0.066***
(0.063) (0.033) (0.032) (0.026) (0.045) (0.053) (0.023) (0.014) (0.018)
Treated*High Type*Info Others 0.048 -0.047 0.122*** -0.000 -0.019 -0.215*** 0.020 -0.023 0.071***
(0.081) (0.040) (0.039) (0.029) (0.058) (0.072) (0.033) (0.017) (0.024)
Mean Emotion Task 1 0.390*** 0.472*** 0.486*** 0.346 0.395*** 0.474*** 0.491*** 0.291 0.395***
(0.059) (0.060) (0.066) (0.244) (0.095) (0.066) (0.090) (0.182) (0.105)
Trait Anger -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.005* -0.002** -0.000
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Anger Out 0.007 -0.000 -0.004 0.001 -0.004 0.012 -0.003 0.000 -0.001
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Anger In -0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.002* 0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Anger Control 0.004 -0.001 -0.003 0.003 -0.000 0.007 -0.001 -0.002 0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Time 1st correct -0.000* 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.016 -0.018 0.007 0.000 0.020 -0.028 0.030* -0.009 0.010
(0.038) (0.022) (0.026) (0.011) (0.036) (0.050) (0.017) (0.009) (0.016)
Age 0.006* -0.004* -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.006 -0.002 -0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Semester 0.002 -0.000 0.006* -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
No Math -0.111*** 0.043 -0.017 -0.017* 0.022 -0.037 0.027 0.015 0.005
(0.041) (0.028) (0.033) (0.010) (0.039) (0.055) (0.026) (0.012) (0.018)
Time 0.004*** -0.001 0.001 0.001* -0.003*** 0.001 -0.001* 0.001** -0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
(Intercept) -0.213 0.111 0.305*** -0.021 0.043 -0.022 -0.040 0.149** 0.171***
(0.173) (0.094) (0.106) (0.067) (0.113) (0.215) (0.088) (0.069) (0.063)
# observations 94,853 94,853 94,853 94,853 94,853 94,853 94,853 94,853 94,853
# clusters 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173
R2 0.129 0.267 0.267 0.030 0.133 0.205 0.223 0.049 0.104
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effects regression based on Equation 2.2. Robust standard errors clustered on individual level in
parentheses.
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To check in how far the treatment effect on emotions carry over to the other
variants of the experiments, Table 2.6 compares the treatment effects for each
emotion measure across the four different variants of the experiment. The full
tables are reported in Tables 2.B.1 to 2.B.9.
Table 2.6: Difference-in-Difference Emotion Response
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Valence
Low Types -0.078* 0.073 -0.041 -0.066
(0.047) (0.062) (0.041) (0.056)
High Types -0.030 -0.047 0.145** 0.046
(0.069) (0.054) (0.058) (0.057)
Angry
Low Types 0.062** -0.003 0.021 0.030**
(0.029) (0.052) (0.030) (0.012)
High Types 0.014 0.001 0.040* 0.014
(0.028) (0.039) (0.021) (0.031)
Neutral
Low Types -0.063*** 0.013 0.056* 0.025
(0.022) (0.033) (0.030) (0.032)
High Types 0.058* -0.035 0.009 0.043
(0.033) (0.038) (0.032) (0.040)
Happy
Low Types 0.006 0.020 0.002 -0.032
(0.015) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022)
High Types 0.006 0.012 0.031* 0.030
(0.027) (0.019) (0.017) (0.028)
Sad
Low Types 0.046 -0.032 0.049 0.002
(0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.039)
High Types 0.027 0.069* -0.081* -0.017
(0.054) (0.039) (0.042) (0.039)
Surprised
Low Types 0.057 0.026 -0.092* -0.015
(0.047) (0.073) (0.052) (0.047)
High Types -0.158*** -0.009 0.026 -0.010
(0.053) (0.069) (0.053) (0.048)
Scared
Low Types -0.006 -0.021 -0.032* 0.008
(0.025) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018)
High Types 0.014 -0.006 -0.037 -0.007
(0.022) (0.024) (0.041) (0.012)
Disgusted
Low Types 0.009 0.015 0.000 -0.008
(0.014) (0.016) (0.004) (0.009)
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High Types -0.014 0.014*** -0.032 -0.014
(0.009) (0.005) (0.024) (0.014)
Arousal
Low Types -0.019 -0.016 0.005 0.018
(0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019)
High Types 0.052*** 0.064*** 0.011 0.041***
(0.017) (0.023) (0.014) (0.015)
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Difference-in-difference esti-
mates of emotion change from “Info Own” to “Info Others”. All estimates
are based on random effect regression of Equation 2.2. Robust standard
errors clustered on individual level in parentheses. Full regression tables
are presented in Tables 2.B.1 to 2.B.9 in Appendix 2.B.
For Valence, the top panel of Table 2.6 shows that low type subjects show
a negative effect on valence in the “Start Easy” variant that is marginally sig-
nificant. In addition, there is a positive effect of ones awareness of being disad-
vantaged in the “Start Easy Wage” variant that is significant on the 5% level.
While the measure for valence is an aggregate and therefore might lack
treatment effects, angry is measured directly by Facereader. What is more,
getting angry seems to be a plausible reaction for high type subjects in response
to the information defining the treatment. In addition, by including measures
from the STAXI-2 questionnaire, they not only serve the purpose of controlling
for subject characteristics, but could show in how far measure like anger control
are correlated with the expression of anger in the experiment26. High type
subjects in the variant “Start Easy Wage” reacted with more expressed anger
to the treatment. However, the other three variants of the experiment fail to
show a similar positive and significant effect for high type subjects. Perhaps
surprisingly, in two of the four variants, low type subjects’ reactions showed
more anger in response to the treatment. They expressed anger as response to
the information that high type subjects will receive a harder task in part 2 as
well as to the information that they themselves receive 6 times the piece rate
that high type participants receive in part 2.
For the neutral state, the variant “Start Easy” of the experiment shows a
different reaction from high and low type subjects. While low type subjects’
response to the treatment is given by the expression of less neutral state, high
type subjects’ facial expression show more neutral in response to the treatment.
Intuitively, happy could be the mirror image of angry in so far as low type
subjects could be assumed to express happiness as response to knowing that
they are advantaged compared to high type subjects. This is not born out in
26The various measures of attitudes towards anger from the STAXI-2 questionnaire do not
show a clear correlation with the expression of anger during the two tested screens of the
experiment.
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the data, though. Rather, in one variant, it is high type subjects who react
positively to the treatment. In addition, high type participants also expressed
less sadness in the “Start Easy Wage” variant.
Although the treatment might have had the potential to surprise subjects,
it did not seem to do so. In contrast, in two variants of the experiments, it was
actually subjects from the control group that increased their surprise more than
the corresponding treatment group among high and low types. This is even
though their screen just said “Please confirm that you are ready for part 2 of
the experiment”.
Based on the treatment, neither low nor high type subjects got scared. But
in the “Start Hard” variant, high type subjects got disgusted as they were
informed that low types were able to switch to the easier task.
The most consistent (across variants of the experiment) emotional reaction to
the treatment can be found in arousal. For high type subjects, the information
on how low type subjects work in part 2 increased arousal in 3 of the four
variants on a 1% level of statistical significance. For low type subjects, though,
arousal did not change at a statistically significant level.
Emotion and Productivity
Last but not least, we will explore the question of whether there is a correlation
between facial expressions during the information screens and productivity in
part 2. To this end, we estimate the following model
correctiP = Treated ∗Hightype ∗Part2 ∗DiffMeanEmoiPβ + εiP (2.3)
where Treated ∗Hightype ∗Part2 ∗DiffMeanEmo is a vector containing
variables for the main effects and all interactions of the three dummy variables
Treated, High Type and Part 2 as well as DiffMeanEmo, which is continuous.
In particular, Emo refers to each one of the nine measures of emotion that
Facereader returns, i.e. valence, angry, neutral, happy, sad, surprised, scared,
disgusted and arousal. Further, the Diff Mean refers to the mean of each emotion
during the “Info Others” and “Info Own” screen and the difference between the
two. In addition, controls are added which include the mean of the emotion in
question during task 1 of the experiment, the duration until the first task was
solved correctly, a dummy for gender, whether the subject’s curriculum includes
classes involving math, their semester and the STAXI-2 measures trait anger,
anger control, anger expression in, anger expression out.
In an additional specification, the model to be estimated is given by
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correctiP = Treated ∗Hightype ∗Part2
+Part2 ∗DiffMeanEmoiPβ + εiP (2.4)
such that DiffMeanEmo is only interacted with Part 2 and not with the dummies
for Treated and Hightype. The effect of DiffMeanEmo on the number of correct
strings in part 2 that comes from this specification is referred to as ALL in the
regression tables in contrast to the estimates for the four sub groups participants.
As before, all regression results reported are random effects regressions with
robust standard errors clustered on the individual level.
For the “Start Easy” variant, Table 2.8 shows the estimate of each emotion’s
impact on part 2 productivity for the four subject groups and the ALL specifi-
cation. This shorter table is derived from Table 2.7 below. According to Table
2.8, the effect of emotion on productivity is not strongly robust across the four
groups of subjects. Nevertheless, all estimates for the effect of angry on part 2
productivity are positive but only in case of Treated Low Types it is statistically
significant as well. The effect of an increase in angry for all subjects is estimated
to be positive as well, with a p-value of 0.0504. Therefore, it seems that the
expression of anger and possibly the feeling of anger seem to be associated with
increased productivity. Interestingly, treated low type subjects not only exhibit
a positive association between anger and productivity but also between happy
and productivity which might suggest that people can be motivated in different
ways. In turn, subjects who are not moved emotionally might not care about
the experiment and its design features and therefore show lower productivity.
This is backed by a statistically significant negative effect of the intensity of the



























Table 2.7: Effect of Emotion Response to Treatment on Productivity (Start Easy), Full Table
Valence Angry Neutral Happy Sad Surprised Scared Disgusted Arousal
Treated 0.711 0.464 0.737 0.857 0.598 0.690 0.784 0.768 0.921
(0.680) (0.726) (0.662) (0.662) (0.701) (0.677) (0.710) (0.701) (0.681)
High Type 7.142∗∗∗ 7.179∗∗∗ 7.141∗∗∗ 7.128∗∗∗ 6.996∗∗∗ 7.336∗∗∗ 7.014∗∗∗ 7.081∗∗∗ 7.024∗∗∗
(1.009) (1.070) (1.027) (1.076) (0.928) (1.155) (1.050) (1.040) (0.887)
Part 2 0.708 0.754 0.723 0.714 0.685 0.703 0.675 0.732 0.674
(0.572) (0.585) (0.568) (0.574) (0.583) (0.579) (0.585) (0.573) (0.566)
Treated*High Type 0.594 0.786 0.611 0.484 0.819 0.193 0.667 0.664 0.504
(1.175) (1.307) (1.253) (1.290) (1.085) (1.399) (1.293) (1.287) (1.119)
Treated*Part 2 0.277 0.110 -0.068 0.275 0.283 0.125 0.258 0.439 0.086
(0.757) (0.812) (0.792) (0.754) (0.773) (0.765) (0.795) (0.766) (0.766)
High Type*Part 2 -16.176∗∗∗ -16.207∗∗∗ -16.068∗∗∗ -16.176∗∗∗ -16.128∗∗∗ -16.214∗∗∗ -16.091∗∗∗ -16.148∗∗∗ -16.056∗∗∗
(0.943) (0.936) (0.924) (0.952) (0.935) (1.035) (0.926) (0.913) (0.885)
Treated*High Type*Part 2 -1.657 -1.525 -1.425 -1.596 -1.674 -1.463 -1.687 -1.870 -1.555
(1.195) (1.225) (1.207) (1.207) (1.200) (1.271) (1.202) (1.180) (1.163)
Difference Mean Emotion 0.783 1.390 -9.210∗∗ 5.692 -0.605 4.591 0.995 -1.512 -1.350
(1.293) (3.512) (4.661) (4.109) (1.385) (3.119) (6.727) (5.557) (5.507)
Treated*Diff. Mean Emotion -0.844 4.456 6.943 7.554 -0.057 -5.888∗ 0.029 -0.665 14.736
(2.199) (4.355) (5.777) (7.699) (3.924) (3.519) (6.897) (17.510) (10.400)
High Type*Diff. Mean Emotion -5.162 2.494 9.310 -11.211 9.309 -10.760∗∗ 2.102 -6.035 1.012
(4.071) (4.238) (5.790) (10.512) (9.572) (5.377) (7.595) (8.522) (9.597)
Part 2*Diff. Mean Emotion -0.816 2.474 -3.230 -0.045 1.069 -0.843 -1.570 1.929 7.319
(2.128) (4.838) (4.528) (4.839) (3.152) (2.948) (4.112) (3.887) (6.800)
Treated*High Type*Diff. Mean Emotion 6.086 -4.760 -5.305 5.281 -8.004 11.919∗∗ -7.306 5.239 -10.675
(4.761) (6.031) (7.508) (13.636) (10.891) (5.797) (8.692) (18.786) (13.435)
Treated*Part 2*Diff. Mean Emotion 0.248 0.508 -5.741 -2.275 0.495 4.005 0.185 -18.916∗ -24.865∗∗
(2.645) (5.802) (6.274) (10.201) (4.581) (3.246) (4.401) (10.386) (11.562)
High Type*Part 2*Diff. Mean Emotion 3.820 -5.345 4.861 5.720 -7.744 2.445 6.030 10.662 -6.831
(3.671) (5.571) (4.999) (8.292) (8.387) (4.242) (6.185) (7.223) (9.512)
Treated*High Type*Part 2*Diff. Mean Emotion -4.712 -0.230 3.295 -11.067 7.093 -5.794 -4.559 7.406 23.312










Mean Emotion Task 1 -0.243 -0.992 0.167 13.776 2.551 -0.054 -1.366 -5.437∗ 1.015
(1.624) (1.026) (1.066) (8.574) (4.268) (0.658) (1.960) (2.810) (3.294)
Trait Anger -0.056 -0.061 -0.065 -0.082∗ -0.059 -0.073∗ -0.071 -0.073 -0.060
(0.049) (0.047) (0.043) (0.042) (0.047) (0.044) (0.047) (0.045) (0.046)
Anger In -0.027 -0.038 -0.041 -0.028 -0.021 -0.077 -0.028 -0.038 -0.031
(0.055) (0.062) (0.061) (0.055) (0.056) (0.068) (0.062) (0.062) (0.058)
Anger Out -0.096 -0.074 -0.088 -0.080 -0.088 -0.046 -0.079 -0.069 -0.086
(0.101) (0.082) (0.079) (0.083) (0.083) (0.069) (0.085) (0.085) (0.089)
Anger Control -0.022 -0.016 -0.040 -0.020 -0.030 -0.002 -0.028 -0.020 -0.020
(0.052) (0.046) (0.047) (0.044) (0.048) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.049)
Time 1st correct -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Female 0.454 0.396 0.419 0.259 0.555 0.666∗ 0.374 0.342 0.357
(0.427) (0.458) (0.431) (0.464) (0.421) (0.401) (0.434) (0.441) (0.474)
Semester 0.046 0.059 0.024 0.028 0.032 0.043 0.039 0.048 0.047
(0.057) (0.058) (0.056) (0.054) (0.062) (0.056) (0.057) (0.054) (0.057)
No Math -0.483 -0.450 -0.594 -0.356 -0.477 -0.622 -0.517 -0.320 -0.467
(0.550) (0.500) (0.462) (0.488) (0.530) (0.510) (0.539) (0.557) (0.505)
(Intercept) 17.122∗∗∗ 17.127∗∗∗ 17.987∗∗∗ 17.484∗∗∗ 17.175∗∗∗ 17.364∗∗∗ 17.572∗∗∗ 17.302∗∗∗ 16.908∗∗∗
(2.336) (2.219) (2.376) (2.215) (2.122) (2.240) (2.328) (2.319) (2.320)
# observations 324 324 324 324 324 324 324 324 324
# clusters 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162
R2 0.846 0.845 0.846 0.845 0.846 0.846 0.843 0.845 0.845
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation 2.3 with robust standard errors clustered on



























Table 2.8: Effect of Emotion Response to Treatment on Productivity (Start Easy)
Valence Angry Neutral Happy Sad Surprised Scared Disgusted Arousal
Treated High Type -0.596 0.987 0.924 -0.352 1.554 -0.325 -4.095 -1.893 2.658
(1.543) (3.151) (2.204) (3.515) (1.525) (1.147) (3.62) (1.616) (3.539)
Control High Type -1.374 1.013 1.732 0.155 2.028 -4.568*** 7.556** 5.044 0.15
(1.314) (1.763) (3.033) (2.876) (2.551) (1.387) (3.732) (3.551) (4.33)
Treated Low Type -0.629 8.828*** -11.237** 10.925** 0.901 1.865 -0.361 -19.164* -4.16
(1.593) (3.016) (4.482) (4.616) (2.628) (1.673) (1.698) (10.98) (9.832)
Control Low Type -0.033 3.864 -12.44** 5.646 0.463 3.747 -0.575 0.417 5.969
(2.127) (2.806) (6.008) (3.719) (3.29) (4.278) (5.308) (6.048) (7.619)
ALL -0.711 2.94* -2.666 3.473 1.256 -0.728 0.14 -1.319 1.975
(0.812) (1.503) (1.664) (2.243) (1.174) (0.905) (1.508) (2.434) (2.694)
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Estimates in first 4 rows based on random effect regressions in Table 2.7. Estimates in last row based on
random effects regressions reported in column 1 of Tables 2.C.10 to 2.C.18 in Appendix 2.C. Robust standard errors clustered on individual level in
parentheses.
2.4. Results 69
In a next step, we will compare in how far the results from the “Start Easy”
variant are robust with regard to our variations of the experiment. To do so,
Table 2.9 presents the estimates for the association of a change in emotion
between the “Info Own” and “Info Others” screen with part 2 productivity.
As can be seen in Table 2.9 high type participants in the treatment show a
positive association between valence and productivity in the “Start Hard” and
“Start Easy Wage” variant of the treatment. The same is true for low type
subjects in the treatment but for them, the coefficients are not significantly
different from zero.
Panel 2 of Table 2.9 reports results on the effect of getting more angry from
the “Info Own” screen to the “Info Others” screen on part 2 productivity. As
reported above, in the “Start Easy” variant of the experiment all groups show
a positive effect of getting more angry on productivity. This positive effect is
significant on the 1% level for treated low types and close to being significant on
the 5% level for all subjects. However, in all other variants of the experiment,
it seems as if the effect of increased anger on productivity is rather negative.
Therefore, a general conclusion of the effect of anger on productivity is hard to
come by.
The effect of retaining a neutral state seems to differ between high and low
types, though few estimates are significantly different from zero. Still, for high
type subjects the majority of estimates are positive, whereas the majority of
estimates for low types is negative.
Based on the estimates in the panel on happy in Table 2.9, in most cases there
might be a negative effect of becoming more happy on productivity. However,
in those cases where the effect is significantly different from zero the effect is
positive for treated subjects but negative for subjects from the control. This
would be consistent with people in the control who dislike the experiment being
happy that the experimenter does not ask them for more unpleasant things and
afterwards enjoy the quite life and slack off during part 2. In contrast, those
in the treatments that get more happy do so because of the information they
receive, i.e. based on characteristics of the experiment, and might therefore be
more prone to exert effort afterwards.
For both, sad and surprised, the estimates are positive and negative and
mostly not significantly different from zero. Those that are significant are nega-
tive. One might therefore conclude that it is probably not the case that inducing
sadness or surprise increases productivity.
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Table 2.9: Effect of Emotion Response to Treatment on Productivity
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Valence
Treated High Type -0.596 3.276** 9.917** 0.443
(1.543) (1.483) (3.852) (1.559)
Control High Type -1.374 -0.637 -1.122 -0.019
(1.314) (1.281) (3.812) (0.692)
Treated Low Type -0.629 2.953 0.142 -0.315
(1.593) (3.313) (3.069) (1.219)
Control Low Type -0.033 -0.405 -1.791 -2.179***
(2.127) (5.409) (5.457) (0.619)
ALL -0.711 1.349 3.404 -0.64
(0.812) (1.801) (2.36) (0.616)
Angry
Treated High Type 0.987 -1.191 -6.82 -3.695
(3.151) (1.769) (4.839) (3.424)
Control High Type 1.013 -3.64** 5.962 -2.829*
(1.763) (1.53) (11.974) (1.515)
Treated Low Type 8.828*** -1.969 -19.627*** 4.457
(3.016) (4.354) (7.063) (4.914)
Control Low Type 3.864 -5.757 -2.143 1.823
(2.806) (4.156) (6.506) (1.947)
ALL 2.94* -3.236* -7.542* -1.824
(1.503) (1.928) (3.882) (1.819)
Neutral
Treated High Type 0.924 1.556 14.38* -1.37
(2.204) (3.236) (7.536) (2.095)
Control High Type 1.732 1.758 -12.257 2.808
(3.033) (2.453) (8.059) (1.886)
Treated Low Type -11.237** 4.086 -6.28 -0.19
(4.482) (3.45) (4.39) (2.313)
Control Low Type -12.44** -13.402 -1.948 -1.951
(6.008) (9.132) (6.242) (2.437)
ALL -2.666 0.545 -1.321 -0.313
(1.664) (2.215) (3.569) (1.13)
Happy
Treated High Type -0.352 7.072*** -1.092 -2.714
(3.515) (2.627) (9.909) (3.53)
Control High Type 0.155 -0.191 -48.971* -1.911
(2.876) (4.95) (27.457) (2.516)
Treated Low Type 10.925** -3.742 -0.48 -3.046
(4.616) (5.471) (7.786) (3.849)
Control Low Type 5.646 4.32 -11.674** -6.125***
(3.719) (7.758) (5.948) (0.973)
ALL 3.473 2.22 -7.697 -3.46**
(2.243) (3.113) (6.809) (1.413)
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Sad
Treated High Type 1.554 -2.995 -12.259** 0.433
(1.525) (3.534) (5.334) (1.348)
Control High Type 2.028 0.33 -1.377 0.38
(2.551) (1.576) (5.374) (0.76)
Treated Low Type 0.901 -7.846* 6.681 -1.467
(2.628) (4.458) (5.896) (1.788)
Control Low Type 0.463 0.995 0.962 1.899
(3.29) (10.826) (7.047) (1.369)
ALL 1.256 -1.747 -3.005 0.61
(1.174) (3.424) (3.372) (0.706)
Surprised
Treated High Type -0.325 1.145 -0.555 1.104
(1.147) (1.484) (5.861) (1.368)
Control High Type -4.568*** -0.291 1.704 -0.185
(1.387) (1.069) (2.817) (1.092)
Treated Low Type 1.865 2.109 0.208 1.102
(1.673) (2.852) (1.873) (1.278)
Control Low Type 3.747 0.658 2.228 0.617
(4.278) (4.518) (4.494) (1.397)
ALL -0.728 0.701 0.744 0.676
(0.905) (1.375) (1.914) (0.638)
Scared
Treated High Type -4.095 -3.989 -12.899** 3.532
(3.62) (4.186) (5.906) (8.136)
Control High Type 7.556** 5.042** -5.457 -0.432
(3.732) (2.065) (8.976) (2.777)
Treated Low Type -0.361 -5.403 14.078** 3.431**
(1.698) (9.013) (7.027) (1.709)
Control Low Type -0.575 16.406 -9.066 5.125
(5.308) (12.208) (7.422) (4.234)
ALL 0.14 6.185 -4.788 3.018*
(1.508) (5.597) (4.621) (1.716)
Disgusted
Treated High Type -1.893 -1.084 2.833 -1.657
(1.616) (18.894) (8.771) (3.004)
Control High Type 5.044 4.266** 33.937** -5.773
(3.551) (1.666) (14.833) (4.372)
Treated Low Type -19.164* 2.835 69.366 0.712
(10.98) (4.587) (44.4) (3.353)
Control Low Type 0.417 -21.734* 8.807 -3.132**
(6.048) (11.43) (47.624) (1.56)
ALL -1.319 -0.896 23.535* -2.782**
(2.434) (3.156) (12.284) (1.38)
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Arousal
Treated High Type 2.658 -0.092 15.628 -0.016
(3.539) (3.544) (23.111) (3.425)
Control High Type 0.15 -4.35 18.939 2.568
(4.33) (4.631) (15.275) (7.552)
Treated Low Type -4.16 13.843 -0.384 2.617
(9.832) (8.699) (9.49) (2.966)
Control Low Type 5.969 -22.341** 5.806 -2.953
(7.619) (10.186) (10.124) (2.808)
ALL 1.975 -3.036 9.971 0.46
(2.694) (3.698) (7.479) (1.89)
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Estimated effects of change in mean
emotion from “Info Own” to “Info Others”. The first 4 rows in each panel are
based on estimates in Tables 2.C.1 to 2.C.9. Estimates for ALL based on Tables
2.C.10 to 2.C.18. All estimates based on random effect regression with robust
standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
While there has been no significant treatment effect on the expression of
scared and disgusted, several estimates for certain subgroup - variant combina-
tions show significant effects of these emotion on part 2 productivity.
Arousal is the one measure that appeared to be most strongly affected by
the treatment in high type subjects. Coefficients for the effect of an increase
in arousal on part 2 productivity, however, are positive as well as negative and,
with one exception, not statistically significant.
All in all, no clear picture emerges concerning the effect of the different
emotion on productivity. But it seems like the effect of emotion on productivity
could be context dependent as was seen with regard to the effect of getting
happy on productivity.
2.5 Discussion
Overall, the experiments are characterized by a remarkable lack of results. Based
on difference-in-difference estimates, the only statistically significant treatment
effect with regard to productivity can be reported for high type subjects in the
“Start Easy” variant. One potential explanation could be that participants did
not perceive the treatment as unfair. However, in an open question at the end
of the “Start Hard Wage” experiment, 22 out of 48 treated high type subjects
stated that the difference in wages was unfair. What is more, in the same
experiment, due to the wage difference in the second part of the real effort task,
treated low type participants earned 15.50 EUR at the median whereas treated
high type participants earned 5 EUR. Therefore, fairness concerns that aim at
equalizing monetary payoff cannot directly explain the lack of adjustments in
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effort.
In terms of emotion, several arguments can be made for why there might
be a lack of facial expression of emotions in response of the treatment. One
might be that participants in the experiments were just not moved emotionally.
However, the comments in the questionnaire seem to indicate that people felt
treated unfairly. Also, anecdotal evidence from the laboratory suggests that
people actually got angry. In our opinion, there are three main reasons why
no robust treatment effect in terms of emotion was found in the data. First,
the treatment was delivered in written form, i.e. participants had to read and
understand the information that was given to them. It is our understanding,
that the involvement of a more cognitive process might reduce the spontaneous
facial expression of emotion. In comparison, tests of the software conducted by
the authors outside the lab showed that reactions to various video clips were a lot
stronger. Therefore, the communication of information in a form that reduces
the involvement of cognitive processes might have facilitated the measurement
of a treatment effect in terms of emotion. Second, while it is known when the
emotional episode triggered by the treatment could have started the earliest,
its actual start and end are not known to the authors. The lack of treatment
effects in the facial expression of emotion could therefore be due to a focus on
the wrong time span in the analysis. Third, alternative choices for the time
emotions are analyzed are not promising as this approach suffers from an open
methodological question: Of all the information a constant stream of facial
expression provides, which are the relevant facial expressions associated with a
stimulus?
The last question appears to be a crucial one. While the Facereader software
appears to be at least as good as humans in recognizing facial expressions in
pictures (see Lewinski et al., 2014), the interpretation of the resulting data from
videos lacks the human ability to tell apart noise and actual information con-
veyed through facial expressions. In other words, we belief that humans have
learned to filter the constant stream of facial expressions they see and interpret
the ones they perceive as being related to a certain stimulus. In our opinion, fur-
ther research is necessary to determine which measures of the recorded emotion
correspond most closely to participants emotional episode in the experiment.
While we have analyzed certain moments such as mean and median of the emo-
tion distribution over a period of time and compared those to the same moments
over a time span we deem neutral, others measures might be superior.
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the effect of disadvantageous and preferential treatment of
workers on effort as well as the mediating role of emotion in real effort exper-
iments. We show that disadvantaged participants reduce their effort when the
disadvantage comes in terms of increased own workload at a constant wage.
However, this results is not robust with regard to treatment variations in which
a comparison group receives a decreased work load or the treatment comes in
terms of wage changes instead of altered tasks. No robust effect of the informa-
tion on being (dis)advantaged can be reported.
Appendix
2.A Productivity Response
Table 2.A.1: Productivity Response to the Treatment
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated 0.467 0.059 -0.133 0.400∗
(0.585) (0.242) (0.713) (0.212)
High Type 6.927∗∗∗ 2.807∗∗∗ 9.063∗∗∗ 2.650∗∗∗
(0.854) (0.383) (0.864) (0.268)
Part 2 0.622 12.590∗∗∗ 1.900∗∗∗ 1.409∗∗∗
(0.521) (0.915) (0.533) (0.264)
Treated*High Type 0.471 -0.195 -0.060 -0.034
(1.073) (0.398) (1.438) (0.329)
Treated*Part 2 -0.081 0.068 -0.400 0.435
(0.705) (1.180) (0.713) (0.392)
High Type*Part 2 -16.100∗∗∗ -13.015∗∗∗ -4.016∗∗∗ -0.888∗∗
(0.837) (0.965) (1.041) (0.376)
Treated*High Type*P. 2 -1.295 -0.002 0.516 -0.743
(1.089) (1.273) (1.275) (0.545)
Time 1st correct -0.009∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.009) (0.000)
Female 0.369 -0.169 -1.097 -0.174
(0.408) (0.351) (0.742) (0.219)
Semester 0.048 0.046∗∗∗ 0.077 0.042
(0.051) (0.012) (0.079) (0.035)
No Math -0.465 -0.740∗ 0.260 -0.196
(0.456) (0.384) (0.807) (0.322)
(Intercept) 14.107∗∗∗ 3.451∗∗∗ 15.172∗∗∗ 2.445∗∗∗
(0.679) (0.486) (1.159) (0.318)
# observations 374 312 322 368
# clusters 187 156 161 184
R2 0.834 0.747 0.348 0.413
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.1 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
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2.B Emotion Response
Table 2.B.1: Valence Response to Treatment
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated 0.049 0.042 -0.032 0.022
(0.050) (0.054) (0.066) (0.064)
High Type 0.059 -0.066 -0.045 0.143*
(0.049) (0.060) (0.066) (0.074)
Treated*High Type -0.212*** 0.004 0.007 -0.044
(0.069) (0.074) (0.085) (0.086)
Info Others -0.041 -0.089* 0.007 0.095*
(0.037) (0.051) (0.028) (0.049)
Treated*Others -0.078* 0.073 -0.041 -0.066
(0.047) (0.062) (0.041) (0.056)
High Type*Others 0.020 0.145** -0.065 -0.103
(0.063) (0.058) (0.049) (0.063)
Treated*High Type*Others 0.048 -0.120 0.186** 0.112
(0.081) (0.083) (0.073) (0.079)
Mean Val Task 1 0.390*** 0.458*** 0.305*** 0.566***
(0.059) (0.102) (0.101) (0.098)
Trait Anger -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.009**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Anger Out 0.007 0.012** -0.006 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
Anger In -0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Anger Control 0.004 0.003 -0.006 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Time 1st correct2 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.006* 0.004 0.002 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006)
No Math -0.111*** -0.030 -0.091 0.012
(0.041) (0.045) (0.062) (0.047)
Female -0.016 0.045 0.051 0.037
(0.038) (0.039) (0.045) (0.042)
Semester 0.002 -0.005*** -0.006 0.005
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Time 0.004*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
(Intercept) -0.213 -0.413** 0.174 -0.090
(0.173) (0.183) (0.177) (0.213)
# observations 94,853 80,576 64,821 88,111
# clusters 173 152 154 177
R2 0.129 0.092 0.142 0.102
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.2 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
2.B. Emotion Response 77
Table 2.B.2: Angry Response to Treatment
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated -0.020 -0.030 0.026 -0.035
(0.026) (0.038) (0.024) (0.030)
High Type -0.008 -0.017 0.038 0.014
(0.028) (0.041) (0.027) (0.032)
Treated*High Type 0.038 -0.010 -0.038 -0.014
(0.038) (0.054) (0.038) (0.043)
Info Others -0.001 0.014 -0.002 -0.009
(0.025) (0.041) (0.013) (0.012)
Treated*Others 0.062** -0.003 0.021 0.030**
(0.029) (0.052) (0.030) (0.012)
High Type*Others -0.005 -0.017 -0.018 0.010
(0.033) (0.046) (0.018) (0.025)
Treated*High Type*Others -0.047 0.004 0.019 -0.016
(0.040) (0.065) (0.037) (0.033)
Mean Angry Task 1 0.472*** 0.471*** 0.385*** 0.672***
(0.060) (0.115) (0.107) (0.097)
Trait Anger -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Anger Out -0.000 -0.001 0.003 -0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Anger In 0.001 -0.002 -0.004* -0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Anger Control -0.001 0.003 0.003* -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Time 1st correct2 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age -0.004* 0.001 0.002* 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004)
No Math 0.043 -0.026 0.028 0.019
(0.028) (0.022) (0.034) (0.031)
Female -0.018 0.005 -0.005 -0.029
(0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.020)
Semester -0.000 0.003** -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Time -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(Intercept) 0.111 0.051 -0.198** 0.127
(0.094) (0.139) (0.080) (0.130)
# observations 94,853 80,576 64,821 88,111
# clusters 173 152 154 177
R2 0.267 0.218 0.282 0.270
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.2 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
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Table 2.B.3: Neutral Response to Treatment
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated 0.035 0.041 -0.086** -0.045
(0.032) (0.033) (0.042) (0.039)
High Type -0.007 -0.001 -0.044 0.010
(0.032) (0.033) (0.042) (0.043)
Treated*High Type -0.112*** -0.003 0.073 0.078
(0.043) (0.050) (0.053) (0.054)
Info Others 0.009 0.020 -0.040* -0.018
(0.019) (0.026) (0.024) (0.027)
Treated*Others -0.063*** 0.013 0.056* 0.025
(0.022) (0.033) (0.030) (0.032)
High Type*Others -0.054* -0.007 0.035 -0.024
(0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.034)
Treated*High Type*Others 0.122*** -0.048 -0.046 0.018
(0.039) (0.050) (0.044) (0.051)
Mean Neutral Task 1 0.486*** 0.546*** 0.653*** 0.454***
(0.066) (0.078) (0.079) (0.066)
Trait Anger -0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Anger Out -0.004 0.006* -0.002 -0.006*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Anger In 0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Anger Control -0.003 0.001 -0.003 -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Time 1st correct2 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age -0.002 -0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
No Math -0.017 0.033 0.024 -0.006
(0.033) (0.024) (0.037) (0.038)
Female 0.007 0.004 0.025 -0.101***
(0.026) (0.023) (0.026) (0.028)
Semester 0.006* -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
Time 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
(Intercept) 0.305*** -0.002 0.080 0.220
(0.106) (0.098) (0.133) (0.140)
# observations 94,853 80,576 64,821 88,111
# clusters 173 152 154 177
R2 0.267 0.278 0.272 0.238
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.2 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
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Table 2.B.4: Happy Response to Treatment
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated -0.003 0.012 -0.013 -0.012
(0.015) (0.017) (0.024) (0.022)
High Type 0.018 -0.012 -0.008 0.029
(0.019) (0.017) (0.024) (0.035)
Treated*High Type -0.029 -0.011 -0.015 -0.041
(0.021) (0.020) (0.026) (0.035)
Info Others -0.014 -0.029 -0.016 0.028
(0.012) (0.020) (0.015) (0.021)
Treated*Others 0.006 0.020 0.002 -0.032
(0.015) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022)
High Type*Others 0.008 0.032 0.008 -0.022
(0.026) (0.021) (0.017) (0.032)
Treated*High Type*Others -0.000 -0.008 0.029 0.062*
(0.029) (0.030) (0.028) (0.035)
Mean Happy Task 1 0.346 0.652*** 0.190 0.734
(0.244) (0.222) (0.168) (0.559)
Trait Anger 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Anger Out 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Anger In -0.002* 0.002 -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Anger Control 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Time 1st correct2 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
No Math -0.017* -0.006 -0.015 -0.013
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.023)
Female 0.000 -0.011 -0.009 0.020
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.019)
Semester -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Time 0.001* 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(Intercept) -0.021 0.021 0.119** 0.028
(0.067) (0.041) (0.058) (0.072)
# observations 94,853 80,576 64,821 88,111
# clusters 173 152 154 177
R2 0.030 0.068 0.019 0.051
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.2 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
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Table 2.B.5: Sad Response to Treatment
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated -0.051 -0.021 -0.033 0.006
(0.038) (0.035) (0.054) (0.050)
High Type -0.018 0.075* -0.038 -0.108**
(0.044) (0.044) (0.057) (0.052)
Treated*High Type 0.165*** -0.012 0.033 -0.022
(0.058) (0.049) (0.072) (0.066)
Info Others 0.029 0.013 -0.025 -0.030
(0.025) (0.024) (0.018) (0.036)
Treated*Others 0.046 -0.032 0.049 0.002
(0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.039)
High Type*Others -0.029 -0.075* 0.048 0.044
(0.045) (0.039) (0.033) (0.041)
Treated*High Type*Others -0.019 0.100** -0.131** -0.019
(0.058) (0.050) (0.053) (0.054)
Mean Sad Task 1 0.395*** 0.886*** 0.456** 0.672***
(0.095) (0.125) (0.193) (0.158)
Trait Anger -0.001 0.004 0.003 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Anger Out -0.004 -0.006 0.000 0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Anger In 0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Anger Control -0.000 -0.006* -0.001 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Time 1st correct2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.001 -0.006** -0.006** 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
No Math 0.022 0.037 0.043 -0.023
(0.039) (0.034) (0.052) (0.034)
Female 0.020 -0.045* -0.068* -0.002
(0.036) (0.027) (0.037) (0.031)
Semester -0.004 0.002** 0.004 -0.006*
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003)
Time -0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(Intercept) 0.043 0.330** 0.243 0.026
(0.113) (0.155) (0.150) (0.172)
# observations 94,853 80,576 64,821 88,111
# clusters 173 152 154 177
R2 0.133 0.157 0.128 0.145
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.2 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
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Table 2.B.6: Surprised Response to Treatment
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated -0.027 -0.066 0.118 0.138**
(0.064) (0.068) (0.073) (0.065)
High Type 0.023 -0.009 -0.030 0.028
(0.067) (0.069) (0.074) (0.065)
Treated*High Type 0.036 0.026 -0.022 -0.104
(0.083) (0.088) (0.097) (0.087)
Info Others -0.046 -0.054 0.062* 0.049
(0.036) (0.066) (0.037) (0.034)
Treated*Others 0.057 0.026 -0.092* -0.015
(0.047) (0.073) (0.052) (0.047)
High Type*Others 0.136** 0.082 -0.074 -0.005
(0.053) (0.085) (0.054) (0.041)
Treated*High Type*Others -0.215*** -0.034 0.118 0.005
(0.072) (0.098) (0.074) (0.067)
Mean Surprised Task 1 0.474*** 0.506*** 0.668*** 0.575***
(0.066) (0.063) (0.070) (0.061)
Trait Anger -0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.011**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Anger Out 0.012 0.003 0.003 0.005
(0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
Anger In -0.005 0.003 0.001 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Anger Control 0.007 0.004 -0.000 0.005
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Time 1st correct2 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.006 0.003 0.000 -0.009**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
No Math -0.037 -0.047 -0.073 0.055
(0.055) (0.050) (0.067) (0.067)
Female -0.028 0.029 -0.027 0.128***
(0.050) (0.042) (0.050) (0.045)
Semester -0.005 -0.003 -0.009* 0.016***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006)
Time 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.003**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
(Intercept) -0.022 -0.001 0.369 -0.059
(0.215) (0.233) (0.225) (0.195)
# observations 94,853 80,576 64,821 88,111
# clusters 173 152 154 177
R2 0.205 0.238 0.360 0.303
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.2 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
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Table 2.B.7: Scared Response to Treatment
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated 0.028 0.011 0.021 -0.018
(0.028) (0.025) (0.019) (0.014)
High Type 0.007 -0.006 0.025 -0.033**
(0.023) (0.025) (0.021) (0.014)
Treated*High Type -0.023 0.025 -0.029 0.027*
(0.038) (0.034) (0.035) (0.017)
Info Others -0.002 0.019 0.011 -0.021*
(0.011) (0.017) (0.013) (0.011)
Treated*Others -0.006 -0.021 -0.032* 0.008
(0.025) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018)
High Type*Others 0.022 -0.018 0.019 0.027*
(0.023) (0.024) (0.039) (0.014)
Treated*High Type*Others 0.020 0.014 -0.005 -0.015
(0.033) (0.031) (0.043) (0.021)
Mean Scared Task 1 0.491*** 0.582*** 0.456* 0.203***
(0.090) (0.169) (0.255) (0.068)
Trait Anger 0.005* 0.003** 0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Anger Out -0.003 -0.000 0.003 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Anger In -0.002 -0.000 -0.003 -0.002**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Anger Control -0.001 -0.002 0.003* 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Time 1st correct2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age -0.002 0.003 -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
No Math 0.027 -0.023 -0.010 -0.017**
(0.026) (0.016) (0.017) (0.008)
Female 0.030* -0.022 0.044*** 0.010
(0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.008)
Semester 0.001 -0.000 0.006** 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Time -0.001* 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
(Intercept) -0.040 -0.035 -0.153** 0.027
(0.088) (0.118) (0.060) (0.034)
# observations 94,853 80,576 64,821 88,111
# clusters 173 152 154 177
R2 0.223 0.193 0.236 0.066
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.2 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
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Table 2.B.8: Disgusted Response to Treatment
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated -0.024* -0.019 -0.001 -0.008
(0.013) (0.016) (0.006) (0.011)
High Type -0.027* -0.023 0.009 0.009
(0.015) (0.017) (0.010) (0.013)
Treated*High Type 0.040** 0.026 0.009 0.020
(0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.017)
Info Others -0.009 0.004 -0.001 -0.005
(0.015) (0.007) (0.003) (0.010)
Treated*Others 0.009 0.015 0.000 -0.008
(0.014) (0.016) (0.004) (0.009)
High Type*Others -0.000 -0.006 0.016 0.001
(0.014) (0.009) (0.019) (0.012)
Treated*High Type*Others -0.023 -0.001 -0.032 -0.006
(0.017) (0.015) (0.024) (0.016)
Mean Disgusted Task 1 0.291 0.648*** 0.281*** 1.221***
(0.182) (0.144) (0.070) (0.249)
Trait Anger -0.002** -0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Anger Out 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.002*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Anger In -0.000 -0.002* -0.001* 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Anger Control -0.002 0.002* -0.000 -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Time 1st correct2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age -0.001 -0.003** -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
No Math 0.015 0.035 -0.003 -0.002
(0.012) (0.025) (0.007) (0.013)
Female -0.009 -0.002 -0.006 -0.009
(0.009) (0.015) (0.006) (0.007)
Semester -0.000 0.001** -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Time 0.001** -0.000* 0.000 0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(Intercept) 0.149** 0.072 0.045 0.029
(0.069) (0.051) (0.062) (0.043)
# observations 94,853 80,576 64,821 88,111
# clusters 173 152 154 177
R2 0.049 0.046 0.056 0.240
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.2 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
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Table 2.B.9: Arousal Response to Treatment
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated 0.003 0.008 0.010 -0.023
(0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.020)
High Type 0.039* -0.003 0.033* -0.015
(0.023) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020)
Treated*High Type -0.024 -0.018 -0.049** 0.004
(0.026) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Info Others 0.026* 0.003 -0.018 -0.018
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Treated*Others -0.019 -0.016 0.005 0.018
(0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019)
High Type*Others -0.066*** -0.022 0.013 -0.014
(0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.015)
Treated*High Type*Others 0.071*** 0.079*** 0.006 0.023
(0.024) (0.029) (0.023) (0.024)
Mean Arousal Task 1 0.395*** 0.601*** 0.223*** 0.562***
(0.105) (0.102) (0.084) (0.124)
Trait Anger -0.000 -0.003** 0.002* 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Anger Out -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Anger In -0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Anger Control 0.001 -0.002** 0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Time 1st correct2 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
No Math 0.005 -0.020* 0.002 -0.026
(0.018) (0.012) (0.017) (0.019)
Female 0.010 0.014 -0.028** -0.018
(0.016) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Semester -0.000 0.002*** 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Time -0.001*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
(Intercept) 0.171*** 0.214*** 0.249*** 0.255***
(0.063) (0.059) (0.061) (0.071)
# observations 94,853 80,576 64,821 88,111
# clusters 173 152 154 177
R2 0.104 0.130 0.071 0.084
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.2 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
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2.C Emotion and Productivity
Table 2.C.1: Effect of Valence on Productivity
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated 0.711 0.056 0.029 0.523∗∗
(0.680) (0.300) (0.819) (0.242)
Hightype 7.142∗∗∗ 2.757∗∗∗ 9.289∗∗∗ 2.574∗∗∗
(1.009) (0.473) (0.955) (0.284)
Part 2 0.708 12.643∗∗∗ 1.906∗∗∗ 1.520∗∗∗
(0.572) (1.066) (0.631) (0.312)
Diff Mean Emo 0.783 -0.445 -4.702 -0.847∗∗
(1.293) (0.987) (4.209) (0.406)
T*H 0.594 -0.031 -0.543 -0.120
(1.175) (0.496) (1.474) (0.383)
T*P2 0.277 0.225 -0.194 0.360
(0.757) (1.317) (0.789) (0.449)
H*P2 -16.176∗∗∗ -13.076∗∗∗ -3.417∗∗∗ -0.993∗∗
(0.943) (1.120) (1.135) (0.426)
T*DME -0.844 1.334 1.627 1.931∗
(2.199) (1.387) (5.085) (1.016)
H*DME -5.162 0.130 0.316 0.947
(4.071) (2.331) (4.889) (0.802)
P2*DME -0.816 0.040 2.912 -1.333∗∗
(2.128) (4.891) (4.566) (0.598)
T*H*P2 -1.657 -0.097 -0.559 -0.708
(1.195) (1.415) (1.370) (0.605)
T*H*DME 6.086 -0.346 8.387 -3.096∗∗
(4.761) (2.851) (6.285) (1.336)
T*P2*DME 0.248 2.023 0.306 -0.068
(2.645) (5.845) (5.033) (1.711)
H*P2*DME 3.820 -0.362 0.353 1.213
(3.671) (5.264) (5.700) (0.927)
T*H*P2*DME -4.712 0.902 0.719 1.695
(4.539) (6.267) (6.467) (2.253)
Mean Emo Task 1 -0.243 0.142 -4.940∗∗ -0.014
(1.624) (1.309) (2.116) (0.476)
Trait Anger -0.056 -0.020 0.169∗ -0.011
(0.049) (0.040) (0.092) (0.027)
Anger Control -0.022 0.043 0.075 0.034
(0.052) (0.035) (0.075) (0.025)
Anger In -0.027 -0.033 -0.030 -0.001
(0.055) (0.050) (0.089) (0.027)
Anger Out -0.096 0.073 -0.069 -0.030
(0.101) (0.058) (0.134) (0.031)
Time 1st correct -0.008∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.042∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.018) (0.000)
Female 0.454 -0.173 -1.047 -0.180
(0.427) (0.366) (0.734) (0.242)
No Math -0.483 -0.777∗ -0.150 0.015
(0.550) (0.405) (0.848) (0.375)
Semester 0.046 0.047∗∗∗ 0.095 0.100∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.014) (0.083) (0.035)
(Intercept) 17.122∗∗∗ 2.266 11.133∗∗∗ 1.835∗∗
(2.336) (1.895) (3.596) (0.919)
# observations 324 292 284 330
# clusters 162 146 142 175
R2 0.846 0.750 0.415 0.452
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.3 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
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Table 2.C.2: Effect of Angry on Productivity
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated 0.464 0.108 1.127 0.665∗∗
(0.726) (0.308) (0.857) (0.260)
Hightype 7.179∗∗∗ 2.828∗∗∗ 9.581∗∗∗ 2.675∗∗∗
(1.070) (0.459) (0.908) (0.290)
Part 2 0.754 12.807∗∗∗ 2.029∗∗∗ 1.507∗∗∗
(0.585) (1.016) (0.621) (0.318)
Diff Mean Emo 1.390 0.283 -13.102∗∗∗ -1.558
(3.512) (1.122) (4.820) (1.594)
T*H 0.786 -0.159 -1.462 -0.275
(1.307) (0.517) (1.425) (0.393)
T*P2 0.110 0.075 -0.453 0.266
(0.812) (1.281) (0.790) (0.456)
H*P2 -16.207∗∗∗ -13.293∗∗∗ -3.785∗∗∗ -0.998∗∗
(0.936) (1.067) (1.139) (0.431)
T*DME 4.456 -1.038 -2.741 -2.430
(4.355) (1.872) (7.232) (2.471)
H*DME 2.494 -0.856 39.119∗∗∗ 0.711
(4.238) (1.793) (8.126) (2.264)
P2*DME 2.474 -6.040∗ 10.958 3.380∗∗
(4.838) (3.373) (8.507) (1.554)
T*H*P2 -1.525 0.145 0.205 -0.542
(1.225) (1.380) (1.389) (0.611)
T*H*DME -4.760 1.427 -25.243∗∗ 3.717
(6.031) (2.441) (10.383) (3.344)
T*P2*DME 0.508 4.827 -14.742 5.064
(5.802) (5.649) (8.967) (4.438)
H*P2*DME -5.345 2.973 -31.013∗∗ -5.363∗∗
(5.571) (3.748) (12.643) (2.457)
T*H*P2*DME -0.230 -2.767 29.944∗∗ -7.217
(8.163) (6.078) (13.562) (5.510)
Mean Emo Task 1 -0.992 1.133 5.145∗∗ 0.271
(1.026) (1.471) (2.556) (0.521)
Trait Anger -0.061 -0.019 0.218∗∗ -0.005
(0.047) (0.039) (0.102) (0.029)
Anger Control -0.016 0.044 0.074 0.022
(0.046) (0.037) (0.072) (0.024)
Anger In -0.038 -0.022 -0.045 -0.001
(0.062) (0.053) (0.088) (0.027)
Anger Out -0.074 0.078 -0.083 -0.053
(0.082) (0.060) (0.125) (0.033)
Time 1st correct -0.008∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.013) (0.000)
Female 0.396 -0.194 -0.467 -0.204
(0.458) (0.372) (0.734) (0.248)
No Math -0.450 -0.630 -0.407 -0.026
(0.500) (0.400) (0.890) (0.396)
Semester 0.059 0.039∗∗ 0.076 0.088∗∗
(0.058) (0.015) (0.087) (0.036)
(Intercept) 17.127∗∗∗ 1.847 12.304∗∗∗ 2.281∗∗
(2.219) (1.893) (3.283) (0.932)
# observations 324 292 284 330
# clusters 162 146 142 175
R2 0.845 0.754 0.416 0.450
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.3 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
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Table 2.C.3: Effect of Neutral on Productivity
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated 0.737 -0.012 1.270 0.598∗∗
(0.662) (0.294) (0.836) (0.231)
Hightype 7.141∗∗∗ 2.803∗∗∗ 9.706∗∗∗ 2.605∗∗∗
(1.027) (0.419) (1.031) (0.291)
Part 2 0.723 12.769∗∗∗ 1.914∗∗∗ 1.424∗∗∗
(0.568) (0.997) (0.621) (0.305)
Diff Mean Emo -9.210∗∗ 1.102 -0.960 -1.379
(4.661) (2.174) (4.169) (1.140)
T*H 0.611 0.069 -1.439 -0.181
(1.253) (0.458) (1.506) (0.382)
T*P2 -0.068 0.019 -0.485 0.436
(0.792) (1.267) (0.824) (0.441)
H*P2 -16.068∗∗∗ -13.225∗∗∗ -3.427∗∗∗ -0.784∗
(0.924) (1.046) (1.120) (0.430)
T*DME 6.943 -0.003 -9.810 3.802∗∗∗
(5.777) (2.533) (7.406) (1.352)
H*DME 9.310 -1.655 -4.176 1.415
(5.790) (2.906) (6.441) (1.999)
P2*DME -3.230 -14.504 -0.989 -0.572
(4.528) (9.218) (3.948) (2.107)
T*H*P2 -1.425 0.196 -0.040 -0.894
(1.207) (1.371) (1.389) (0.608)
T*H*DME -5.305 1.722 26.174∗∗ -4.403∗∗
(7.508) (3.678) (12.209) (2.198)
T*P2*DME -5.741 17.491∗ 5.478 -2.041
(6.274) (9.913) (5.856) (3.175)
H*P2*DME 4.861 16.816∗ -6.132 3.344
(4.999) (9.353) (6.690) (2.991)
T*H*P2*DME 3.295 -19.413∗ 4.794 -1.537
(7.969) (10.371) (8.843) (4.462)
Mean Emo Task 1 0.167 0.025 0.349 -0.587
(1.066) (0.999) (2.043) (0.500)
Trait Anger -0.065 -0.020 0.250∗∗ -0.005
(0.043) (0.041) (0.106) (0.028)
Anger Control -0.040 0.050 0.094 0.022
(0.047) (0.038) (0.077) (0.025)
Anger In -0.041 -0.037 -0.072 -0.002
(0.061) (0.046) (0.089) (0.027)
Anger Out -0.088 0.080 -0.112 -0.051
(0.079) (0.062) (0.136) (0.032)
Time 1st correct -0.008∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.020) (0.000)
Female 0.419 -0.229 -1.070 -0.214
(0.431) (0.371) (0.759) (0.243)
No Math -0.594 -0.605 0.054 0.007
(0.462) (0.422) (0.794) (0.355)
Semester 0.024 0.042∗∗∗ 0.124 0.094∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.013) (0.087) (0.034)
(Intercept) 17.987∗∗∗ 1.928 11.013∗∗∗ 2.539∗∗∗
(2.376) (2.096) (3.616) (0.951)
# observations 324 292 284 330
# clusters 162 146 142 175
R2 0.846 0.757 0.395 0.455
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.3 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
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Table 2.C.4: Effect of Happy on Productivity
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated 0.857 -0.031 0.806 0.673∗∗∗
(0.662) (0.288) (0.831) (0.258)
Hightype 7.128∗∗∗ 2.715∗∗∗ 9.591∗∗∗ 2.710∗∗∗
(1.076) (0.430) (1.015) (0.289)
Part 2 0.714 12.636∗∗∗ 1.913∗∗∗ 1.515∗∗∗
(0.574) (1.022) (0.630) (0.288)
Diff Mean Emo 5.692 4.472∗∗ -7.092 -1.170
(4.109) (2.003) (5.450) (1.062)
T*H 0.484 -0.030 -0.710 -0.205
(1.290) (0.445) (1.614) (0.382)
T*P2 0.275 0.235 -0.298 0.256
(0.754) (1.290) (0.801) (0.465)
H*P2 -16.176∗∗∗ -13.091∗∗∗ -3.369∗∗∗ -1.000∗∗
(0.952) (1.071) (1.095) (0.407)
T*DME 7.554 -4.345 3.618 4.034
(7.699) (2.811) (8.869) (3.757)
H*DME -11.211 -8.995 -1.108 0.441
(10.512) (7.331) (13.441) (2.365)
P2*DME -0.045 -0.152 -4.582 -4.955∗∗∗
(4.839) (6.863) (4.548) (1.402)
T*H*P2 -1.596 -0.112 -0.336 -0.616
(1.207) (1.387) (1.362) (0.625)
T*H*DME 5.281 11.866 1.855 -7.611
(13.636) (8.093) (15.598) (4.803)
T*P2*DME -2.275 -3.716 7.577 -0.955
(10.201) (8.758) (7.407) (5.265)
H*P2*DME 5.720 4.485 -36.188 3.773
(8.292) (8.669) (22.607) (2.406)
T*H*P2*DME -11.067 3.458 34.829 3.729
(13.728) (10.471) (24.480) (6.070)
Mean Emo Task 1 13.776 -2.865 -12.529∗∗∗ -4.751
(8.574) (3.871) (4.078) (3.438)
Trait Anger -0.082∗ 0.004 0.212∗∗ -0.021
(0.042) (0.043) (0.100) (0.029)
Anger Control -0.020 0.051 0.107 0.025
(0.044) (0.038) (0.077) (0.025)
Anger In -0.028 -0.032 -0.077 0.009
(0.055) (0.048) (0.090) (0.028)
Anger Out -0.080 0.049 -0.048 -0.024
(0.083) (0.059) (0.134) (0.033)
Time 1st correct -0.008∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.047∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.019) (0.000)
Female 0.259 -0.265 -1.298 -0.221
(0.464) (0.361) (0.800) (0.235)
No Math -0.356 -0.753∗ 0.079 -0.041
(0.488) (0.401) (0.844) (0.363)
Semester 0.028 0.047∗∗∗ 0.103 0.097∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.013) (0.093) (0.035)
(Intercept) 17.484∗∗∗ 1.952 11.014∗∗∗ 1.958∗∗
(2.215) (2.001) (3.804) (0.948)
# observations 324 292 284 330
# clusters 162 146 142 175
R2 0.845 0.749 0.400 0.462
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.3 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
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Table 2.C.5: Effect of Sad on Productivity
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated 0.598 0.130 0.526 0.531∗∗
(0.701) (0.295) (0.838) (0.246)
Hightype 6.996∗∗∗ 2.827∗∗∗ 9.403∗∗∗ 2.595∗∗∗
(0.928) (0.459) (1.000) (0.289)
Part 2 0.685 12.615∗∗∗ 1.808∗∗∗ 1.448∗∗∗
(0.583) (1.022) (0.597) (0.302)
Diff Mean Emo -0.605 0.155 11.571∗∗∗ 1.068
(1.385) (1.049) (3.626) (0.650)
T*H 0.819 -0.204 -0.967 -0.124
(1.085) (0.502) (1.523) (0.394)
T*P2 0.283 0.159 -0.231 0.400
(0.773) (1.293) (0.773) (0.455)
H*P2 -16.128∗∗∗ -13.039∗∗∗ -3.311∗∗∗ -0.928∗∗
(0.935) (1.079) (1.114) (0.423)
T*DME -0.057 -1.987 -4.619 -1.781
(3.924) (1.910) (6.096) (1.623)
H*DME 9.309 -0.345 -8.839∗ -1.006
(9.572) (3.097) (5.122) (1.019)
P2*DME 1.069 0.840 -10.609∗∗ 0.831
(3.152) (10.089) (4.573) (1.304)
T*H*P2 -1.674 0.087 -0.508 -0.734
(1.200) (1.394) (1.360) (0.614)
T*H*DME -8.004 2.511 -5.053 2.158
(10.891) (4.243) (8.389) (1.958)
T*P2*DME 0.495 -6.854 10.338∗ -1.585
(4.581) (11.107) (5.345) (2.911)
H*P2*DME -7.744 -0.320 6.500 -0.512
(8.387) (10.272) (6.038) (1.545)
T*H*P2*DME 7.093 3.004 -11.549 1.260
(9.257) (11.670) (7.128) (3.359)
Mean Emo Task 1 2.551 -3.026∗ 0.906 0.191
(4.268) (1.586) (4.031) (0.748)
Trait Anger -0.059 -0.018 0.191∗ -0.006
(0.047) (0.039) (0.099) (0.029)
Anger Control -0.030 0.045 0.074 0.031
(0.048) (0.034) (0.081) (0.025)
Anger In -0.021 -0.045 -0.040 -0.003
(0.056) (0.045) (0.094) (0.028)
Anger Out -0.088 0.057 -0.089 -0.041
(0.083) (0.061) (0.150) (0.031)
Time 1st correct -0.008∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.017) (0.000)
Female 0.555 -0.135 -1.225 -0.177
(0.421) (0.354) (0.768) (0.239)
No Math -0.477 -0.842∗∗ -0.041 0.039
(0.530) (0.381) (0.785) (0.377)
Semester 0.032 0.039∗∗∗ 0.095 0.096∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.013) (0.091) (0.035)
(Intercept) 17.175∗∗∗ 2.631 12.631∗∗∗ 1.954∗∗
(2.122) (1.838) (3.631) (0.928)
# observations 324 292 284 330
# clusters 162 146 142 175
R2 0.846 0.751 0.399 0.445
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.3 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
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Table 2.C.6: Effect of Surprised on Productivity
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated 0.690 0.019 0.511 0.609∗∗
(0.677) (0.281) (0.807) (0.237)
Hightype 7.336∗∗∗ 2.742∗∗∗ 9.440∗∗∗ 2.598∗∗∗
(1.155) (0.418) (0.986) (0.289)
Part 2 0.703 12.714∗∗∗ 1.709∗∗∗ 1.428∗∗∗
(0.579) (0.998) (0.642) (0.303)
Diff Mean Emo 4.591 -0.816 -3.618 0.203
(3.119) (0.727) (3.165) (0.593)
T*H 0.193 0.061 -0.910 -0.142
(1.399) (0.452) (1.466) (0.383)
T*P2 0.125 0.279 -0.165 0.425
(0.765) (1.264) (0.832) (0.443)
H*P2 -16.214∗∗∗ -13.140∗∗∗ -3.201∗∗∗ -0.895∗∗
(1.035) (1.049) (1.127) (0.418)
T*DME -5.888∗ -0.371 4.230 -0.453
(3.519) (1.152) (3.838) (1.043)
H*DME -10.760∗∗ 1.543 -0.237 -0.247
(5.377) (1.149) (3.882) (1.023)
P2*DME -0.843 1.474 5.846∗ 0.414
(2.948) (4.168) (3.128) (1.343)
T*H*P2 -1.463 -0.144 -0.382 -0.752
(1.271) (1.362) (1.389) (0.596)
T*H*DME 11.919∗∗ -1.065 -3.927 0.627
(5.797) (1.638) (6.315) (1.480)
T*P2*DME 4.005 1.822 -6.251∗ 0.938
(3.246) (5.282) (3.504) (1.844)
H*P2*DME 2.445 -2.492 -0.287 -0.555
(4.242) (4.259) (4.074) (1.733)
T*H*P2*DME -5.794 1.050 3.689 0.177
(5.167) (5.493) (5.416) (2.391)
Mean Emo Task 1 -0.054 -0.109 -1.868 0.477
(0.658) (0.682) (1.539) (0.360)
Trait Anger -0.073∗ -0.018 0.150 -0.006
(0.044) (0.039) (0.099) (0.028)
Anger Control -0.002 0.050 0.079 0.027
(0.046) (0.036) (0.075) (0.024)
Anger In -0.077 -0.038 -0.024 0.003
(0.068) (0.047) (0.091) (0.026)
Anger Out -0.046 0.070 -0.007 -0.044
(0.069) (0.062) (0.138) (0.033)
Time 1st correct -0.009∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.019) (0.000)
Female 0.666∗ -0.187 -0.694 -0.264
(0.401) (0.364) (0.780) (0.261)
No Math -0.622 -0.680 0.203 0.047
(0.510) (0.431) (0.845) (0.387)
Semester 0.043 0.044∗∗∗ 0.122 0.093∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.014) (0.100) (0.035)
(Intercept) 17.364∗∗∗ 2.147 12.605∗∗∗ 1.865∗
(2.240) (1.997) (3.637) (0.979)
# observations 324 292 284 330
# clusters 162 146 142 175
R2 0.846 0.750 0.388 0.447
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.3 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
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Table 2.C.7: Effect of Scared on Productivity
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated 0.784 0.098 0.907 0.547∗∗
(0.710) (0.289) (0.791) (0.267)
Hightype 7.014∗∗∗ 2.881∗∗∗ 9.720∗∗∗ 2.600∗∗∗
(1.050) (0.440) (1.044) (0.312)
Part 2 0.675 12.246∗∗∗ 2.077∗∗∗ 1.508∗∗∗
(0.585) (0.850) (0.603) (0.316)
Diff Mean Emo 0.995 0.412 2.519 1.320
(6.727) (1.741) (3.965) (2.072)
T*H 0.667 -0.118 -1.086 -0.145
(1.293) (0.484) (1.506) (0.406)
T*P2 0.258 0.634 -0.538 0.373
(0.795) (1.153) (0.779) (0.447)
H*P2 -16.091∗∗∗ -12.691∗∗∗ -3.555∗∗∗ -0.985∗∗
(0.926) (0.908) (1.132) (0.442)
T*DME 0.029 1.167 15.320∗∗∗ -2.155
(6.897) (2.913) (5.827) (2.600)
H*DME 2.102 2.066 -1.333 -2.798
(7.595) (3.314) (7.032) (4.297)
P2*DME -1.570 15.995 -11.586 3.805
(4.112) (11.089) (8.761) (4.379)
T*H*P2 -1.687 -0.459 -0.035 -0.728
(1.202) (1.258) (1.388) (0.615)
T*H*DME -7.306 -3.768 -29.027∗∗∗ 2.927
(8.692) (3.974) (8.571) (6.948)
T*P2*DME 0.185 -22.976 7.823 0.461
(4.401) (14.722) (11.313) (4.987)
H*P2*DME 6.030 -13.430 4.942 -2.759
(6.185) (11.485) (10.920) (6.221)
T*H*P2*DME -4.559 16.546 -1.559 2.731
(8.308) (15.348) (13.429) (8.391)
Mean Emo Task 1 -1.366 -1.368 4.487∗ -0.759
(1.960) (1.829) (2.432) (0.878)
Trait Anger -0.071 -0.011 0.209∗∗ -0.004
(0.047) (0.038) (0.097) (0.028)
Anger Control -0.028 0.055 0.117 0.026
(0.047) (0.040) (0.079) (0.025)
Anger In -0.028 -0.029 -0.062 -0.001
(0.062) (0.044) (0.092) (0.028)
Anger Out -0.079 0.070 -0.049 -0.055
(0.085) (0.060) (0.136) (0.034)
Time 1st correct -0.008∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.048∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.019) (0.000)
Female 0.374 -0.178 -1.248 -0.183
(0.434) (0.382) (0.783) (0.241)
No Math -0.517 -0.558 0.317 0.033
(0.539) (0.398) (0.887) (0.377)
Semester 0.039 0.037∗∗∗ 0.093 0.094∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.014) (0.088) (0.035)
(Intercept) 17.572∗∗∗ 1.629 10.218∗∗∗ 2.300∗∗
(2.328) (2.020) (3.852) (0.938)
# observations 324 292 284 330
# clusters 162 146 142 175
R2 0.843 0.765 0.388 0.447
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.3 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
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Table 2.C.8: Effect of Disgusted on Productivity
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated 0.768 0.016 0.658 0.597∗∗
(0.701) (0.284) (0.805) (0.253)
Hightype 7.081∗∗∗ 2.722∗∗∗ 9.442∗∗∗ 2.655∗∗∗
(1.040) (0.407) (1.012) (0.286)
Part 2 0.732 12.670∗∗∗ 1.893∗∗∗ 1.480∗∗∗
(0.573) (0.985) (0.627) (0.293)
Diff Mean Emo -1.512 -2.231 45.560 0.686
(5.557) (2.572) (29.147) (1.171)
T*H 0.664 0.017 -0.863 -0.212
(1.287) (0.444) (1.526) (0.388)
T*P2 0.439 0.163 -0.373 0.392
(0.766) (1.284) (0.799) (0.442)
H*P2 -16.148∗∗∗ -13.160∗∗∗ -3.521∗∗∗ -0.946∗∗
(0.913) (1.035) (1.141) (0.409)
T*DME -0.665 1.714 2.107 -0.460
(17.510) (3.446) (47.328) (3.572)
H*DME -6.035 1.244 -24.155 -1.798
(8.522) (2.810) (31.369) (4.043)
P2*DME 1.929 -19.503∗ -36.753 -3.818∗∗
(3.887) (10.824) (24.631) (1.504)
T*H*P2 -1.870 0.083 -0.043 -0.742
(1.180) (1.383) (1.392) (0.599)
T*H*DME 5.239 -0.644 -23.393 0.577
(18.786) (10.655) (50.441) (5.601)
T*P2*DME -18.916∗ 22.855∗ 58.452 4.304
(10.386) (11.689) (38.983) (5.448)
H*P2*DME 10.662 24.755∗∗ 49.286∗ -0.843
(7.223) (10.851) (25.908) (4.972)
T*H*P2*DME 7.406 -29.274 -68.271∗ -0.306
(12.197) (22.502) (39.851) (7.682)
Mean Emo Task 1 -5.437∗ -0.724 -9.492∗∗ 0.697
(2.810) (6.312) (4.542) (1.674)
Trait Anger -0.073 -0.028 0.189∗ -0.013
(0.045) (0.042) (0.100) (0.029)
Anger Control -0.020 0.050 0.105 0.022
(0.047) (0.035) (0.082) (0.026)
Anger In -0.038 -0.028 -0.048 0.001
(0.062) (0.045) (0.093) (0.027)
Anger Out -0.069 0.069 -0.008 -0.054
(0.085) (0.062) (0.136) (0.033)
Time 1st correct -0.008∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.018) (0.000)
Female 0.342 -0.146 -1.050 -0.222
(0.441) (0.370) (0.774) (0.242)
No Math -0.320 -0.525 0.250 0.037
(0.557) (0.414) (0.847) (0.368)
Semester 0.048 0.046∗∗∗ 0.103 0.091∗∗
(0.054) (0.012) (0.090) (0.037)
(Intercept) 17.302∗∗∗ 2.160 10.982∗∗∗ 2.455∗∗
(2.319) (1.914) (3.976) (1.038)
# observations 324 292 284 330
# clusters 162 146 142 175
R2 0.845 0.752 0.398 0.446
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.3 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
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Table 2.C.9: Effect of Arousal on Productivity
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated 0.921 0.053 0.604 0.557∗∗
(0.681) (0.287) (0.924) (0.237)
Hightype 7.024∗∗∗ 2.609∗∗∗ 9.321∗∗∗ 2.708∗∗∗
(0.887) (0.428) (1.103) (0.317)
Part 2 0.674 12.466∗∗∗ 1.928∗∗ 1.407∗∗∗
(0.566) (0.919) (0.748) (0.312)
Diff Mean Emo -1.350 -3.615 6.370 -1.400
(5.507) (2.378) (8.603) (1.748)
T*H 0.504 0.071 -0.579 -0.212
(1.119) (0.460) (1.681) (0.407)
T*P2 0.086 0.939 -0.357 0.458
(0.766) (1.287) (0.895) (0.446)
H*P2 -16.056∗∗∗ -12.971∗∗∗ -3.459∗∗∗ -0.800
(0.885) (0.971) (1.202) (0.504)
T*DME 14.736 2.015 -7.392 2.749
(10.400) (3.030) (12.203) (2.203)
H*DME 1.012 0.991 4.984 1.678
(9.597) (3.257) (15.473) (4.272)
P2*DME 7.319 -18.726∗ -0.563 -1.553
(6.800) (10.380) (8.929) (2.927)
T*H*P2 -1.555 -0.660 -0.124 -0.890
(1.163) (1.398) (1.444) (0.662)
T*H*DME -10.675 1.088 0.925 -4.026
(13.435) (4.161) (21.923) (5.032)
T*P2*DME -24.865∗∗ 34.169∗∗ 1.202 2.821
(11.562) (13.771) (10.381) (4.659)
H*P2*DME -6.831 17.000 8.149 3.844
(9.512) (11.089) (17.123) (6.948)
T*H*P2*DME 23.312 -33.014∗∗ 1.955 -4.127
(14.586) (14.568) (24.198) (8.313)
Mean Emo Task 1 1.015 -0.245 6.811 4.123∗
(3.294) (3.656) (10.591) (2.456)
Trait Anger -0.060 0.002 0.185∗ -0.006
(0.046) (0.037) (0.101) (0.029)
Anger Control -0.020 0.053 0.100 0.023
(0.049) (0.036) (0.079) (0.026)
Anger In -0.031 -0.050 -0.047 -0.001
(0.058) (0.050) (0.090) (0.027)
Anger Out -0.086 0.072 -0.075 -0.052
(0.089) (0.062) (0.133) (0.035)
Time 1st correct -0.008∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.019) (0.000)
Female 0.357 -0.093 -1.017 -0.204
(0.474) (0.368) (0.789) (0.241)
No Math -0.467 -0.776∗ 0.379 -0.004
(0.505) (0.419) (0.853) (0.334)
Semester 0.047 0.042∗∗∗ 0.075 0.088∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.013) (0.094) (0.033)
(Intercept) 16.908∗∗∗ 1.898 9.969∗∗ 1.206
(2.320) (2.059) (4.299) (1.208)
# observations 324 292 284 330
# clusters 162 146 142 175
R2 0.845 0.764 0.382 0.450
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.3 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
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Table 2.C.10: Effect of Valence on Productivity (ALL)
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated 0.686 0.008 0.237 0.574∗∗
(0.681) (0.293) (0.809) (0.245)
High Type 7.085∗∗∗ 2.694∗∗∗ 9.366∗∗∗ 2.600∗∗∗
(0.982) (0.464) (0.971) (0.281)
Part 2 0.716 12.758∗∗∗ 1.898∗∗∗ 1.457∗∗∗
(0.569) (0.984) (0.616) (0.300)
Diff Mean Emotion -0.956 0.178 -0.203 -0.310
(1.203) (0.595) (1.709) (0.329)
Treated*High Type 0.666 0.033 -0.463 -0.151
(1.142) (0.476) (1.482) (0.382)
Treated*Part 2 0.290 0.119 -0.169 0.415
(0.752) (1.239) (0.784) (0.435)
High Type*Part 2 -16.126∗∗∗ -13.256∗∗∗ -3.407∗∗∗ -0.941∗∗
(0.924) (1.042) (1.117) (0.419)
Part 2*Diff Mean Emotion 0.245 1.171 3.607∗∗ -0.329
(1.223) (1.661) (1.474) (0.589)
Treated*High Type*Part 2 -1.724 0.104 -0.554 -0.743
(1.168) (1.334) (1.374) (0.601)
Mean Emotion Task 1 -0.308 -0.173 -5.007∗∗ -0.072
(1.688) (1.282) (2.034) (0.479)
Trait Anger -0.056 -0.020 0.175∗ -0.007
(0.050) (0.039) (0.091) (0.027)
Anger Control -0.023 0.047 0.069 0.024
(0.051) (0.035) (0.074) (0.024)
Anger In -0.030 -0.031 -0.039 0.001
(0.057) (0.048) (0.089) (0.027)
Anger Out -0.085 0.076 -0.088 -0.049
(0.096) (0.057) (0.130) (0.030)
Time 1st correct -0.008∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.042∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.018) (0.000)
Female 0.426 -0.185 -0.869 -0.199
(0.417) (0.369) (0.724) (0.236)
No Math -0.512 -0.705∗ -0.200 0.013
(0.549) (0.393) (0.879) (0.368)
Semester 0.050 0.044∗∗∗ 0.082 0.095∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.013) (0.085) (0.035)
(Intercept) 17.010∗∗∗ 2.096 11.494∗∗∗ 2.204∗∗
(2.295) (1.890) (3.597) (0.897)
# observations 324 292 284 330
# clusters 162 146 142 175
R2 0.844 0.749 0.398 0.441
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.4 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
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Table 2.C.11: Effect of Angry on Productivity (ALL)
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated 0.523 0.077 0.780 0.616∗∗
(0.691) (0.308) (0.802) (0.249)
High Type 7.111∗∗∗ 2.797∗∗∗ 9.313∗∗∗ 2.664∗∗∗
(1.034) (0.462) (0.975) (0.282)
Part 2 0.702 12.724∗∗∗ 1.899∗∗∗ 1.412∗∗∗
(0.569) (0.986) (0.628) (0.304)
Diff Mean Emotion 3.671∗∗∗ -0.184 -2.300 -0.706
(1.327) (0.558) (3.679) (0.882)
Treated*High Type 0.758 -0.118 -0.842 -0.207
(1.255) (0.511) (1.467) (0.382)
Treated*Part 2 0.331 0.147 -0.320 0.469
(0.767) (1.255) (0.791) (0.447)
High Type*Part 2 -16.120∗∗∗ -13.210∗∗∗ -3.488∗∗∗ -0.892∗∗
(0.909) (1.043) (1.117) (0.413)
Part 2*Diff Mean Emotion -0.731 -3.052∗ -5.241 -1.118
(2.005) (1.705) (3.429) (1.899)
Treated*High Type*Part 2 -1.765 0.039 -0.091 -0.790
(1.157) (1.353) (1.371) (0.595)
Mean Emotion Task 1 -0.725 0.973 5.049∗ 0.186
(1.001) (1.450) (2.739) (0.491)
Trait Anger -0.057 -0.023 0.185∗ -0.004
(0.046) (0.039) (0.096) (0.028)
Anger Control -0.014 0.040 0.071 0.023
(0.045) (0.037) (0.071) (0.024)
Anger In -0.040 -0.022 -0.045 -0.001
(0.060) (0.050) (0.088) (0.027)
Anger Out -0.082 0.078 -0.049 -0.054
(0.081) (0.057) (0.126) (0.033)
Time 1st correct -0.008∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.016) (0.000)
Female 0.355 -0.192 -0.628 -0.193
(0.442) (0.364) (0.736) (0.244)
No Math -0.452 -0.673∗ -0.020 -0.034
(0.500) (0.398) (0.821) (0.386)
Semester 0.055 0.041∗∗∗ 0.091 0.090∗∗
(0.056) (0.014) (0.088) (0.035)
(Intercept) 17.171∗∗∗ 2.050 11.806∗∗∗ 2.233∗∗
(2.192) (1.900) (3.524) (0.899)
# observations 324 292 284 330
# clusters 162 146 142 175
R2 0.844 0.752 0.391 0.441
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.4 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
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Table 2.C.12: Effect of Neutral on Productivity (ALL)
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated 0.742 0.022 0.959 0.590∗∗
(0.679) (0.287) (0.820) (0.237)
High Type 7.066∗∗∗ 2.741∗∗∗ 9.650∗∗∗ 2.620∗∗∗
(1.012) (0.419) (1.029) (0.289)
Part 2 0.718 12.641∗∗∗ 1.929∗∗∗ 1.433∗∗∗
(0.565) (0.992) (0.619) (0.299)
Diff Mean Emotion -1.293 0.763 -0.875 -0.149
(1.960) (0.771) (2.994) (0.557)
Treated*High Type 0.695 0.035 -1.180 -0.166
(1.249) (0.454) (1.564) (0.377)
Treated*Part 2 0.229 0.255 -0.347 0.435
(0.757) (1.248) (0.804) (0.437)
High Type*Part 2 -16.173∗∗∗ -13.087∗∗∗ -3.457∗∗∗ -0.906∗∗
(0.916) (1.041) (1.128) (0.415)
Part 2*Diff Mean Emotion -1.373 -0.218 -0.445 -0.164
(1.955) (2.188) (2.248) (1.220)
Treated*High Type*Part 2 -1.609 -0.064 -0.180 -0.777
(1.190) (1.342) (1.388) (0.593)
Mean Emotion Task 1 0.254 -0.260 -0.079 -0.733
(1.023) (0.949) (1.989) (0.481)
Trait Anger -0.061 -0.021 0.197∗ -0.004
(0.044) (0.039) (0.102) (0.028)
Anger Control -0.027 0.048 0.082 0.027
(0.045) (0.035) (0.075) (0.024)
Anger In -0.023 -0.036 -0.048 -0.000
(0.061) (0.045) (0.089) (0.026)
Anger Out -0.097 0.075 -0.048 -0.050
(0.080) (0.061) (0.138) (0.033)
Time 1st correct -0.008∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.050∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.020) (0.000)
Female 0.389 -0.198 -1.003 -0.211
(0.443) (0.360) (0.755) (0.238)
No Math -0.524 -0.687∗ 0.132 -0.003
(0.492) (0.384) (0.869) (0.367)
Semester 0.038 0.044∗∗∗ 0.093 0.094∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.012) (0.091) (0.035)
(Intercept) 17.303∗∗∗ 2.247 11.538∗∗∗ 2.305∗∗
(2.330) (1.905) (3.669) (0.901)
# observations 324 292 284 330
# clusters 162 146 142 175
R2 0.844 0.748 0.369 0.442
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.4 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
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Table 2.C.13: Effect of Happy on Productivity (ALL)
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated 0.828 0.016 0.777 0.585∗∗
(0.679) (0.278) (0.787) (0.247)
High Type 7.132∗∗∗ 2.750∗∗∗ 9.541∗∗∗ 2.683∗∗∗
(1.082) (0.428) (1.001) (0.286)
Part 2 0.720 12.655∗∗∗ 1.920∗∗∗ 1.471∗∗∗
(0.569) (0.993) (0.619) (0.289)
Diff Mean Emotion 2.950 1.328 -4.317 -1.240
(3.886) (1.666) (3.079) (0.938)
Treated*High Type 0.563 -0.069 -0.559 -0.170
(1.278) (0.439) (1.576) (0.376)
Treated*Part 2 0.282 0.238 -0.407 0.361
(0.754) (1.256) (0.790) (0.434)
High Type*Part 2 -16.131∗∗∗ -13.104∗∗∗ -3.444∗∗∗ -0.972∗∗
(0.941) (1.043) (1.110) (0.408)
Part 2*Diff Mean Emotion 0.523 0.892 -3.380 -2.220∗
(3.337) (2.683) (4.949) (1.264)
Treated*High Type*Part 2 -1.721 -0.057 -0.049 -0.630
(1.177) (1.355) (1.385) (0.602)
Mean Emotion Task 1 15.767∗ -4.450 -13.313∗∗∗ -5.160
(8.520) (3.221) (4.455) (3.495)
Trait Anger -0.065 -0.007 0.220∗∗ -0.015
(0.044) (0.042) (0.098) (0.028)
Anger Control -0.014 0.044 0.098 0.021
(0.043) (0.036) (0.076) (0.024)
Anger In -0.043 -0.036 -0.068 0.006
(0.056) (0.046) (0.089) (0.027)
Anger Out -0.078 0.058 -0.070 -0.036
(0.083) (0.060) (0.131) (0.030)
Time 1st correct -0.008∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.047∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.018) (0.000)
Female 0.316 -0.194 -1.249 -0.231
(0.417) (0.359) (0.790) (0.236)
No Math -0.536 -0.768∗ 0.080 -0.071
(0.492) (0.396) (0.826) (0.356)
Semester 0.038 0.044∗∗∗ 0.090 0.093∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.012) (0.091) (0.035)
(Intercept) 17.082∗∗∗ 2.292 11.261∗∗∗ 2.229∗∗
(2.127) (1.895) (3.711) (0.890)
# observations 324 292 284 330
# clusters 162 146 142 175
R2 0.844 0.748 0.382 0.454
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.4 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
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Table 2.C.14: Effect of Sad on Productivity (ALL)
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated 0.594 0.119 0.804 0.579∗∗
(0.692) (0.293) (0.832) (0.240)
High Type 6.991∗∗∗ 2.752∗∗∗ 9.620∗∗∗ 2.613∗∗∗
(0.896) (0.429) (1.018) (0.284)
Part 2 0.721 12.681∗∗∗ 1.885∗∗∗ 1.440∗∗∗
(0.572) (0.981) (0.598) (0.298)
Diff Mean Emotion 1.504 -0.251 1.461 0.347
(1.451) (1.053) (2.692) (0.437)
Treated*High Type 0.887 -0.135 -0.974 -0.165
(1.027) (0.471) (1.520) (0.384)
Treated*Part 2 0.284 0.179 -0.154 0.436
(0.752) (1.250) (0.782) (0.437)
High Type*Part 2 -16.127∗∗∗ -13.196∗∗∗ -3.385∗∗∗ -0.917∗∗
(0.933) (1.034) (1.106) (0.417)
Part 2*Diff Mean Emotion -0.248 -1.496 -4.465∗∗ 0.263
(1.811) (3.230) (1.804) (0.716)
Treated*High Type*Part 2 -1.725 0.118 -0.557 -0.773
(1.168) (1.367) (1.366) (0.594)
Mean Emotion Task 1 2.812 -2.312 0.257 0.209
(4.661) (1.741) (3.911) (0.781)
Trait Anger -0.057 -0.016 0.194∗∗ -0.005
(0.048) (0.038) (0.098) (0.028)
Anger Control -0.021 0.051 0.087 0.025
(0.046) (0.034) (0.078) (0.024)
Anger In -0.029 -0.044 -0.046 -0.001
(0.059) (0.045) (0.091) (0.027)
Anger Out -0.087 0.065 -0.045 -0.050
(0.084) (0.060) (0.145) (0.031)
Time 1st correct -0.008∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.020) (0.000)
Female 0.477 -0.141 -0.988 -0.205
(0.415) (0.354) (0.763) (0.233)
No Math -0.475 -0.717∗ 0.125 0.002
(0.519) (0.384) (0.839) (0.374)
Semester 0.027 0.044∗∗∗ 0.094 0.093∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.012) (0.090) (0.035)
(Intercept) 17.006∗∗∗ 2.312 11.296∗∗∗ 2.206∗∗
(2.029) (1.888) (3.743) (0.895)
# observations 324 292 284 330
# clusters 162 146 142 175
R2 0.844 0.749 0.376 0.439
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.4 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
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Table 2.C.15: Effect of Surprised on Productivity (ALL)
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated 0.828 0.020 0.409 0.607∗∗
(0.710) (0.276) (0.794) (0.239)
High Type 7.225∗∗∗ 2.741∗∗∗ 9.505∗∗∗ 2.603∗∗∗
(1.098) (0.416) (0.985) (0.285)
Part 2 0.729 12.692∗∗∗ 1.823∗∗∗ 1.424∗∗∗
(0.571) (0.983) (0.607) (0.299)
Diff Mean Emotion -1.846 -0.341 -2.238 0.023
(1.474) (0.397) (1.646) (0.383)
Treated*High Type 0.329 0.030 -0.800 -0.147
(1.390) (0.445) (1.495) (0.379)
Treated*Part 2 0.210 0.230 -0.088 0.438
(0.759) (1.251) (0.812) (0.434)
High Type*Part 2 -16.207∗∗∗ -13.162∗∗∗ -3.332∗∗∗ -0.890∗∗
(0.957) (1.039) (1.107) (0.413)
Part 2*Diff Mean Emotion 1.118 1.042 2.982∗∗ 0.653
(1.356) (1.328) (1.322) (0.581)
Treated*High Type*Part 2 -1.551 -0.033 -0.441 -0.771
(1.242) (1.351) (1.374) (0.591)
Mean Emotion Task 1 -0.239 -0.133 -1.862 0.456
(0.713) (0.650) (1.524) (0.339)
Trait Anger -0.061 -0.018 0.150 -0.006
(0.045) (0.039) (0.098) (0.027)
Anger Control -0.017 0.050 0.079 0.026
(0.046) (0.035) (0.073) (0.024)
Anger In -0.046 -0.037 -0.026 0.003
(0.066) (0.046) (0.088) (0.026)
Anger Out -0.057 0.071 -0.012 -0.046
(0.072) (0.060) (0.134) (0.033)
Time 1st correct -0.008∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.019) (0.000)
Female 0.399 -0.192 -0.690 -0.258
(0.418) (0.359) (0.775) (0.249)
No Math -0.454 -0.671∗ 0.219 0.017
(0.514) (0.399) (0.849) (0.371)
Semester 0.050 0.044∗∗∗ 0.118 0.094∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.013) (0.097) (0.035)
(Intercept) 17.024∗∗∗ 2.147 12.627∗∗∗ 1.908∗∗
(2.294) (1.959) (3.593) (0.959)
# observations 324 292 284 330
# clusters 162 146 142 175
R2 0.845 0.748 0.381 0.444
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.4 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
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Table 2.C.16: Effect of Scared on Productivity (ALL)
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated 0.731 0.047 0.812 0.593∗∗
(0.679) (0.283) (0.791) (0.247)
High Type 7.041∗∗∗ 2.857∗∗∗ 9.685∗∗∗ 2.643∗∗∗
(1.025) (0.437) (1.026) (0.288)
Part 2 0.706 12.512∗∗∗ 1.999∗∗∗ 1.499∗∗∗
(0.569) (0.901) (0.599) (0.299)
Diff Mean Emotion 0.474 1.003 0.165 -0.339
(1.872) (1.077) (3.976) (1.240)
Treated*High Type 0.645 -0.031 -1.118 -0.180
(1.251) (0.469) (1.500) (0.388)
Treated*Part 2 0.278 0.384 -0.469 0.378
(0.757) (1.196) (0.770) (0.432)
High Type*Part 2 -16.110∗∗∗ -12.954∗∗∗ -3.491∗∗∗ -0.998∗∗
(0.912) (0.954) (1.108) (0.427)
Part 2*Diff Mean Emotion -0.334 5.182 -4.953 3.358∗
(1.668) (5.252) (3.680) (1.839)
Treated*High Type*Part 2 -1.716 -0.164 -0.057 -0.708
(1.171) (1.312) (1.355) (0.596)
Mean Emotion Task 1 -1.461 -0.624 4.014 -1.227∗
(1.959) (1.831) (2.889) (0.725)
Trait Anger -0.062 -0.017 0.189∗∗ -0.007
(0.045) (0.039) (0.095) (0.028)
Anger Control -0.019 0.037 0.101 0.024
(0.046) (0.037) (0.078) (0.024)
Anger In -0.037 -0.028 -0.051 0.001
(0.060) (0.046) (0.091) (0.027)
Anger Out -0.071 0.064 -0.027 -0.055
(0.084) (0.059) (0.132) (0.034)
Time 1st correct -0.008∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.048∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.019) (0.000)
Female 0.380 -0.219 -1.129 -0.186
(0.435) (0.367) (0.755) (0.237)
No Math -0.469 -0.723∗ -0.064 0.039
(0.529) (0.405) (0.860) (0.373)
Semester 0.047 0.044∗∗∗ 0.088 0.096∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.012) (0.090) (0.035)
(Intercept) 17.110∗∗∗ 2.256 10.741∗∗∗ 2.321∗∗
(2.275) (1.878) (3.855) (0.923)
# observations 324 292 284 330
# clusters 162 146 142 175
R2 0.844 0.752 0.374 0.444
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.4 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
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Table 2.C.17: Effect of Disgusted on Productivity (ALL)
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated 0.784 0.046 0.754 0.581∗∗
(0.688) (0.276) (0.799) (0.250)
High Type 7.110∗∗∗ 2.732∗∗∗ 9.504∗∗∗ 2.642∗∗∗
(1.029) (0.409) (0.999) (0.281)
Part 2 0.729 12.639∗∗∗ 1.953∗∗∗ 1.467∗∗∗
(0.567) (0.990) (0.623) (0.291)
Diff Mean Emotion -2.905 -0.939 14.964∗ -0.099
(2.177) (0.899) (8.681) (1.067)
Treated*High Type 0.645 -0.003 -0.874 -0.194
(1.265) (0.439) (1.514) (0.382)
Treated*Part 2 0.256 0.249 -0.404 0.382
(0.753) (1.257) (0.791) (0.433)
High Type*Part 2 -16.135∗∗∗ -13.087∗∗∗ -3.550∗∗∗ -0.933∗∗
(0.908) (1.034) (1.125) (0.407)
Part 2*Diff Mean Emotion 1.587 0.043 8.571 -2.683∗∗
(1.974) (3.209) (5.512) (1.196)
Treated*High Type*Part 2 -1.699 -0.052 -0.024 -0.739
(1.167) (1.354) (1.382) (0.591)
Mean Emotion Task 1 -5.421∗ -2.266 -7.441∗ 0.717
(2.866) (5.952) (4.110) (1.553)
Trait Anger -0.069 -0.016 0.176∗ -0.012
(0.044) (0.039) (0.096) (0.028)
Anger Control -0.020 0.051 0.070 0.023
(0.046) (0.035) (0.078) (0.024)
Anger In -0.035 -0.036 -0.041 -0.001
(0.061) (0.045) (0.092) (0.027)
Anger Out -0.069 0.075 -0.042 -0.052
(0.084) (0.061) (0.135) (0.033)
Time 1st correct -0.008∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.019) (0.000)
Female 0.371 -0.182 -1.190 -0.210
(0.430) (0.360) (0.780) (0.237)
No Math -0.362 -0.662∗ 0.236 0.028
(0.532) (0.395) (0.835) (0.365)
Semester 0.044 0.045∗∗∗ 0.095 0.091∗∗
(0.056) (0.012) (0.089) (0.036)
(Intercept) 17.136∗∗∗ 1.977 12.311∗∗∗ 2.404∗∗∗
(2.226) (1.884) (3.772) (0.926)
# observations 324 292 284 330
# clusters 162 146 142 175
R2 0.844 0.747 0.386 0.443
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.4 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
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Table 2.C.18: Effect of Arousal on Productivity (ALL)
Start Easy Start Hard Start Easy Wage Start Hard Wage
Treated 0.791 0.012 0.648 0.533∗∗
(0.687) (0.274) (0.822) (0.239)
High Type 7.186∗∗∗ 2.680∗∗∗ 9.399∗∗∗ 2.646∗∗∗
(0.995) (0.417) (1.020) (0.284)
Part 2 0.719 12.623∗∗∗ 2.053∗∗∗ 1.446∗∗∗
(0.570) (0.974) (0.658) (0.303)
Diff Mean Emotion 2.832 -1.314 5.314 -0.107
(3.030) (1.056) (4.619) (1.146)
Treated*High Type 0.475 0.140 -0.676 -0.176
(1.221) (0.456) (1.581) (0.384)
Treated*Part 2 0.269 0.208 -0.465 0.420
(0.757) (1.282) (0.816) (0.435)
High Type*Part 2 -16.164∗∗∗ -13.128∗∗∗ -3.584∗∗∗ -0.895∗∗
(0.912) (1.054) (1.142) (0.415)
Part 2*Diff Mean Emotion -0.857 -1.722 4.657 0.568
(3.557) (3.464) (5.596) (1.752)
Treated*High Type*Part 2 -1.674 0.120 -0.040 -0.792
(1.169) (1.485) (1.392) (0.599)
Mean Emotion Task 1 1.277 0.410 5.983 3.958∗
(3.313) (3.658) (9.452) (2.371)
Trait Anger -0.063 -0.012 0.200∗∗ -0.002
(0.044) (0.039) (0.100) (0.028)
Anger Control -0.018 0.054 0.101 0.027
(0.047) (0.036) (0.078) (0.025)
Anger In -0.034 -0.037 -0.058 -0.003
(0.059) (0.045) (0.089) (0.027)
Anger Out -0.081 0.080 -0.076 -0.053
(0.083) (0.062) (0.136) (0.035)
Time 1st correct -0.008∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.047∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.019) (0.000)
Female 0.425 -0.188 -1.089 -0.219
(0.436) (0.361) (0.771) (0.246)
No Math -0.505 -0.698∗ 0.326 0.005
(0.513) (0.391) (0.850) (0.353)
Semester 0.046 0.044∗∗∗ 0.089 0.091∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.013) (0.092) (0.035)
(Intercept) 16.782∗∗∗ 1.677 9.843∗∗ 1.123
(2.246) (2.134) (4.182) (1.192)
# observations 324 292 284 330
# clusters 162 146 142 175
R2 0.844 0.748 0.376 0.444
Notes. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Random effect regression based on Equation
2.4 with robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses.
104 Chapter 2. Emotions and Effort
2.D Instructions & Consent Form
The following two pages contain translations of the instruction the participants
receive27 and a consent form for being filmed.
27The instructions given here were used in the “Start Easy” variant. In all other variants,
only the description of task or piece rate changed according to the treatment.
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Welcome to our experiment!
During the experiment, you are not allowed to use electronic devices or
communicate with other participants. Please only use the software and functions
intended to be used in the experiment. Please do not talk to other participants.
In case you have a question, please raise your hand. We will come to your desk
and answer your question in private. Please do not ask questions aloud. In case
your question is relevant for all participants, we will repeat it and answer it for
all participants. Should you violate those rules, we have to exclude you from
the experiment and payment.
If your read these instructions carefully you can earn a significant amount
of money. The payoff you receive during the experiment will be payed out in
cash at the end of the experiment. Everything in this experiment will happen
exactly as described in this instruction. In addition, we assure you that your
data is only used in anonymized form.
Basic structure of the experiment
The experiment consists of two parts. In part 1, you will solve tasks. For
every correctly solved task you will receive 0.50 EUR. This part lasts 30 minutes
and your performance in this part of the experiment can affect part 2 of the
experiment. Afterwards, you will receive additional information on part 2 of
the experiment.
In part 2 of the experiment you can again earn money by solving tasks. This
part as well takes 30 minutes. Your payoff is fixed after the second part of the
experiment. Subsequently, we ask you to fill out a questionnaire.
Task in Part 1
The task in part 1 of the experiment consists of typing a string of numbers
and letters without error. This string will be displayed on the computer screen.
You will receive money for every correctly typed strings. In the 30 min you have
to your disposal, you can solve as many task as you wish. The time you have
left is displayed on screen. For every correct task, you will receive 0.50 EUR.
Payoff
You will earn money in this experiment that will be payed in cash at the
end of the experiment. In addition to what you earn during the experiment,
you will receive 5 EUR for showing up.
Thank you for participating!
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Consent form
You are about to sign up for an experiment which will be recorded using
video cameras. The footage will be handled strictly confidential and is used for
purely scientific reason. No personal information or data will be given to third
parties. In our research, we stringently follow all guidelines of the states data
protection law. All employees that handle your data in scientific analysis are
bound to follow §8 Berliner Datenschutsgesetz (BerlDSG).
All work places have webcams installed to record actions and reactions of
participants. The video data that will collected during the experiment will be
saved on a secured storing device at the WZB and deleted after 10 years. The
duration and way of storage are in accordance with recommendation 7 of the
DFG for self-monitoring of science.
I have read and understood the consent form and agree that the my video







“Solidarity means a willingness to help people in need who are sim-
ilar to oneself but victims of outside influences such as unforeseen
illness, natural catastrophes, etc.” (Selten & Ockenfels, 1998, p. 518)
Widespread solidarity is a form of insurance without explicit contracts. All
types of insurance, however, suffer from the problems of moral hazard and ad-
verse selection. Therefore, whenever possible, insurance differentiates between
customers from different risk classes and rules out payment in cases of gross
negligence. Higher risk groups receive less coverage or have to pay higher fees.
It is then a natural question to ask whether voluntary solidarity also differenti-
ates between risk groups and/or people who consciously decide to take higher
or lower risks. Indeed, when assuming that a relevant part of the population
cares, in contrast to insurance companies, not only about monetary payoffs, we
may very well expect that there is a difference between solidarity and insurance.
∗This paper is coauthored with Friedel Bolle and has previously been published in the
Review of Behavioral Economics (see Bolle & Costard, 2015, DOI: 10.1561/105.00000036).
We would like to thank Hannah Liepmann, Annemarie Conrath, Alexandra Jung, Agnieszka
Gryska and in particular Claudia Vogel for helping to conduct the experiment. Yves Breit-
moser provided helpful advice with respect to statistical questions and Erik Sørensen was of
great help when providing access to the Cappelen et al. (2013) data and advising in com-
putational questions. We are also thankful for comments by seminar participants in Berlin
and Bergen. Remaining shortcomings are, of course, ours. An earlier version of this paper
circulated under the title “Who shows solidarity with the irresponsible?”. Jano Costard’s
bachelor thesis included a description of the experiment as well as descriptive statistics of the
results.
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One the one hand, it can be imagined that those who are ready to take
high risks may be held partly responsible if they fail – and therefore receive
smaller solidarity transfers – just as would be the case with insurance contracts.
This view was confirmed experimentally where it was shown that “there was
(...) broad support for the view that individuals should be held responsible for
their choice (...).”(Cappelen et al., 2010, p. 440). Note that this responsibility
argument requires discrimination of beneficiaries but no differentiation based on
characteristics of the benefactors.
On the other hand, it is possible that behavior depends on characteristics
of the benefactor as well. It could, for example, be the case that benefactors
who also have taken risks (and succeeded) may be more sympathetic to fellow
risk-takers. It is easier for them to put themselves in their shoes than in those
of “scaredy-cats”, and vice versa. Another potential reason for differentiation
is the existence of a behavioral norm or fairness standard which requires treat-
ing people who took the same action differently from people who took different
actions (see e.g. Cappelen et al., 2013). A third potential reason for differ-
ently behaving benefactors is the formation of group-identity feelings with the
consequence of in-group favoritism which is supported by a vast amount of lit-
erature that started with Tajfel (1970). The consequences of these last three
lines of reasoning for observed behavior are very similar and it is therefore hard
to distinguish between them2. As our experiment is not aimed at differentiating
between these motives, we will not take a stand on which one offers the more
plausible explanation. Outside our experiment differentiating between a fairness
standard based on actions taken and pure discrimination based on belonging to
a group is certainly important, though. While most people see differences in
outcomes as just which are due to different actions, this is not true if discrimi-
nation is based on group belonging with the definition of that group not being
related to the action in question.
Holding people responsible for their decisions (as suggested by the first argu-
ment) and favoritism of individuals with the same risk-choice suggest different
types of solidarity behavior between people who decide to take a higher risk
and those who do not. According to the responsibility argument, people in
need would receive less help if they chose the more risky option. For individ-
uals who favor others who made the same choice, however, lucky risk takers
show more support for needy risk takers than towards needy risk averters and
vice versa. It is the aim of this paper to experimentally evaluated whether fa-
voritism of people with similar choice of risk can overcome the motive to hold
2In fact, they might be intertwined in the sense that in-group favoritism based on shared
identity works partly because it is easier to put oneself in the shoes of others to which one
feels closer connected.
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people responsible for their decision.
In the next section, closely related literature is presented that gives support
to the different potential underlying motives. The experiment is described in
Section 3.3 and in Section 3.4, following Cappelen et al. (2013), a theory of
redistribution is suggested. This order is preferable because hypotheses can be
formulated with respect to the specific experimental conditions. In Section 3.5
the experimental results are presented and a variant of the Cappelen et al.
(2013) social utility function is estimated. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Literature
The question, what people should be held responsible for, has been answered
in various ways. These normative answers consist (among others) of the two
extremes “libertarianism” and “strict egalitarianism”, i.e. the notion that indi-
viduals should be held responsible for all factors that lead to some distribution
of resources or that they should not be held responsible at all. In between,
there is a wide variety of other concepts according to which individuals should
be held responsible for some factors that determine distribution of income but
not for others. One prominent concept that relates to the fair distribution of
income is equality of opportunity. In the sense of Rawls (1971), equality of fair
opportunity implies that individuals should not only formally have the same op-
portunities but that individuals of same ability should have the same effective
chance. The libertarian Robert Nozick stresses in particular this role of ability
and other endowments. He illustrates this principle by asking the question of
whether it would be just to reallocate resources and spend those on cosmetic
surgery and intelligence training for men that were less lucky in the natural
lottery than himself with the aim of leveling the playing field in competing for
women (Nozick, 1974, p. 237). Nozick concludes that these inequalities in op-
portunity do not justify reallocating resources. Roemer (1995) adds a for our
experiment important differentiation between brute bad luck and option bad
luck in the determination of outcomes. Brute bad luck refers to bad outcomes
that result from unavoidable risks, whereas option bad luck occurs in case risk
was consciously taken but resulted in a bad outcome. This differentiation leads
him to conclude that ”Even under an equal-opportunity view, we might well
decide that society should insure its citizens against brute bad luck, but not
against option bad luck. Under an equal outcome view, society must insure
its citizens against bad luck of any kind, whether the consequence of voluntary
gambles or not.”(Roemer, 1995).
In a dictator game with preceding production phase, Cappelen et al. (2010)
investigate empirically what factors individuals are held responsible for, i.e.
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whether participants are compensated for a lack of equal opportunity or even
for an unequal distribution of outcomes in case equality of opportunity existed.
Although their participants can be classified according to various normative
concepts, about 80 percent of the subjects support the view that individuals
should be held responsible for factors that are within their control (the choice
of working time in their experiment) whereas more than 70 percent of their
experimental subjects reject the view that people should be held responsible
for factors that are beyond their control (the price per unit produced as chosen
by the experimenter). This result is also related to the accountability principle
as stated in Konow (2000) which requires that someones entitlement varies in
direct proportion to his or her discretionary variables.
However, it was not analyzed whether fairness views were conditional on
characteristics of the benefactor. This question received attention in a different
study (Cappelen et al., 2013) where experimental subjects first had a binary
choice of either a risk-less income or a lottery ticket. Then the ex-post aggregate
income of two randomly matched subjects could be redistributed by one of them
or by a spectator without own interests. Cappelen et al. (2013) find that the
redistribution behavior of their subjects can be explained by subjects having
one of three types of social utility functions which are based on either one of
two unconditional fairness norms or on a conditional fairness norm. The latter
implies discrimination of in-group and out-group subjects where the risk-takers
form one group and the risk-averters the other and was estimated to be present
with about 30 percent of the subjects. We will come back to their model in
Section 3.4.
Another mechanism which would lead to outcomes being conditional on char-
acteristics of the benefactor is the formation of group-identity, a mechanism first
studied in the experiments by Tajfel (1970). In these experiments, he shows that
even for groups defined by rather meaningless categories there is significant in-
group/out-group discrimination. Tajfel (1970) thereby spurred a huge literature
in the social sciences on social identity (a good overview is given in Chen and Li
(2009)). Within economics, the role of identity was introduced by Akerlof and
Kranton (2000) which incorporated identity into an economic model (see also
Akerlof & Kranton, 2002, 2005). Following their seminal work, identity received
increased attention in the experimental economics literature and has been stud-
ied in the lab as well as in the field. In the lab, Chen and Li (2009) show that
there is more altruism and less envy as well as more positive reciprocity and less
negative reciprocity between members of the same group than between members
of different groups and Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini (2007) find that the
effect of group-membership depends positively on salience of the group. Out-
side the lab, Bernhard, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2006) found in-group favoritism
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with regard to norm enforcement in a natural field experiment in Papua New
Guinea. What is more, in-group/out-group differentiation can not only robustly
be observed in experiments, it can also be derived from various social categories
as Ben-Ner, McCall, Stephane, and Wang (2009) show. Their experimental
subjects not only give more in dictator games if the receiver has similar reli-
gious or political views, favors the same sports team or looks alike, they are also
more eager to share an office with people similar in those categories or to com-
mute with them. Notably, only one category did not cause in-group/out-group
differentiation and this was gender.
An interesting question is why there is discrimination at all? Here, differ-
ent evolutionary arguments can be made. According to Eaton, Eswaran, and
Oxoby (2011), the origin of group formation and in-group favoritism is the
hunter-gatherer society in which mankind for 99 percent of its existence has
lived. In a group where food is at least partly shared, risk averse individuals’
utility maximization requires supporting other risk averse individuals who help
to create a steady stream of food. On the other hand, if someone is risk-prone
he also would like his group to be risk-prone. In addition, Costard et al. (2013)
show in an evolutionary setting that a strategy purely differentiating between
in-group and out-group typically outperforms other more elaborate strategies
that build on reputation and indirect reciprocity.
Solidarity, as studied in experimental economics, has mainly been investi-
gated in the framework of the Dictator game and the Solidarity game. In the
original Solidarity game of Selten and Ockenfels (1998), the three members of a
group are each endowed with DM 10 with 2/3 probability and with DM 0 with
1/3 probability. In the cases where there are winners (who got DM 10) and
losers (who got nothing), the winner(s) can give an arbitrary amount of their
endowment to the loser(s). Further experiments investigate the impact of the
strategy method (Büchner, Coricelli, & Greiner, 2007), the influence of culture
(Ockenfels & Weimann, 1999), or are concerned with the identification of dif-
ferent types of behavior (Bolle, Breitmoser, Heimel, & Vogel, 2012). We may
regard the Dictator game as a two-person solidarity game although it is rarely
discussed under this aspect. It seems that in the dictator game roles (rich and
poor) are “given” while in the Solidarity game the random mechanism which
determines incomes (winners and losers) is emphasized. In addition, for some
purposes the three-player design has advantages. If the only winner of a group
determines his transfer to two different losers then we can directly see whether
and how they are treated differently.
An experiment closely related to ours is Trhal and Radermacher (2009),
where the original Solidarity game (Solidarity Treatment ST) was conducted as
well as another experiment, called Risk Treatment RT. In RT each of the three
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participants of a solidarity group had to choose between lottery C: “EUR 10
with certainty” or lottery R: “EUR 0 with Prob=0.5, EUR 10 with Prob=0.4,
EUR 60 with Prob=0.1”. In RT, only winners of EUR 10 were allowed to
compensate losers. All subjects played both treatments, half of them in the
order (ST, RT) and half of them in the opposite order, each time in a newly
formed group. Trhal and Radermacher (2009) find that subjects in RT who
voluntarily took risks and failed, receive less compensation than subjects in ST
who could not avoid risks.
Our paper will analyze giving behavior in a variant of the Solidarity game
which is close to the Trhal and Radermacher (2009) design. However we will
show that solidarity transfers are heavily influenced by in-group favoritism with
group-membership defined by the level of risk-taking.
3.3 The Experiment
The experiment took place at the European-University Viadrina in Frankfurt
(Oder), Germany, in 2009. 237 students from the faculties Economics and Busi-
ness, Law, and Cultural Sciences participated in the experiment. They were
invited via email and distributed into two sessions. Each session lasted about
one hour. The subjects were placed in a large lecture hall as in written exams,
i.e. with so much space between them that the six experimenters could pre-
vent communication. All participants received a show-up fee of EUR 3. The
experiment started by giving the participants an instruction form and a first
decision form3. The instruction form explained that an initial income would be
created by one of two random processes (lottery tickets) between which they
could choose.
• Random process A: With probability 2/3 you “win” EUR 10, with prob-
ability 1/3 you receive EUR 0.
• Random process B : With probability 1/3 you “win” EUR 20, with prob-
ability 2/3 you receive EUR 0.
They were further told that they would be matched with two other (anony-
mous) people in the room to form a group of three. If their group consisted only
of “winners” or “losers” (who receive EUR 0) then the game would end. If it
consisted of winners and losers, the winner(s) could transfer arbitrary parts of
their prize to the loser(s). After receiving this general information the subjects
chose A or B (knowing that there would be a phase with voluntary transfers).
They also reported their expectation about the frequencies of A- and B-choices.
3The English translation of both forms are reproduced in the Appendix.
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Then they had to draw an A- or B-envelope (according to their decision) from
a box4. By opening the envelope they found a new decision form.
First they were informed that they were winners or losers. We deviated
from a complete strategy method because the winners had to decide among five
further conditions (see below). An additional fundamental conditionality (“if
you are a winner”) might have restricted the perceived relevance of decisions too
much. Because of the same reason we restricted the number of conditions to five.
In the following, those who have chosen A and lost (received EUR 0) are called
A-losers, the others A-winners. B-losers and B-winners are defined respectively.
The winners decided on their transfers for the different possible loser structures
and reported their expectations about the other winner’s transfers in the one-
loser case. Losers decided on transfers “they would have made if they had been
winners”. The losers’ hypothetical decisions served mainly to keep them busy
and not to disturb the winners and are not subject of the following analysis.
The participants were told that all payments would be carried out according to
the random matching of participants. They could collect their money later from
a person not involved in the experiment (after reporting their subject number
and their self-chosen pseudonym).
We required the winners to make conditional transfer decisions in five dif-
ferent situations:
1. How much would you give to a single A-loser? 5
2. How much would you give to a single B-loser?
3. How much would you give to each of two A-losers?
4. How much would you give to each of two B-losers?
5. If there is one A-loser and one B-loser, how much would you give to the
A-loser and how much to the B-loser?
In the end they were asked to write a short comment on their decisions. In
addition, they reported their gender, faculty, semester and age.
3.4 Solidarity Theory
In this section, we introduce an extension of the two-person social utility func-
tion of Cappelen et al. (2013) to apply it to our experimental setting. In partic-
ular, we make it a three-person social utility function to match our three-player
4Within about five minutes, six experimenters with boxes distributed the new decision
forms.
5I.e. there are two winners and one loser. In order not to introduce further ramifications
of the hypothetical decisions, the type of the other winner is not revealed.
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experimental set-up. For the case where there is one winner and two losers, it
takes the following form
Vi = γyi − βi
(yj − F k(j))2
2X
− βi
(yh − F k(h))2
2X
(3.1)
Here, yi is the income which winner i reserves for himself and yj and yh are the
losers’ incomes, i.e. i’s transfers to them. X = yi + yj + yh is i’s prize (EUR 10
or EUR 20). γ is a general and βi is an individual positive parameter and F
k(j)
is a reference income for player j. In Cappelen et al. (2013), three different
versions of this reference income are considered. First, winner i could have a
preference for equalizing income ex post, unconditional of actions taken. She
would therefore exhibit an ex post standard “equality of income” which corre-
sponds to a reference income FEP = X/3 for both players j and h. Second,
winner i might prefer not to equalize income ex post, again unconditional of
actions taken. As all players start out in the same situation, this can be called
a preference for “equality of opportunity” and implies a reference income of
FEA = 0 for both players j and h6. Third, reference income might depend on
actions taken, so being conditional on past actions, in contrast to the previous
two cases. Cappelen et al. (2013) analyze the case where the ex post standard
“equality of income” is applied to individuals who took the same action as the
benefactor and the ex ante standard “equality of opportunity” is applied to
individuals who took a different action. Cappelen et al. (2013) prefer to inter-
pret these different reference incomes as “ex ante”, “ex post” and “conditional”
fairness standards. However, as discussed above, alternative interpretations are
possible, especially with regard to the “conditional” fairness standard.
The social utility function yields the following forecast for the transfer of












and correspondingly for loser h. Based on our three-player setting and the
different reference incomes, F k(j)/X = 0 or F k(j)/X = 1/3. This implies
(ceteris paribus) independence of transfers from the question whether the winner
is an A-winner or B-winner. Transfers would, however, differ for losers of a
6To be precise, the reference income FEA = 0 is consistent with equality of opportunity
in the sense of Rawls (1971) only if it can be taken for granted that all experimental subjects
have the same ability in evaluating the lotteries between which the chose. If it would be the
case that all participants have the same basic intellectual ability but some have no training
in mathematics and therefore no understanding of what probabilities are there would be
no equality of fair opportunity as Rawls (1971) sees it. For Nozick (1974), in contrast, no
entitlement would follow even for those subjects that lack knowledge of probabilities. As all
our experimental subjects are university students which received mathematical training at
least in high school, we assume that equality of opportunity is satisfied also in the sense of
Rawls (1971).
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certain type if the winner’s preferences reveal in-group favoritism.
If there is one loser j and a second winner h, then the utility function becomes







whereas Ei[yj ] = ti + Ei[th] is the loser’s expected income after i’s transfer ti
and h’s expected transfer Ei[th]. The “ex post” standard is defined as F
EP =
Ei[X]/3 with




with αi being i’s expected share of A-players















While the expected shares of A-players are nearly the same in our experiment
(66 percent and 63 percent for A- and B-winners) the expectations Ei[th] are
rather different. A-winners expect on average transfers of EUR 1.82 and B-
winners EUR 2.85. The difference is highly significant (p < 10−7 in a two-sided




= 0.0997 for A-winners and 0.0992 for B-winners. (3.6)
Therefore we expect the same result as in the two-loser case, however in terms
of shares of Ei[X]: If there are no further differences between A- and B-players
then they should transfer the same shares of Ei[X].
Using the elicited expectations of the other winner’s transfer in this way
implies the hypothesis that, first, subjects develop expectations, and then they
decide on transfers based on these expectations. Alternatively, we can assume
that the two winners determine the Bayesian equilibrium of the public good
game they play. (In the case of interdependent utility functions the income of the
loser is a public good or bad for the winners.) We could not use the expectations
as in (3.4) if the winners determine the transfers first (with whatever rationale)
and then determine their expectations on the basis of their own transfers. For
a discussion of this problem see Selten and Ockenfels (1998).
Based on the theoretical framework, we expect the experimental results to
feature the following characteristics. First, in-group transfers as share of the
prize won will be independent of the winners’ lottery choice. Second, out-group
transfers as share of the prize will be independent of the winners’ lottery choice.
7The conditional probability that the only other winner is an A-winner is (4αi/9)/(4αi/9+
(1 − αi)/9) = 4αi/(1 + 3αi).
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Third, in-group transfers will be higher than out-group transfers8.
3.5 Results
230 of the 237 participants delivered completely filled questionnaires. Among
these there were 60 percent female students. The faculties were represented
with 60 percent economics and business students, 15 percent law students and
26 percent cultural science students. It is remarkable that only 47 percent of
our subjects chose the less risky A and 53 percent the more risky B lottery. On
the first glance this seems to be an astonishingly high number of risk seekers.
In Cappelen et al. (2013), for example, 90 percent of the subjects preferred
a riskless income to a risky lottery with the same expectation value. Note,
however, that this difference is at least partly caused by the well-known certainty
effect (see also Cohen & Jaffray, 1988). Another reason for so many risk seekers
might be that they are somewhat insured by the expected solidarity transfers9.
It is also interesting to note that the average expectations of the frequencies of
B-choices are 35 percent which is less (p = 0.07 in a chi square test) than the
real choices of B but which is still large if one expects most people to be risk
averse.
We observe a gender effect with regard to the lottery choice. While 62% of
male participants chose the more risky lottery B this was only true for 47% of
female participants. In the end, we had 73 A-winners and 35 B-winners, which
are the basis of the following analysis. Only 5 of these 108 decision makers
(4 percent) did not collect their money. The average transfers of A-winners to
A-losers, EUR 1.27 in the one-loser case and EUR 1.13 in the two-loser case,
are close to those in treatment ST of Trhal and Radermacher (2009).
3.5.1 Aggregate Results
The average relative amounts which losers receive are presented in Table 3.1
and Table 3.2. In the one winner/two losers case the expected group income
Ei[X] is equal to the prize which the only winner receives. The simple result
is strong discrimination: In-group transfers are between 10.8 percent and 12.7
percent of the winner’s prize. Out-group transfers are between 7.0 percent
and 8.8 percent of the winner’s prize. The hypothesis of in-group/out-group
differentiation is therefore strongly supported (only for the comparison of in-
group and out-group transfers for B-players in the case of two winners measured
8In the case of two winners, these statements apply to the share of the expected prize won
by both winners.
9In a follow-up investigation by Lübbe and Bolle (2011), however, it is shown that moral
hazard does not play a significant role for the choice of B.
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Table 3.1: Relative transfers from winners to losers in the two winners case.




in % of prize in % of Ei[X] in % of prize in % of Ei[X]
A-player
12.7∗ 6.7∗ 7.2 3.8
73
(11.3) (5.9) (9.3) (4.9)
B-player
8.8 6.4 11.3∗ 8.3+
35
(11.4) (8.3) (11.8) (8.6)
∗(+) indicate that transfer is significantly larger than corresponding transfer to losers
of the other type (Wilcoxon matched pairs rank test with p < 0.01 (p = 0.06)).
Standard deviations in brackets.
Table 3.2: Relative transfers from winners to losers in the one winner case.
Transfers to receivers of type
Type
Losers of same type Losers of mixed types
N
A B A B
A-player
11.3∗ 6.8 12.4∗ 7.0
73
(9.1) (7.9) (9.9) (8.1)
B-player
7.1 9.6∗ 7.0 10.8∗
35
(7.7) (10.8) (8.1) (12.0)
∗ indicate that transfer is significantly larger than corresponding transfer to losers of
the other type (Wilcoxon matched pairs rank test with p < 0.01). Standard deviations
in brackets.
as shares of Ei[X] the level of significance is lower). Interestingly, although
there is a gender effect with regard to lottery choice, there is no gender effect
with regard to in-group/out-group differentiation, i.e. also female participants
transfered more to losers that chose the same lottery. Also the other hypotheses,
namely that in-group transfers and out-group transfers do not differ between
A-winners and B-winners, is supported as no statistical differences (p < 0.05)
can be found. These finding continue to hold when controlling for individual
attributes such as gender, field of study or age of the experimental subjects in
an OLS-regression. For details, we refer to Appendix 3.B.
3.5.2 Structural Modeling
Finally, we want to investigate the model of Section 3.4 and the question of
whether A- and B-players have different preferences beyond their risk attitudes
with a random utility approach (McFadden, 1973; McKelvey & Palfrey, 1995).
We concentrate on the one winner/two losers case because we want to avoid
the discussion mentioned in Section 3.4 about the nature of the expectation
formation in the two winners/one loser case.
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We add a random term εi to the utility function (3.1), i.e.
V ki (yj , yk) = γ(X − yy − yh)− βi
(yj − F k(j))2
2X
− βi
(yh − F k(h))2
2X
+ εi (3.7)
and assume that εi is i.i.d. extreme value. The individual choice probabilities
then have a logit form. Following Cappelen et al. (2013) we assume log βi to be
normally distributed with log βi ∼ N (µ, σ)10.
The winners’ transfers could not be more than half of their prize and only
8 of the 432 transfers were not a multiple of 50 Eurocent. Thus we choose
finite sets of possible transfers (in Euro) to one loser, namely T = TA =
{0, 0.5, 1.0, . . . , 5.0} for A-winners and T = TB = {0, 0.5, 1.0, . . . , 10.0} for B-
winners. The eight deviating values are set equal to the closest element of the
finite sets.
i’s decision under the three conditions yj = yh = τi→AA, yj = yh = τi→BB ,
and yj = τi→AB , yh = τi→BA lead to utilities V
k(AA), V k(BB) and V k(AB),
whereas τi→jh is the transfer of winner i to losers j and h. The expected
likelihood of these three decisions is
Lki = L
k
i (τi→AA, τi→BB , τi→AB , τi→BA, γ, µ, σ) =∫ ∞
0


















where F is the lognormal distribution. We assume the standard k = EA to
be present in the population with a share of λEA , standard EP with λEP and






1− λEA − λEP
)
LCEi (3.9)
In order to find out whether A- and B-players are different we estimate the
parameters (γ, µ, σ, λEA, λEP ) for A- and B-players separately and jointly (see
Table 3.3). The reduction of the log-likelihood score of 16.0 after adopting sep-
arate estimates surpasses the critical limit described by the BIC and the AIC
criteria. The improvement is also highly significant in a likelihood ratio test
(p = 4 · 10−5). The differences between A- and B-players are mainly the dif-
ferent shares with which the standards are distributed. While A-players have
more often (9.3 and 14 percentage points more) standards EP and CE, the stan-
dard EA is more frequent (23.3 percentage points more) among the B-players.
10γ can be assumed as the precision parameter of the logit equilibrium and βi/γ as the
parameter of the normalized utility function.
3.5. Results 119
We can interpret γ as the precision parameter of the logit choice probabilities;
dividing the utility function by γ delivers a normalized utility function whose
only parameter βi/γ is lognormal distributed with µ − log(γ) and σ. The dis-
tributions of βi/γ have the same µ − log(γ) value and the same σ for A- and
B-players but the B-players have a smaller γ which indicates a larger random
variance of behavior.
Table 3.3: Parameter estimates
γ µ µ− log γ σ λEA λEP λCE − logL
A-players
3.29 2.77 1.68 0.41 0.22 0.62 0.16 425.2
(0.17) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
B-players
1.34 1.99 1.70 0.19 0.46 0.51 0.04 274.1
(0.20) (0.15) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
A- and 2.30 2.43 1.42 0.35 0.26 0.61 0.13 434.0
B-players (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) +281.5
Parameter estimation for (3.8) and (3.9) with the utility function (3.7). Standard
errors in brackets. All coefficients are highly significant (p < 10−5 ) except σ for
B-players. λCE = 1− λEA − λEP .
We are not completely satisfied with this result, however. The small share of
players with a conditional (CE) standard cannot explain the in-group/out-group
discrimination identified by non-parametric tests, i.e. the model is misspecified.
We think that the EA fairness standard and the CE out-group standard need
not require strictly zero transfers. While the fairness standard EP (equality)
seems to be well rooted in society, we are skeptical with respect to a standard
of giving nothing (though actually many people give nothing), not even in cases
of “self-inflicted harm”11. Therefore we introduce, instead of zero standards,
variable standards fEAX (X =prize) and fCEX (for out-group players) in the
utility function (3.7).
The estimated parameters are reported in Table 3.4. The separate estimation
for A- and B-players again significantly improves the log-likelihood score with
respect to all criteria (p = 2·10−12 in the likelihood ratio test). The same is true
when we compare the scores of A-players and B-players with and without the
variable fairness standards. In the likelihood ratio test we get p < 10−9 in both
cases. In addition, the frequencies based on the model with variable fairness
standards and on the parameters in Table 3.4 are in good accordance with the
empirical frequencies of transfers (see Appendix 3.A). They might be further
improved by introducing prominence (integer number transfers). Because of
11Think of the biblical Parable of the Lost Son (Luke 15, 11-32).
120 Chapter 3. Solidarity, Responsibility & In-group Bias
Table 3.4: Parameter estimates with flexible standards fEA and fCE
γ µ µ − log γ σ fEA fCE λ
EA λEP λCE − logL
A-player
3.95 3.07 1.68 0.42 -0.77 0.22 0.21 0.27 0.52 403.6
(0.48) (0.14) (0.06) (1.85) (0.01) (0.05) (0.08)
B-player
0.91 1.52 1.61 0.61 -4.64 0.27 0.33 0.00 0.67 252.1
(0.22) (0.31) (0.16) (5.51) (0.04) (0.26) (0.39)
A- & 2.07 2.40 1.68 0.47 -0.68 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.53 417.3
B-player (0.26) (0.14) (0.06) (0.37) (0.02) (0.04) (0.08) +265.9
Introducing variable fairness standards FSEA = fEA and FS
EA = fCE (out-group
standard). Standard errors in brackets. All coefficients except fEA and, for B-players,
also λEA and λEP are highly significant (p < 0.01). λCE = 1− λEA− λEP .
the restricted number of B-winners, however, we did not want to extend the
number of parameters.
We find now – in accordance with the non-parametric tests – the majority of
players deciding conditionally, i.e. showing in-group/out-group discrimination.
They feel an obligation to help also the out-group losers, however with a mild
reduction of their standard of transfers to a quarter (0.22, 0.27) of their income
instead of a third as in the case of in-group losers. The share of players with an ex
post (equality) standard is estimated as 27 percent for A-winners and 0 percent
for B-winners, although in the latter case with a large standard deviation. This
is understandable because the conditional decision makers and those with an ex
post standard are, in particular in the case of B-winners, not very different.
Surprisingly there are negative fairness standards in the group with an ex
ante standard which make zero transfers almost certain12. The large standard
error is due to a very flat maximum with respect to variations of fEA. The log-
likelihood value for fEA = 0 is, however, 270.3 for B-players which is significantly
more than 252.1. Therefore the correct standard error is large but certainly
smaller than 3.59. The usage of bootstrapping for an alternative determination
of the standard errors is difficult because of the long computation times for the
determination of maximum likelihood estimations. Similar arguments apply in
the case of A-players (− logL = 406.1 for fEA = 0) and for the joint estimation
of A and B-players (− logL = 427.4+276.0 for fEA = 0). Our conclusion is not
that there is really such a norm of taking away large sums from losers (if this were
possible) but that people with negative fEA are strong unconditional supporters
of the idea that everybody who had had his chance should care for himself13.
12For A-winners with a fairness standard fEA = −0.77 we get prob(transfer = 0) > 0.99 in
the case of two losers of the same kind as well as in the case of one A- and one B-loser. For
B-winners with fEA = −3.80 the corresponding probabilities are even larger.
13The elder brother of the Lost Son is strictly opposed to his fathers forgiving and joyful
welcoming of the loser. He might be interpreted as having an EA-standard. His father, on the
other hand, indicates that he is discriminative (CE-standard), telling his elder son “ everything
I have is yours” (Luke 15, 31). The enthusiastic welcome, however, shows that the younger
son need not fear really severe discrimination.
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Such a standpoint could also be expressed by the norm fEA = 0 and a large
precision parameter for this group. Adopting this idea we might ask whether
also the conditional standard fCE which is not far from the equality standard
1/3 should be substituted by 1/3 (thus we have an EP standard) and whether
there are different precision parameters for all three cases. Estimating γEA and
γCE (in addition to γ) instead of fEA and fCE leads, however, to increased
negative log-likelihood scores (424.3 for A, 256.3 for B and 429.7 + 266.8 for
the joint estimation of A and B). Thus no uniform definition and interpretation
of parameters seems to be possible and we stick to the estimation in Table 3.4
where we interpret fCE as a different standard of giving and fEA only as a
substitute for a high precision parameter14. For the application of variable EA
standards to the data of Cappelen et al. (2013) see Appendix 3.C.
3.6 Conclusion
The main regularity in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 is that risk averters (A-players)
strongly favor risk averters and that risk seekers (B-players) weakly favor risk
seekers. This pattern is also found in a regression analysis (which can be found in
the appendix) which controls for the influence of gender and faculty. The result
is further supported by the estimation of social utility functions which reveals
that the majority of individuals favor others who have taken same risk-choice
over those who took a different action.
We find similarities and significant differences between A- and B-winners in
our analysis of behavior in the framework of a random utility approach. A-
and B-winners are rather similar with regard to transfers conditional on their
type. The players with EP standards are anyway assumed to be identical and
the seemingly large difference of fEA for A- and B-players makes almost no
difference in terms of behavior. Also players who use a conditional standard
are similar: In both groups the standard for in-group players is 1/3 of the prize
and for out-group players 1/4. The real difference is the frequency distribution
of standards. While A-players consist of 1/5 players with EA standards and
1/4 with EP, there are no B-players with EP standards and 1/3 with EA stan-
dards. In addition, with 1/2 of A-players but 2/3 of B-players being estimated
as having the conditional standard, there seems to be a correlation between
risk preferences and social preferences as our more risk averse subjects are more
often characterized as making transfers unconditional of lottery choice and are
less often characterized as having an ex ante standard that implies no transfers
to losers whatsoever. Also, the relatively large share of players with an uncondi-
14In a mixed approach with a precision parameter γEA and a fairness standard fCE we get,
in the case of B-players, γEA = 11 (std.err.= 6.4) and otherwise parameters as in Table 3.4.
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tional ex ante (equal opportunity) standard among B-players shows that many
people take high risks without expecting solidarity.
The different CE fairness standards and the different frequencies of fairness
standards in the population are the major differences to Cappelen et al. (2013),
which may be explained by the different nature of the redistribution in the
two papers: while Cappelen et al. (2013) investigate redistribution of aggregate
income (in real situations by taxes and social insurance schemes) our frame and
focus is the voluntary transfer of income from “winners” to “losers” (within the
family, among friends, and by private welfare).
Further support for a conditional standard comes from the participants’
comments. Naturally, A-winners accuse B-losers of “irresponsible” behavior. In
their free comments, 33 of 73 A-players did so15. Only one of the 35 B-players
expressed this opinion, though. Therefore, behavior seems to be denounced as
irresponsible only if it is riskier than one’s own. In addition, 9 (out of 35) B-
players explicitly remark, that B-losers should get more transfers because they
are more risk-loving (i.e. like themselves). This condensed report about the
free comments seems to indicate that in-group favoritism/out-group aversion is
differently strong between A- and B-players. A-players condemn the decision
of B-players more often and more fiercely than vice versa. Thus we may ask
whether there are more differences between B-players and A-players than those
which we have identified in our paper16.
We think that it is worthwhile to look for more differences in further stud-
ies. In a world beyond our simple model there may be more agreement about
the question when risk takers should be called irresponsible (risk loving car
drivers) or beneficial for the society (entrepreneurs with innovative products or
processes).
15They do not always use the term “irresponsible” but they express their opinion that the
B-players should not have chosen such high risk.
16Neither do A- and B-players differ significantly with respect to their share of women or
economists. In the follow-up study by Lübbe and Bolle (2011), however, differences according
to a personality test are found.
Appendix
3.A Predictions of the model
In the following Figures 3.A.1 to 3.A.8, transfers predicted by the model and the
estimated parameters of Table 3.4 (black) are compared with empirical transfers
(grey). As integer numbers i are more prominent, in the windows frequencies of
i+ 0.5 and i+ 1 are aggregated under i+ 1. In the case where sole winners were
confronted with one A-loser and one B-loser the transfers x and y are presented
as marginal distributions and not as distributions of (x, y) because then 73 (35)
data points would have to be distributed on a – at least – 11 × 11 (21 × 21)
matrix.
Figure 3.A.1: Frequencies of A-winners’ transfers to two A-losers
Notes. N = 73. Top right figure shows result for aggregation to integer values.
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Figure 3.A.2: Frequencies of A-winners’ transfers to two B-losers
Notes. N = 73. Top right figure shows result for aggregation to integer values.
Figure 3.A.3: Frequencies of A winners’ transfers to an A-loser (mixed losers)
Notes. N = 73. Top right figure shows result for aggregation to integer values.
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Figure 3.A.4: Frequencies of A winners’ transfers to a B-loser (mixed losers)
Notes. N = 73. Top right figure shows result for aggregation to integer values.
Figure 3.A.5: Frequencies of B-winners’ transfers to two A-losers
Notes. N = 35. Top right figure shows result for aggregation to integer values.
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Figure 3.A.6: Frequencies of B-winners’ transfers to two B-losers
Notes. N = 35. Top right figure shows result for aggregation to integer values.
Figure 3.A.7: Frequencies of B winners’ transfers to an A-loser (mixed losers)
Notes. N = 35. Top right figure shows result for aggregation to integer values.
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Figure 3.A.8: Frequencies of B winners’ transfers to a B-loser (mixed losers)
Notes. N = 35. Top right figure shows result for aggregation to integer values.
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Table 3.B.1: Regression analysis of absolute transfers
constant 1W 1Econ 1AB 1BA 1BB Adj. R
2
2 winners/ 1 loser
1.22 0.55 -0.57 -0.54 0.67 1.17 0.15
(0.000) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.000)
1 winner/
2 losers (same type)
1.15 0.39 -0.51 -0.45 0.45 0.96 0.15
(0.000) (0.03) (0.008) (0.03) (0.09) (0.000)
1 winner/
2 losers (diff. type)
1.26 0.34 -0.46 -0.53 0.34 1.06 0.12
(0.000) (0.08) (0.03) (0.02) (0.28) (0.000)
Regression analysis of absolute transfers from a winner to the only loser/to one of the
two losers. N = 216. p-values of a two-sided t-test in brackets .
3.B Regression analysis
We extend our analysis by controlling for influences of individual attributes in
a regression analysis with the dummy variables 1w = 1 for women, 1Econ = 1
for economics students, 1AB = 1 if the transfer is from an A-winner to a B-
loser, and 1BA and 1BB respectively. The first line of Table 3.B.1 shows the
results for the case where there is one loser. The value of the constant, 1.22,
is the average amount which a male, non-economist A-winner transfers to an
A-loser. The regressions show that, compared with the male non-economist,
females’ transfers were on average EUR 0.55 larger and the transfers by economic
students on average EUR 0.57 smaller. Also, the coefficient of the dummy 1AB
is negative and significant, showing that A-winners transfer less to B-losers than
to A-losers. When interpreting the coefficient of 1BA one has to keep in mind
that B-winners won double the amount of A-winners, so a coefficient of zero
would mean that B-winners transferred on average and in relative terms only
half as much to A-losers than A-winners did. Further, the coefficient of 1BB
being larger than coefficient of 1BA indicates that B-winners favor B-loser over
A-losers. This group effect is stable over all winner/loser cases. Therefore, the
regression analysis confirms all the results from Table 3.1 and Table 3.2.
3.C Variable norms in Cappelen et al. (2013)
We were not completely satisfied with the original version of Cappelen et al.
(2013) proposal about norms. We therefore allowed one of their norms to vary
and got thus a better fit and a consistent interpretation of our results. Is such
a variation advantageous also in the case of Cappelen et al. (2013) results?
In their experiments two subjects i and j decided independently about risk
taking or not. They got incomes yi and yj according to their decisions and
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Table 3.C.1: Fixed and variable norms in Cappelen et al. (2013)
λEA λEP ζ σ γ fEA fCE − logL
fixed fEA
and fCE
0.274 0.411 3.094 4.378 15.577 1 1 1200.6∗
(0.086) (0.091) (0.503) (0.655) (0.509)
variablefEA
and fCE
0.629 0.233 3.441 3.192 24.922 0.0665 1.003 1150.8
(0.079) (0.072) (0.424) (0.396) (2.019) (0.034) (0.017)
Note that the estimates in row 1 are taken from Table 4 in Cappelen et al. (2013) for
specification 1 and the case of stakeholders.
Remark: ∗ Due to different approximation methods for integration we compute 1201.8.
then subject i (or a referee, which is not analyzed here) had to distribute their
aggregate income X = yi + yj between them. i’s decision is assumed to be
influenced by one of three norms F k. k = EP designates the “ex post” norm of
an equal split of the aggregate income. k = EA designates the “ex ante” norm
which requires both to get the income yi and yj which they earned according
to their risk taking decision. k = CE designates a conditional norm where for
subjects who have decided as oneself (who have also decided to take a risk or
have also decided to take no risk) the EP norm applies and otherwise the EA
norm. If the norm k applies for i and if he decides to take xi for himself his
utility is
V ki (xi) = γxi − βi
(xi − F k(i))2
2X
+ εi
where γ and βi are parameters and εi is a random variable. The βi are assumed
to be log-normally distributed with parameters (ζ, σ). In our first estimation
we accepted all these assumptions. The only difference is that we have a three-
person game with a corresponding extension of the utility by an additional term
and that the utility function is expressed in terms of transfers xj to j.
The suggestion in our paper is that the “ex ante” standard may not be as
strict as Cappelen et al. (2013) require it to be, in particular if our co-player
earned yj = 0 (the only case with transfers in our experiment). We therefore
set FEA = fEAxi and F
CE = FEP for co-players who decided as i and fCExi
otherwise. The introduction of the two additional parameters fEA and fCE
improved the fit to the experimental data in Cappelen et al. (2013) considerably
(see Table 3.C.1).
Note that all norms are effective only for large enough βi. The large param-
eter γ guarantees complete egoism for a large share subjects who are assigned
to any of these norms. This makes the interpretation of the results and com-
parisons difficult.
We have shown that there is still unexploited information in the residuals
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of the model of Cappelen et al. (2013) and that a generalization of their util-
ity function is successful in exploiting this information. The question remains
whether these amendments are satisfactory or whether additional aspects should
enrich the original classification of social norms. In any case Cappelen et al.
(2013) utility function is a promising alternative to the often used altruism and
inequity aversion. Its applicability should be tested in further investigations.
3.D Instructions
The following pages contain translation of the instructions of the experiment as
well as the forms used to record participants’ decisions. Note that the decision
form for winning participants is differentiated between participants who chose
lottery A and participants who chose lottery B. For the experiment, the same
was true for losing participants. However, as the decision form for losers only
differed in whether they had an A or B in the top left corner of the first page,
here, only one version is reproduced.
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General Instructions & Decision Forms
For the following experiment, you can influence your initial endowment (in Euro)
by choosing between two random processes.
Random process A: With probability 2/3 you “win” Euro 10, with probability
1/3 you receive Euro 0.
Random process B: With probability 1/3 you “win” Euro 20, with probability
2/3 you receive Euro 0.
After choosing the initial endowment, groups of three are built by random choice
from the attendees. If a group consists only of winners or only of losers, the
game ends. If the group consists of one or two winners, each winner has the
possibility to give money to the loser(s). You will be informed on the chosen
alternative of the “loser”, but won’t get information on the choice of the second
winner in case there are two winners.
You receive the money that results from your decision. If you are a loser,
you receive, in addition to your initial endowment, the money the winner(s)
transfer to you. If you are a winner, you receive your initial endowment minus
the transfers to the loser(s).
You can collect your payoff in the time from 11.05. to 15.05.2009 in room
HG 242. Please remember your number and pseudonym!
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Number:
Pseudonym:
Which of the alternatives do you choose?
Random process A: With probability 2/3 you “win” Euro 10, with probability
1/3 you receive Euro 0.
Random process B: With probability 1/3 you “win” Euro 20, with probability
2/3 you receive Euro 0.




What do you think, how many of the attendees pick random process A. How
many pick random process B.
Random process A is chosen by % the attendees.





You arose from the random process as “winner” and you received an initial
endowment of Euro 10.
(a) What would you give if there are two winners in your group and you have
no information on the other winner?
Answer A: To a loser, who choose random process A,
I give , EUR.
Answer B: To a loser, who choose random process B,
I give , EUR.
What do you expect the other to transfer on average? (The best estimation
will be rewarded with 10 EUR, each)
Answer A: I expect , EUR on average for a loser,
who chose random process A.
Answer B: I expect , EUR on average for a loser,
who chose random process B.
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(b) What do you give if you are the only winner in your group?
Answer A: In case both losers choose random process A,
I give each of them , EUR.
Answer B: In case both losers choose random process B,
I give each of them , EUR.
Answer C: In case one loser choose random process A and the other loser choose
random process B,
I give the one with random process A , EUR








In case your transfers differed between loser who choose A and loser who choose





You arose from the random process as “winner” and you received an initial
endowment of Euro 20.
(a) What would you give if there are two winners in your group and you have
no information on the other winner?
Answer A: To a loser, who choose random process A,
I give , EUR.
Answer B: To a loser, who choose random process B,
I give , EUR.
What do you expect the other to transfer on average? (The best estimation
will be rewarded with 10 EUR, each)
Answer A: I expect , EUR on average for a loser,
who chose random process A.
Answer B: I expect , EUR on average for a loser,
who chose random process B.
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(b) What do you give if you are the only winner in your group?
Answer A: In case both losers choose random process A,
I give each of them , EUR.
Answer B: In case both losers choose random process B,
I give each of them , EUR.
Answer C: In case one loser choose random process A and the other loser choose
random process B,
I give the one with random process A , EUR








In case your transfers differed between loser who choose A and loser who choose





You arose from the random process as “loser” .
What do you think, how much do you get from the winner(s)?
Answer A: In case there are two winners, I receive altogether , EUR.
Answer B: In case there is just one winner, I receive , EUR.
In the following we would like to know how you would have decided in case
you would have been picked as a winner.
(a) What would you give if there are two winners in your group and you have
no information on the other winner?
Answer A: To a loser, who choose random process A,
I give , EUR.
Answer B: To a loser, who choose random process B,
I give , EUR.
What do you expect the other to transfer on average? (The best estimation
will be rewarded with 10 EUR, each)
Answer A: I expect , EUR on average for a loser,
who chose random process A.
Answer B: I expect , EUR on average for a loser,
who chose random process B.
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(b) What do you give if you are the only winner in your group?
Answer A: In case both losers choose random process A,
I give each of them , EUR.
Answer B: In case both losers choose random process B,
I give each of them , EUR.
Answer C: In case one loser choose random process A and the other loser choose
random process B,
I give the one with random process A , EUR








In case your transfers differed between loser who choose A and loser who choose
B, please comment on the reason.
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